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A long and extensive study of skillful human actions has convinced
me that our present conceptions of skills are not always adequate either
to the teaching of such skills or to a more general understanding of

their role in human life.

Most of the literature in this field might be

described as either overly mechanical or vaguely mystical:

the first

based on a conception of skills as a rigid mechanism of chained
physiological reflexes or as the manipulation of specific variables
leading eventually to the emission of the correct response, the second
on a conception of skills as a mysteriously ordained structure requiring
for its fulfillment only the proper psychic surrender.

My study of

skills and my various experiments in teaching have led me to believe

that these present conceptions are not only constricted but in many ways

essentially false, that therefore no manipulation or readjustment of
them can lead to a fruitful result, and that a more adequate conception
of skills can be achieved only through an understanding and

reformulation of the deeper philosophical foundation on which our

present conceptions are founded.

IV

V

This dissertation contains a description of the problem

(summarized above), a selective exploration of our present philosophical
foundation, a possible reformulation of that foundation, and within that

reformulation the suggestion of a more adequate conception of skills.
My philosophical exploration focuses on the Cartesian structures of

understanding which seem to dominate so much of modern thought, and the
exploration is similar to much of the work done by Hans Jonas and
Marjorie Grene.

My philosophical reformulation has been influenced by

the work of Merleau-Ponty

,

Erwin Straus, Helmuth Plessner, but most

particularly by Michael Polanyi.

Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge

suggests a conception of human abilities and a conception of reality

within which

I

find a solution both to the general inadequacies of our

present philosophical foundation and to the inadequacies of our present
conception of skills.
In all my work with skills, there have always been intimations of
a kind of coherence and meaning which I have never been able to

adequately understand or explain.

Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge

suggests to me that the structure of skills is analogous to any of the

structures— be they scientific or artistic— through which man

is able to

meaning
reach beyond himself, and that therefore these intimations of
or an artist may
and coherence are similar to those which a scientist
nature.
feel when his work achieves a true coherence with

It is toward

is working.
such a conception of skills that this dissertation
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INTRODUCTION
Intimations of Meaning in the
Practice of Physical Skills

This paper, along with the rest of my doctoral work, is directed

toward the exploration of a problem

physical skills.

I

have come across in my work with

The problem is not yet clearly defined; it is still

more of an intimation of something hidden and waiting to be discovered,
an intimation that in the development and practice of physical skills

there exists a kind of meaning and coherence that is not usually
recognized.
Let me give you an example, a story

was learning to fly sailplanes.

I

heard from a friend when

I

In the spring when storm systems sweep

up from the Mediterranean and cross Europe at high speeds, there exists,

at the front edge of the storm, a swiftly moving line of great power and

turbulence.

As the storm moves, warm air is sucked in at the base of

the advancing front; the air rises, cools and then rapidly sinks so that
a

powerful swirling cylinder, often with a diameter of more than two

miles, is formed at the leading edge.

If you happen to have a sailplane

at just the
and if you are lucky enough to be able to enter the storm
feet, a small area
right point, there can exist for you, at about 10,000

across Europe at somewhere
of rising air currents which are traveling

between 50 and 75 mph.
somewhat tricky.

be
The flight can be fun, but it can also

a couple
The area of rising air currents may be only

of hundred yards across.

Always

3

there
ust behind you, hour after hour,

2

exists a rather good size storm, with thunder and lightening,
at that

altitude usually some hail, and certainly adequate power to pull
the

wings off your plane.

Moving just in front of you, though you can't see

it, is an area where the air is sinking so rapidly that, if you happen

to fly into it, there is a good chance that you will be very close to

the ground before you will be able to fly out.

So,

all in all, it is

somewhat risky.
Still though, despite the risk or maybe because of it,
that such a flight can be rather special.

I

gather

There is the risk, the over-

coming of danger, the objective measure of your skills in flying a
distance few have flown before in a sailplane.

But beyond this, there

is a strange sense of having become for that time, somehow different:

a

kind of rightness, a feeling that you had at last entered into the kind
of existence that had often been intimated but never before present.
I

think that this feeling of rightness may be part of the skill

itself and that the pilot feels this rightness because he has, for a

brief time, totally entered into his skill.

Flying a sailplane at the

front of a moving storm is a complex skill.

When an automatic pilot

flys a regular airplane, it must make upwards of three quarters of a

million yes/no decisions every few minutes.

Flying a sailplane is at

least as complex a process; and some of the skills involved, no computer
has yet mastered.

A sailplane pilot must possess not only the normal

but also
flying skills like those simulated by the automatic pilot,
falling air
skills which subtly judge, in advance, how the rising and

currents will move and shift.

This judgment, this feel, is a skill he

but it is a skill
possesses and his success confirms this possession,

3

which cannot really be specified.

No machine has yet duplicated this

skill; nor in fact does any theory or model offer the kind of complex

knowledge of the changing variables of a moving storm, which the pilot's
skill possesses.

The pilot's skill, therefore, can be viewed as complex in at least
two ways.

First it is complex objectively when compared by analogy to

the automatic pilot; although the pilot cannot be said to be duplicating
the processes of the computer, he is duplicating its results; in fact he
is surpassing them.

Second, in subtly maintaining his position at the

leading edge of the storm, he is demonstrating the possession of a kind
of skill and knowledge which neither he nor any scientist can fully

explain.

These are two of the factors which lead me to say that the

pilot has entered into his skill.

It is inconceivable that the pilot

could explicitly perform all the operations necessary to fly his

sailplane

— for

this stimulus

I

move the controls three inches left, etc.

By any objective estimate, the pilot is performing the equivalent of

thousands of these operations every minute, and at the same time he is

performing operations which have no objective analogy at all.
If it seems that

I

am already at odds with an enemy not yet even

introduced, you are correct.

My knowledge of what

I

wish to discover is

conceptions of
only an intimation, but my knowledge of our present

skills is more specific.

In some measure,

and attacking those conceptions which
I

I

I

am proceeding by defining

feel to be in error.

Right now

skills, which, if it were true to
am covertly attacking a concept of

pilot's accomplishments a
its own logic, would make the sailplane
logical impossibility.

while.
I'll return to that concept in a

Now, to

4

the pilot.

In a small and graceful machine, with no external power, he

flies more than one thousand miles in a single day, balanced

precariously but precisely on the leading edge of a powerful storm; and
in so flying he exhibits skills of incomprehensible complexity.
is at peace.

He has entered into his skill.

Yet he

To fly, to remain in this

joyful, precarious balance, is his single awareness.

He could never

explain all the myriad components of his actions, yet they are his,
neither visited on him, nor unconscious.

It is his skill, and it is

Here, at the interface, the air will be rising.

right.

edge of the storm with another sense

filling all your nerves.

— the

You follow the

flight sense, located nowhere,

As long as you stay always right at the edge

between fair lowlands and the madness of the thunder, it will not fail
you, whatever it is that flies, this carrying drive forward.

That's at least an idea of the kind of meaning and coherence

O.K.

which

I

feel may exist in the practice of physical skills.

I

have had

similar experiences in my own practice of skills, in tennis and sKiing,
though mine were perhaps not as intense as those described above.

Now

very
you may object that although this type of experience may be

usually regard to
interesting, it doesn't really seem to exhibit what we

be meaning and coherence.

You are right, and that's the "problem

come across in my work with physical skills."

experiences are meaningful:

I

have

To me such skillful

and
they do establish contact with reality,

coherence within that rea
their structure does exhibit a meaningful

y

it's a difficult one to defend.
But for now, that's just my opinion, and
In

reading.

ray

exploration of the subject of skills,

I

ve done a lot

rather poor.
Most of the books on sports are

Take just one

5

aspect of such books, the photography.

Sports photography usually

considers itself successful when it destroys time at precisely the right
moment, forcing an eternal extension upon a transient shape.

But the

motions of sport are a far less understandable process than the
arresting, gracious, somehow comprehensible forms that the athletes’

bodies assume on a piece of paper.

The motions of sport are about

something beyond the syntactical ability of graphic images to describe.

Neither the quality nor the structure of these motions is adequately
described.

Or take another aspect of such books.

What follows is part

of a description of how to fly a sailplane in thermals, from a book

called New Soaring Pilot

:

Considering now the performance of the glider when circling;
it can be assumed without much error that the lift/drag ratio
at a particular angle of attack is the same as it was in
straight flight. Making use of this assiimption, any
particular point in the straight flight polar can be
translated into a corresponding point on a polar curve for a
set angle of bank by making use of the following formulae:

V2

cos

S2

cos

cos

is speed in straight flight at a particular angle of
where
attack ....

would be very
None of this information is inaccurate; in fact it
pilot systems.
useful for a man who designs and programs automatic
is just of little use to the pilot.

It

It represents in no way what the

pilot tried to use this
pilot actually does when he flies, and if the
of his skill, he would have
type of information in the actual practice

little chance of remaining aloft.

In a similar way, sports photograp

skill.
are not of much use in learning a

Like the technical description

.
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above, photographs accurately describe some aspects of
a skill; in fact

photographs usually describe skills much more accurately than
do
technical descriptions.

But both photographs and technical descriptions

describe skills from what
reference.

I

must call here a non-human frame of

Neither photographs nor technical descriptions describe the

structure of a skill in a way that makes sense to one who must learn the
skill

,

nor do either of these approaches ever convey the coherence and

meaning of a skill in the way it is understood after one has learned the
skill

Books which attempt to describe skills usually take one of two

different approaches,

2

which

I

will label objective and subjective.

I

use these labels because books on skills never seem to approach their

subject directly, understanding its structure and meaning from within
the processes of learning and mastering a skill.

Rather they seem to

structure their descriptions on the model of some other discipline,

usually psychology or physiology, and ultimately,

model of an even deeper philosophical foundation.
of flying in thermals,

I

would label objective.

I

would argue, on the
The above description

Objective books on

skills are usually very technical, with lots of data and detailed

studies and analyses.

They have a pretty specific idea of what the

right approach is, of how to describe skills in the most accurate way.

Objective books on skills seem to be based on a model in which all
knowledge is ultimately explicit and in which the best way to arrive at
such knowledge is through a kind of logical analysis.

Again, none of

they are just
the descriptions, based on such a model, are inaccurate;

irrelevant.

sets
Within the philosophical standards Mew Soaring Pilot

7

itself, this hard, factual type of description looks great.

For the

real soaring pilot, however, the pilot who must balance hundreds of

unseen variables within the complex and largely unspecif iable framework
of his skill, such information is of no use.

Flying skills are not a

kind of explicit, mechanical technique for dealing with specific
variables.

But New Soaring Pilot is typical of objective books on

In one way or another, almost all of them attempt to be

skills.

empirical or scientific in a way that really misses the point; and none
of them, as I've said before ever even attempts to convey the coherence
and meaning of a skill as it is understood by a master of that skill.

3

The subjective writings on skills are, in a similar way, based on
a deeper philosophical foundation.

These books are more difficult to

find, but the few which do seem to exist usually talk about skills in

vaguely mystical or psychological ways.
Art of Archery

,

worldly forces.

Eugen Herrigel, in Zen and the

describes skills in terms of unconscious or even other-

Tim Gallwey in The Inner Game of Tennis

,

sees skills as

a constant battle for control between various selves within the mind.

While

I

am generally more sympathetic to this type of approach,

believe that it fails in two ways.

I

First, most of the subjective books

seem to assume that skills are innate within us; all the motions preto
exist, and we need only achieve the proper frame of mind for them

emerge.

one
Such a concept is difficult to grasp, especially say, if

were about to receive service from Arthur Ashe.

Second, although these

when engaged in
books sometimes talk about the kind of feelings one has
a skill,

pilot felt,
feelings similar to the rightness the sailplane

these feelings are granted no real validity.

Rather they seem to arise

8

independently within the mind, with connection neither to the
practice
of the skill nor to any kind of communicable reality.

limited to a very narrow range of existence.

Such feelings are

They are granted reality

only to the subject himself.

Neither the objective nor the subjective books seem to offer an
adequate understanding of the structure and meaning of skills.

Both

types of book offer a few insights which are helpful, but at a more

basic level, both are deeply antithetical to the kind of meaning and
coherence which

I

feel to be present in the practice of skills.

My

readings, my conversations with others engaged in skills and my own

experiences offer evidence of many intimations similar to that of the
sailplane pilot.

These intimations suggest to me that the practice of

skills is analogous to any of the structures, be it the sciences or
arts, through which man reaches beyond himself toward understanding,

toward achievement, toward meaning.

The fact that such meaning can

neither be explicitly expressed nor logically analysized does not

obviate my intimations.

Nor does the fact that this meaning seems

inextricably enmeshed in patterns of strong feeling preclude my claims.
The objective and subjective books are wrong and

I

am right.

That such

intimations and claims are not widely recognized indicates only that the

philosophical foundation which governs these books is so deeply

pervasive that it governs not only the books on skills but books on
other aspects of our lives as well.

In fact,

I

would claim, it governs

of
many of our day to day thoughts and feelings, our perceptions

ourselves and our existence.

4
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This may seem a very fast transition, from books that
offer an

inadequate conception of skills to a philosophical foundation which
somehow underlies these books

,

and now suddenly to the suggestion that

this same foundation underlies much of the structure on which we build

our lives.

with me.

I

I

agree.

At this time

I

can only ask the reader to bear

am unable to defend such a transition directly.

I

can only

hope that by the end of my paper, my argument will have at least

partially explained and defended the thesis
I

believe that the problem

I

I

so blatantly here purpose.

have in understanding physical skills lies

essentially within a philosophical foundation which not only does
violence to the conception of skills but which also seems to deny
reality to many aspects of existence.

This pervasive philosophical

foundation is a major obstacle to all our understandings, and the

pervasive nature of this foundation cannot be avoided if
explore and overcome the problems

I

I

am finally to

have encountered in my work with

physical skills.

—

A Secondary Theme Negative Aspects
in The Practice of Skills

This paper is intended primarily as a philosophical exploration.

Within "the problem
I

I

have come across in my work with physical skills,"

am most interested in those intimations which suggest that something

is missing,

that within the practice of skills, there are possibilities

recognized or
for a kind of meaning and coherence which is not presently

experienced.

Further,

I

believe that the problem

I

have come across

of skills, and that
does not lie with any of the surface manifestations

10

it cannot be cured by any superficial techniques.

Such techniques,

labelled mostly as humanistic psychology, are already widely available
'"^i^hin

our present culture, but like fad diets or smoking cures, their

lasting results have been less than profound.

problem

I

believe that the

I

have run across is less easily diagnosed and cured.

problem lies not with its surface manifestations

The

but rather within our

,

conception of skills.
Although

am focusing on physical skills,

I

I

have come to believe

that all human skills participate in basically the same structure.

Therefore, when

but

I

I

use the term "skills,"

I

am denoting physical skills,

am also implying certain parallels with the intellectual and

affective skills as well.

We are unable to experience the possibilities

of meaning and coherence existing within skills because our conception
of skills is inadequate.

This conception of skills is founded within a

larger philosophical foundation which itself offers an inadequate

conception of existence

— of

man, of the world, and of man's knowing

relationship with himself and that world.

The solution to the problem

I

have come across lies, therefore, with a reformulation of those
conceptions.
superficially.

This solution, like the diagnosis, cannot be done

Both must begin by identifying the most basic principles

within our present philosophical foundation.

They must then trace these

principles through their evolution and elaboration within that
and
foundation, until some understanding of the many complex forces
achieved.
conceptions of knowledge, present within our culture, is

Only

which must also
then may a reformulation be suggested, a reformulation

begin with the most basic principles.

Starting with these new

.
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principles, a more adequate conception of existence may eventually
be
envisioned, and within that conception, a more adequate conception
of

skills
This is obviously a long range solution.

I

will attempt to trace

the basic principles of our present philosophical foundation back over
300 years, and they are probably much older than that.

Therefore, it is

difficult to imagine that new principles could lead to an immediate
solution.

Nevertheless,

I

believe this to be the best course of action.

While certain men within any epoch may be able to escape the cultural
and intellectual constructs of their time, the general themes of

individual and cultural development indicate that a solution to the type
of problem

I

am discussing may take many generations.

Perhaps it is the

task of our generation to begin.
The main purpose of this section of the introduction is to suggest

some side issues which may accompany my main theme.

While

I

am pursuing

my primary task of exploring our present and future philosophical

foundations, it may be possible to notice some interesting secondary
themes.

The problem

I

have come across in my work with physical skills

is manifest not just in intimations of possible meaning and coherence,

but in the many direct negative effects of our present conception of
skills; effects such as tension, loss of power, of grace, of joy.

These

negative effects may also be seen to have their roots within the basic

principles

I

mentioned above and within the philosophical foundation in

which those principles have become elaborated and influential.

Thus

existence of that
these negative effects may serve to substantiate the
to day ways of
foundation and to illustrate its connection with our day
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thought and being.

In substantiating the connection, these secondary

themes will aid my primary exploration, which involves even more
basic

elements in our conception of knowledge.

This is not to say that these

secondary themes will not have an intrinsic interest of their own.
I

think that these "negative effects" will be familiar to most

readers, probably more through psychological literature rather than

through that of sport.

Their connection to various aspects of our

philosophical foundation will probably also be familiar.

Nevertheless,

to encourage the reader to begin thinking in the categories

I

will later

discuss in some detail, let me briefly suggest two major aspects of that
foundation, and then mention a few of the "negative effects," which the

reader may wish to keep in the back of his mind, and refer to, from time
to time.

Our present philosophical foundation can generally be

characterized as offering two disparate visions of reality.
is of a reality contained and STobjective,

One vision

totally inside the mind,

without motion, without power to reach out into the world.

This

subjective vision allows personal thoughts and feelings no validity, no

meaning beyond the confines of the mind.

The other vision is of a

reality totally outside, hard and objective.

This objective reality

wants no contamination from subjective influences.

It is a controlled

reality allowing meaning only to those things which are clear, distinct
and logical.

Both of these visions of reality,

I

would claim, are

present in each of us, conflicting, combining in various ways

but

and of our
always, in whatever form, narrowing our vision of ourselves

possible achievements.

^
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Many of the negative effects, present in the practice
of skills,

can be seen to be connected, to have their roots, within
these visions
of reality.

As

I

proceed in my exploration of our present philosophical

foundation, these connections may become more clear.
few of these negative effects.

Let me suggest a

Often in the practice of physical

skills, there exists a certain mechanical quality, mechanical both in
the motions themselves and in the way the individual seems to think

about and try to control his body.

I

call it mechanical rather than

just clumsy or inept; because in other parts of his life, that

individual often seems to be able to move with considerable grace.
Basically, this kind of mechanical movement seems to be tied to a very

mechanistic conception of how the body is supposed to work.

Sometimes,

however, such motions become so tense and rigid that it seems that the

individual almost fears his body.

Shoulders and necks become tense;

sometimes this tension carries down the body into the diaphram and ribs
so that breathing becomes constricted.

In extreme cases, the whole body

becomes almost rigid, balance is uncertain, and even vision can become
impaired.

There also seem to exist what might be termed more general
effects.

The institutionalization of sport often focuses on performance

at the expense of experience, emphasizing competition, winning and

records rather than the simpler, more fundam.ental aspects such as motion
and interaction.

Coaches, much like behaviorists

,

assume that they can

always get results if their teams are properly motivated.

In teaching

motions,
sports, the emphasis is on separate parts of the various
as the sum of
believing always that a complete motion can be described

14

its parts.

Teaching is almost wholly description rather than

explanation; all that is needed for success is good technique.
and on.

The refrain snould, by now, be familiar.

And on

Often the literature

describing these negative effects is pretty good, far better than my
descriptions; it's the solutions that are inadequate.

trying a different approach.

That's why I'm

g

This tension, this emphasis on technique, this teaching of parts

rather than wholes, are examples which the reader may wish to keep in

mind as he moves through my philosophical exploration.

It may be

difficult to make one-to-one connections, but some of the themes should
correlate.

There are certain negative elements present in the practice

of skills, and in our lives as a whole, which need not be as massively

present as they now are.

Although my central concern lies with the

meaning and coherence now lacking in the practice of skills, rather than
with these negative effects, the themes are related.

The reader's

awareness of these effects should augment, rather than hinder, his

understanding of my argument.

Just as skills are more than a series of

techniques for the manipulation of our bodies

,

but are unextricably part

of our being, so too are these negative aspects related to many themes
in human life.

So generation after generation of men in love with pain
and passivity serve out their time in the world
silent, redolent of faded sperm, terrified of dying,
desperately addicted to the comforts other sell them,
however useless, ugly or shallow, willing to have life ^
for them by men whose only talent is for death.

defined

******************
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Every gain has its loss, not every loss
its gain but sinks into the waste
the primal pain unplastic, the chaos
^
without a future the astounding past.

CHAPTER

I

PHYSICAL SKILLS VIEWED IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE
The Interface:

Before
foundation,

I
I

A Metaphor of My Central Purpose

begin an exploration of our present philosophical
would like to again emphasize my central purpose and

suggest a metaphor which may help to focus both mine and the reader's

attention on this purpose, throughout.

In the first section of this

paper, the pilot's flight is an example of the kind of skillful human

activities which interest me.

In particular,

I

am interested in the

structure of such skills and in the intimations of meaning which skills
sometimes arouse.

For the most part in our society, both the structure

and meaning of skills seem to be misunderstood.

Instructional books on

flying, on tennis and on other sports offer a deficient conception of

skills, a conception adequate neither to the learning of such skills nor
to an understanding of their meaning.

This deficiency,

I

feel lies not

so much in the books themselves but more deeply in a philosophical

foundation which itself fails to develop an adequate conception of life.
This foundation offers basically a one-level conception of life, where
all reality is centered within one of two frameworks, each of which

tries to account for the whole

—a

reality centered either subjectively

within the narrow isolation of the mind or centered objectively within
the material world.

This second and more frequent conception of

16
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reality

,

is further narrowed in that all explanation within that

material world is itself one-leveled in terms of least particulars:
thus for example, complex order is ultimately explained by the one real

order which is molecules in motion, or thought is ultimately explained
as the compulsive outcome of neural processes.

A direct examination of these instructional books would not
fulfill my purpose.

Because this deficient conception of skills seems

founded on a deeper foundation and because the writings on skills
themselves are not only inadequate but superficial,

center my inquiry at a philosophical level.

I

I

have chosen to

purpose first to

selectively explore the present inadequate philosophical foundation,

suggesting where possible, how its inadequacy influences our present

conception of skills.

I

will then purpose a partial reformulation of

the foundation and within that new foundation offer a new conception of
skills.

This is a complex strategy and my focus on skills will

inevitably become enmeshed in many conflicting themes.
I

Before

I

begin,

would like to jump ahead and suggest a metaphor which seems to embody

at least part of the conception of skills

I

plan to eventually purpose.

The metaphor is intended neither as an explanation nor as a defense of
this conception.

It is to serve only as a reminder of my central

purpose, so that this purpose will not be lost in the midst of

philosophical exploration and reformulation.

The metaphor, like the

but its a good
punch line to a joke, requires a little "building up to,"
one and worth the wait.

When

I

began this paper,

I

conception of skills within the widest perspectives

tried to form a
I

could imagine:

what is their function?
where do skills appear in the universe and

Thus
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ths in0taphoir arisGS out of what might ba callGd an ontology of skills.

Within the objective perspectives of the eons of time and the
vastness of space, the universe seems to be dominated by the disorder of

interstellar dust; and its destiny to be governed by the dictates of
entropy.

However, from time to time within its entropic destiny, matter

takes on various manifestations of order.

As these manifestations

become more complex, their existence becomes less probable, more
precarious:

the existence of a star is less probable than that of a

nebula; the existence of a crystalline rock less probable than that of
an igneous one.

But while such manifestations of order are improbable,

the structure of matter itself and the natural forces acting upon it

seem adequate to explain both the existence of that material order and
the transformations it may go through, including its final return to

disorder.

When, however, one moves up the hierarchy of order from the

inorganic to the organic, existence becomes so complex, so improbable
and precarious, that structure alone seems no longer adequate to explain

existence.

At this point, some may wish to adduce that evolution is

sufficient argument to carry forward the structural explanation into the
organic orders of existence.

I

would agree that the structure of

existence, but
evolution is important in explaining the higher orders of

explain why higher orders
to me, evolution is only a kind of ratchet to
do not slip backwards.

Evolution may explain why a particular species

species came into existence
survived, but it does not explain why that
in the first place.

the
At some point in the hierarchy of order,

clock-work machine in which all
concept that the universe is just a huge
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sxistence can be explicitly explained through one basic principle, no
longer works.

To use the term organic or biological as synonymous with

functional, adaptive or conducive-to-survival does not develop an

adequate conception of life.

The structure of evolution is a

mechanistic, one-leveled explanation in terms of least particulars, and
it does not suffice.

The emergence of life and further life is more than just the play
of chance and necessity;

living things are not just adaptation machines.

Like machines they are dependent on conditions specifiaible in terms of

lower levels, but they are not explicable in terms of these levels.

A

machine may be dependent on the principles of physics and chemistry, but
its function is not explicable in terms of these principles.

Living

things, like machines, are also dependent on basic principles, but they
are certainly not explicable in terms of them.

Even if one sneeks some

minimal purpose into the supposedly neutral concept of evolution, as
many biologists do

— molecules

in motion for the sake of motion, for

instance, or survival for the sake of survival, such a purpose still
does not offer adequate explanation for even the static conditions of
life:

its complexity, its multiplicity, its intricacy

— much

less so for

the harmony of life's various adaptations or the persistent structures

and rhythms with its development.

Within the vastness of the universe, life seems an improbable
occurrence.

Neither the existence nor

the

transformation of living

structure, nor can the
things can be explained wholly in terms of their

solely by the
complexity and multiplicity of life be accounted for

principles of evolution.

more
The conditions of life seem to demand a
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complex logic than the one-leveled reductionism of evolution.
needed to begin this logic is a new focus.

What is

Rather than viewing living

things as just one more form of matter, passively dependent on the laws
of a mechanistic universe,

I

would like to suggest that living things

owe their improbable existence to the fact that they can interact with
their surrounding and that they therefore maintain a certain flexibility

within their structure.

Through this ability, living things can

selectively take in parts of their environment and can also extent
themselves out into that environment.
The existence of living things is not just given them:

earned and maintained by them.

it is also

Within most of the universe, such is not

the case; though it may take billions of years, the fate of a star is

determined by its structure.

Flexibility within structure, however,

offers life a destiny not shared by the inorganic.

The destiny of

living things is not wholly pre-existent, not fully determined.

Because

living things can interact, there is always the possibility for change
Even at the lowest levels of life, organisms seem to be

and growth.

involved in sensing and performing; and even so simple a creature at the
paramecium, H. S. Jennings would argue, has already entered the class of
learners.

In studying life, one must focus not merely on the structure

this ability
of living things, nor on the fact of their survival, but on
to interact.

such
In distinguishing this principle within the organic,

improbable;
a focus makes the existence of life less

it suggests an

and offers the
escape from mechanistic, one-leveled explanations,

possibility of a more adequate conception of life.

Within this focus,

seen to have a certain
life, even at its lowest levels, can be
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flexibility within structure and thus to be explicable by principles not

wholly contained within that structure.

With such

a focus,

the vast

majority of living things can be seen not only to interact, but to
choose and to choose skillfully.
their existence, they earn it.

These living things not only maintain

Their existence is dependent on

principles which, by their actions, they acknowledge and in part create.
Their lives can be seen as an achievement.
This flexibility within structure, this ability of living things
to perceive and perform, this skillful interaction,

term, the interface.

I

would like to

Throughout the remainder of my paper,

I

hope that

this metaphor will help to remind the reader of my central purpose.
Again, my interest is in the structure and meaning of skillful human

activities.

I

hope eventually to suggest a conception of skills which

will adequately explain their structure and meaning.

Presently, the

rigid formalism of basically one-leveled ontology precludes an adequate
conception.

What

I

am suggesting in the metaphor of the interface is

that the essence of life lies not in its structure, but in its

activities.

When one focuses on activities rather than on structure,

certainty is lost; and philosophical explanations are no longer as
inclusive, as formal, as explicit.

But in their stead may come

explanations more adequate to the myriad complexities of life
explanations in which the sense of beauty, of the intrinsically
meaningful, will dominate our grasp of what is real.
living things are not
The metaphor of the interface implies that

solely considered or
isolated physical systems nor can they ever be

studied as such.

"in" the world;
All living things do not live merely
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they live "within" it.

ecological niche.

All organisms live within and are related
to an

The extent of this relationship is dependent on
the

nature of the organism; a rock, therefore, can be imagined
to have no
interface, the paramecium a rather narrow one, and man, one
which is
broad.

Whatever its extent, this relationship is not a static system,

^ process;

the organism is constantly interacting, ceasing to be

what is was and becoming what it is not yet.

All living things, even

the most simple, interact with their environment.

They have a certain

flexibility within their structure, and therefore cannot be known solely
through that structure.

Most orders of life, perhaps from the

paramecium on up, not only interact, but interact skillfully:
choose and choose well.

they

Their perceptions form hypotheses about the

world, and their actions are governed by these hypotheses.
of living things can be called learners.

These kinds

In skillfully projecting

themselves out into the world and in selectively assimilating it to
themselves, they are participating in a process of skillful interaction,
which, in the higher orders, can continue throughout the lifespan of the

organism.

By this process, an organism can broaden its interface,

creating knowledge and deepening its own coherence.

Thus an organism

can surpass its given structure; and in so doing, its existence and

being can be seen as an achievement.

There is no ultimate logic which

dictates that we must fasten on the structure of nerves and muscles, and
call them the one sure reality.

Nor must we ourselves despair of all

worldly knowledge and retreat into the confines of consciousness.
essence of life,
at the interface:

I

The

will claim lies at neither of these extremities, but
in the engagement of living things with their world.

,
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in their creation of knowledge and of themselves, in
their achievements

and their becoming.

Let me return for a moment to my original example of skillful

human activity; and thereby suggest first, how the human condition
itself demands that we acknowledge what is unique in our being, and

suggest second, how that uniqueness may be experienced.

Look back for a

moment at the storm sweeping up from the Mediterranean.

At the very

leading edge, between the turbulence of the clouds and the precipitous

descent to the lowlands, there exists a small, swiftly moving area of
rising air.

This interface on which the pilot must skillfully maintain

his precise yet precarious balance.

Mankind is himself a skillful

balance within a universe of entropy; the rise of man when viewed within
the immensity of temporal and spatial dimensions, is an improbable

occurrence:

a delicate and creative moment, a fold in the eons of time,

a conscious interface in the vastness of interstellar dust.

This

interface, this conscious point within the universe, is our improbable
existence.

At every level of our being, from birth through maturation

and on through the range of human achievements

balanced here at the rising edge.

,

our skills keep us

This balance, our very existence,

already exhibits a long heritage of skillful achievement.

Being is

given to each one of us, and with being come not only the skills to
remain balanced, but the possibility for further skills, and the hope

and passion for further achievement.

But because being here is much, and because all this
that's here, so fleeting, seems to require us and strangely
Us the most fleeting of all. Just once,
concerns us.
everything, only for once. Once and no more. And we,
too
once, And never again.
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Just as the human condition can be seen as an interface, a
balance, a point of consciousness with the universe; so too, as

have

I

already suggested, can an essential aspect of man's existence be viewed
as an interface.

As the sailplane pilot flies at the edge of the storm,

ths flight sense is filling all his nerves:

feel of his muscles, his motions

purpose.

— all

his eyes, his touch, the

are aware, absorbed in his single

This awareness, this quality in ourselves which rises up to

meet the world, to be in the world, is the embodim.ent of our skills.
Through skills we enter both into the world and more deeply into
ourselves.

Skills are the interface, the joining.

of the great tennis players of the 1940

's

It was said of one

that he had touch all his

life; this is said also of a great pianist, and it can be said,

of a great artist or a great scientist.

I

think,

Touch is neither a quality of

introspection, nor is it a calculated series of techniques for dealing

with the world.

Rather it speaks of flhency and subtlety at the

interface, of skills so refined and powerful that we choose to give

ourselves to their being.

In their beauty and power, they catch us up;

and as in love or faith, our surrender to them offers intimations of a

truer existence.
The interface can thus serve as a metaphor for two aspects of our
existence; first, for the precarious balance of ourselves as beings
for
within the universe and second, and more importantly in this paper,

maintains that
the complex nexus of skills through which each one of us

balance and achieves his own unique human possibilities.
demands the second.

The first

"Because being here is much, and because all this

strangely concerns
that's here, so fleeting, seems to require us and
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us," we are therefore compelled to acknowledge both the
uncertainty and

the uniqueness of our being, and to center ourselves fully
within the

essence of that being, which is the nexus of skills.

We must not

philosophically detach ourselves in an illusive quest:

there is

c®^bainty neither within a totally objective world nor within the

disorder of a mind cut off from all reality.
roust

Rather, like the pilot we

avoid both the secure lowlands and the chaos of the storm.

Aware

of risk, aware of uncertainty, passionately involved in the unique

possibilities of human achievement, we must live at the interface.

Intellectual or Philosophical Foundations

Before

I

talk further about the interface and purpose a

philosophical reformulation within which a more adequate conception of
skills will be possible,

I

must first complete a rather complex task.

I

must explore, at least selectively, the philosophical foundation which
underlies our present conception of skills.

It is in this foundation

that the inadequacy of our present conception of skills lies.

The

metaphor of the interface is interesting, but without this deeper
exploration, it will prove finally to be indefensible.

present philosophical foundation,

I

In exploring our

am attempting to discover general

themes and ideas, themes which govern our various disciplines, and

influence cultural patterns of thought.

The intellectual foundation of

every society is a generally accepted model of reality.

This model is

comprehensive and includes in its range of influence, the formal
5'tructures of the physical and life sciences

,

definitions of logic and

of individual
truth within the society as a whole, and even the contents
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perceptions and feeling.

One of the major intellectual difficulties of

human existence is due to the fact that this model of reality

is,

in

every case, a mere interpretation of the world, and yet exerts,
as long
as it seems the valid interpretation, the subtly compelling
claim to

being accepted as the only true picture of the universe, indeed as truth
itself.

Our intellectual foundation governs much of the coherence of our
lives.

In large measure we build our personal world upon such a

foundation; our hypotheses and interpretations are influenced by this
foundation, and we act upon them.

indespensible

;

Some foundation is, however,

it is a necessary concomitant to our thought processes,

an intrinsic and inescapable part of our commitment to living.

Our

perceptions and our minds are so structured that we must understand the

world through a continual process of narrowing and definition.

From our

birth onward, our parents and our culture guide first our senses, and
then the more articulate aspects of our being, toward the structures

already established by such a foundation.

3

To understand and perhaps eventually to alter the intellectual

foundation which is an intrinsic part of our being and which
exist as truth itself, is a difficult task.

seem.s to

Each one of us feels that

his perceptions and thoughts are not mere interpretation, but that he
sees and understands the world unquestionably just as it is.

Theodore

Roethke says that "all lovers live by longing and endure /summon a
,

vision and declare it pure."^

From our earliest desires to see, to

world; to
move, to create a meaningful life, we are all lovers of the

begin to understand, we must at least admit as much.

This is not to say
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that our visions are in error.
visions,
'^^hich

o^

interpretations.

It is rather to admit that they are

o^

As such they are based on a foundation of

we are largely unaware and based also on our own processes of

knowing, of which, as
aware.

I

shall later demonstrate, we can never be fully

Thus there is always the possibility of error.

To begin the

process of understanding and change, we must first admit this uncertain
aspect of knowledge.
I

am including this long preamble to my exploration, because

without some measure of curiosity, some of that old-time-explorerdaring, my enterprise is doomed.

Our present intellectual foundation,

like every comprehensive theory, every vision of the universe, is

necessarily circular.
thinker dwells.

It forms a closed system in which the mind of the

Just as it is difficult to explore and see anew the

countryside where one has always lived, so it is difficult to explore an
intellectual foundation which has been, for so long, the landscape of

one's mind.

Yet though it is difficult, such an exploration can be

meaningful.

Though one may never be able to venture far outside the

system in which he dwells, one may at least acquire some knowledge and

understanding of that system.

An exploration of our present

intellectual foundation may offer, if not an escape, then at least a new
And such an exploration may offer, some

freedom within that foundation.

part of that
day, the possibility of altering, of changing some small

foundation.

Look back at what

I

have been describing; the pilot's

such skillful
skills and intimations, the inadequacy of books about

human activities, the possibility of

a

more adequate conception of

the subliminal prison
skills in the metaphor of the interface, and now,
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of our intellectual foundation.
exploration:

I

am trying to provide an incentive for

an awareness that we do form conceptions of ourselves and

our world within such a foundation, a suggestion that our present

conceptions are neither adequate nor necessarily true, and an intimation
of the kind of meaning which, one day, might be possible within an

altered foundation.
I

have emphasized that my exploration will be selective; the study

would otherwise be impossibly long and complex.

Much of the foundation,

by its nature, cannot be systematically articulated.

I

will confine my

exploration to a narrow range of important ideas, first as they are

manifested in the work of one philosopher, and then as they come to be
influential in the work of subsequent philosophers and scientists.
hope that the importance of these ideas will be apparent.

I

I

also hope

that a discussion of the context in which they were formed, and an

explanation of their subsequent evolution, will serve as an historical
example of the complex cultural and personal forces which have
Our present

influenced the formation of our intellectual foundation.

foundation seems dominated by a kind of extreme formalism, in which

explicitness and indubitability are the hallmarks of true knowledge.
Many of the forces and themes within our foundation are basically

products of this one ideal, either embracing or rebelling from it, but
never disputing its basic definitions of truth.

It is a foundation

which takes science as the paradigm case of knowledge.

This formalism,

the rise of
constructed on the ideals of science, had its beginning with

the work of the
modern science in the 17 th century, and especially with

most influential philosopher

of

that period, Rene Descartes.

detail.
therefore plan to discuss Descartes' work in some

I

)
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The Unspecifiability of Knowledge

(In the next chapter then, I plan to attempt a relatively
detailed

exploration of Descartes and his influence on our present intellectual
foundation.

In order to provide sufficient perspective to guide and

sustain the reader's interest in this exploration,

I

would like to

introduce in the remainder of this chapter several themes which bear

both on the Cartesian philosophy and on a possible reformulation of that
philosophy.

When modern transformationalists, such as Toffler, 0 fasten on what
they term the human mania for categorization, and suggest that mankind's

salvation lies in overcoming our stunted and unimaginative visions of
life, their theories are incompatible with much of current neuro

psychology.

Man's senses and brain are so structured that he is able to

perceive and think only through a continued process of narrowing and
interpretation.

When

I

mentioned earlier that our senses form

hypotheses and that we act upon these hypotheses, this was not merely a
It was

self-serving characterization designed to support my thesis.
rather the consensus opinion of the best of modern research.

7

Sensory

data is always ambiguous; the same data can mean any of several

alternative objects, but we experience only one object and usually the

correct one.

The brain is continually filtering and interpreting

conflicting information, and much of this information has already been
interpreted before it ever reaches the brain.

Interpreting mechanisms

sensing
exist not only in the brain but in the retina and in the other

processes as well.

in"
The structure of these mechanisms seems "wired

—
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but the mechanisms are flexible and have the ootential for

a

considerable range of development, especially during the first nine

months of life.

R.

L.

Gregory, one of the foremost researchers of

perception, here characterizes his central thesis:
Since perception is a matter of reading non-sensed, as well
as sensed, characteristics of objects from available sensory
data, it is difficult to hold that our perceptual beliefs
our basic knowledge of objects is free from theoretical
contamination. We not only believe what we see, we also see
what we believe.®

O'*

—

'

There is no knowledge which can be explicitly specified.

When we

see an object or when we think a thought, it is the result of a long and

largely unspecif iable process.

The general structures of interpretation

are amorphously present at birth, and the development of the specific

interpreting mechanisms is so subtle and complex as to be almost
unknowable.

Furthermore, both the sensory and mental interpreting

mechanisms seem to form hierarchies which process and combine
information in ways which are even less specifiable.

Our linguistic

abilities are a later manifestation of the brain's proclivity to code
and recode information.
is

— the

Even our most certain information, v;hatever it

existence of a rock or the second law of thermodynamics— is only

an hypothesis, perhaps a good hypothesis

over centuries of man's existence

— but

— one

which has proved reliable

an hypothesis nevertheless.

In

never be
our situation as interpreting beings, what we call truth can

wholly explicit, never be wholly proved.

William James characterizes

the mind:
into facts
Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward
and reveal
create
again
again and add to them; which facts
themselves
facts
The
new truth... and so on indefinitely.
is the
g
meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth
them.
among
terminate
and
start
that
beliefs
the
function of

.
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This argument of the unspecif lability of knov/ledge will be elaborated
later in my paper.

It is presented here to familiarize the reader with

my bias; like the metaphor of the interface, it should suggest

perspective in which to view my arguments.

To be consistent,

a

must, in

I

turn, admit that existence of the interpreting mechanisms is itself a

theory and not certain knowledge.

The theory is supported by fine

studies in physiology and psychology; nevertheless, there is no

indubitable evidence for its acceptance.

Those studies and my own

acceptance of the theory have proceeded by means of the logically

unspecif iable processes

I

outlined above.

I

accept the theory as true

and use it, acknowledging that, in the last analysis, it is my ovm

convictions which support my acceptance

My Arguments Viewed in the Light of the Theory
of the Un specif lability of Knowledge

The theory of the unspecifiability of knowledge supports several
of the arguments

I

have and will use in this paper.

First it supports

the idea of a philosophical or intellectual foundation.

What

I

characterized above as a hierarchy of interpreting mechanisms is very
similar to an intellectual fondation.

We are able to think and voice

are
our ideas only from within a whole system of acceptances which

logically prior to any particular assertion of our own.

system of acceptances is hierarchical.

Further, this

Both physiologically and

to an elaborated
intellectually, it proceeds from a few basic principles

conceptual framework.

This is fundamentally the structure

illustrate through Descartes.

I

wish to
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I

hope to argue pursuasively that a few basic principles,

formulated by Descartes, have, over the centuries, become so deeply

ingrained in our disciplines and in our cultural structures of
knowledge, that they now powerfully govern our thought in ways of which
we are totally unaware.
that the principles

I

claim to be Cartesian are really the result of

many other influences.
it is unimportant.

An intellectual historian may be able to show

I

will grant such a claim, but for my purposes

It is the pervasive and hierarchical nature of our

intellectual foundation

I

wish to illustrate.

Whether the basic

principles are Cartesian or whether they have other origins is relatively
unimportant.

While

I

seem to argue the Cartesian origins strongly, it

is not because I vrish to be historically convincing, but rather because
I v/ish

to make a strong and consistent intellectual case.

If

I

succeed

in showing that a few simple ideas can become so embedded in our

traditions of thought that they deeply influence not just our present

disciplines but our day-to-day lives as well, then my proposed solution,

which itself begins with basic principles of its own, may have some
validity.

The theory of the unspecifiability of knowledge, while supporting
the role of the basic Cartesian principles within an intellectual

those
foundation, at the same time argues against the content of

principles and thus anticipates my proposed solution.

Descartes’ basic

possible, and he
principle is that explicit and certain knowledge is

around this principle of
builds his conceptions of man and knowledge

certainty.

on elements which
However, if knowledge must always be based

are logically unspecifiable

,

possible:
then certain knowledge is never
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certainty is a false ideal.

Our situation as knowing beings, the

structure of our senses and brains, does not lend itself to an explicit
and indubitable kind of knowing.

With this in mind, the reader may be

able to view Descartes from a perspective similar to my own.

But just what is my perspective?

Even while

I

contest the

Cartesian ideal of certainty and envision a truer conception of
knowledge,

cannot totally escape my Cartesian heritage.

I

I

have

suggested in my introduction that our present intellectual foundation
offe;rs us an inadequate conception of life and

I

will argue that this

inadequate conception is still due in great measure to the influence of

basic Cartesian principles.

Our conception is inadequate because the

Now logically

Cartesian principles are false.

I

cannot believe in the

unspecifiability of knowledge and still accept the Cartesian ideal of
certain knov/ledge.

Yet obviously, by my very definition of an

intellectual foundation,

I

do accept the Cartesian principles.

They are

so deeply embedded in my processes of thought, that I cannot possibly

trace them all, much less expell them.

What does this mean?

It means

I

must argue against a conception of knowledge from within that very
As this inconsistency is a major liability in my argument,

conception.
I

would like to elaborate on it.
The Logical Inconsistency of my Argument

What

I

i.orward
am writing purports to be a relatively straight-

in the practice of skills,
argument, leading from intimations of meaning

which meaning is presently
onto the inadequacy of the structure through
perceived, and on, later, to

a

new structure.

This approach is.
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however, basically self-contradictory.

I

have already suggested through

the metaphor of the interface, and will later argue directly,
that the

basic weakness of our present intellectual foundation is that
it is too
straight-forward, too explicit, too logical.
,

illusion.

There is no hard core of

and so much logic and explicitness, however appealing, is an

That's basically the whole problem with Descartes:

he grabs

onto the ideal of certainty, and then, to guarantee this ideal, he pulls
and twists all the rest of existence until it fits into a logical,

supporting structure.

But

too, could be accused of being too

I,

straight-forward; my argument too logical; my ideas too explicit.
Basically, I'm arguing against a structure of knowledge from within that

very structure.

I

cannot help feeling that if my metaphors were a

genuine embodiment and exegesis of my intimations, if my work were more
truly an articulation and affirmation of the beliefs implied in my
intimations, then my argument would not need to be so structured.
Instead, as Polanyi would characterize the process:

my intimations

would evoke further intimations, gather unto themselves

a

whole new body

of knowledge, and guide and sustain my efforts toward the comprehensive

achievement of a new structure of knowing.
Thus, if my intimations were as meaningful and powerful as

claim

I

them to be, they would create a new structure and language, through

which they could be known.

keep thinking about two books

I

\\7hich

succeed in creating their own structure. Personnel Knowledge
Polanyi and Gravity's Rainbow

by Thomas Pynchon.

,

little about Gravity's Rainbow

.

,

do

by Michael

Let me tell you a

On the first reading, it is

confused argument;
exasperating; it seems to offer a simple, if somewhat
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but at the same time it is deeply disorienting in a way
that no simnle

book should be.

Upon further examination, Gravity's Rainbow seems to

offer intimations of a deeper coherence, a comprehensive view
toward

which the reader is compelled to struggle.

Yet, just as one struggles

bo articulate the central theses of the book, the whole enterprise
seems
to betray a fundamental instability and falls apart.

At the same time,

one is being subtly changed in unspecified ways and all before one has

decided how to take up a proper critical attitude.
has had great power over me:
I

has enchanted me, involved me, changed me.

first read the book at a time when

small child.

As

I

Gravity's Rainbow

I

was also close to a very

played with the child, images from the book would

flash across my mind.

The parallels were many:

my growing involvement

with the world Pynchon had created was an abbreviated version of the
child's fascination and involvement with his own new world.

Both the

child and myself were irrevocably changing, beginning a journey toward
some larger coherence, entering a

what Pynchon had created.

nev;

world.

For a new world is exactly

My exasperations in trying to understand

Gravity's Rainbow were like the child's frustrations in trying to

understand and master a world, which on the surface, seemed so simple;
but which at a deeper level was profoundly complex.

My intimations of a

deeper coherence existing within Gravity's Rainbow were similar to the
intimations which compelled the child to enter ever more deeply into his
own new world.
Pynchon,

I

would claim, is a genius whose intimations were so

powerful that they guided him toward the formation of

a new structure,

very intimations.
comprehensive enough to include and articulate those
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If one wishes to change the world, this is
how one should proceed.

cannot.

My ideas lack power.

the same structure

I

am still arguing basically from within

I

wish to change.

and should be recognized as such.
structure,

I

i

Thus my argument is a compromise

Because

I

am attempting a lesser approach.

cannot create a new
I

am attempting to

delineate the present structure so clearly that its existence
may at
least be recognized, and its influence become apparent.
approach,

I

Later in my

will suggest guidelines which may, some day, lead to the

reformulation of that structure.

How then should my paper be read, if not as a logical argument?
suggest that the reader view my logic as

outmoded structure of knowledge.

I

I

do, as a concession to an

Within the reader's normal patterns of

thought, such a logical structure is necessary to enable him to

understand my material; just as it is necessary for me, in order to
allow that material to emerge.

^’Jhat

is more important, however,

is not

the structure or the logical connectedness of the material, but the new

possibilities within it.

VJithin my lesser approach,

a detailed

understanding of the structure of our present intellectual foundation is
important, but more important are the new insights and patterns of

thought that this understanding may eventually evoke.

What

I

to achieve, finally, are those moments of assent, of discovery

moments of "A ha:"

can hope

— those

"A ha, maybe he’s right; my life has felt just like

a long series of techniques;" or "A ha,

there's something here he

doesn't seem to see; these two ideas are really just the same idea, only
seen from opposite sides.
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I

am not implying that a new intellectual foundation, when it

comes, will be illogical.

I

am suggesting that it will be a new logic,

a new order, broader and more inclusive.

forroulate this new logic, but since

misleading,

I

I

Since

myself, cannot

I,

also believe that our old logic is

am suggesting that the reader focus his attention not so

much on the structure of my argument, but rather that he try to look

through that structure toward those insights and intimations it may
evoke in him.

Such a focus is, moreover, part of the process in which

discovery is usually possible.

Neither Pynchon nor Polanyi were able to

create their new structures of reality by ignoring the old.

Rather,

they spent years in detailed study of all that had gone before.

But

they spent these years of study not in an attitude of total acquiesence,

but looking always for insights, for intimations of new coherence within
Such is the process and attitude

the old patterns of thought.

I

am

suggesting to the reader.

Characterizing Our Present Intellectual Foundation

My argument might best be characterized as philosophical.

I

believe that our present conceptions of man and his acquisition of
knowledge offer an inadequate, and really a false, vision of existence.
Any theory which ignors these deeper levels of reality and tries to
argue wholly within the conceptions offered by our present intellectual

foundation is condemned to superficiality.

But that is just the

and spiritual
weakness of so many of the modern "cures" for man's social

illnesses.

Whatever it is

— E.S.T.,

Clarification," Future Shock

,

P.E.T., T.M.

,

"Values

The Revolution of Hop_e

,

or so many others.
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they either ignor or offer only a sham confrontation with our

heritage, and thus condemn themselves to phony orioinality
or witless repetition.

The process of forgetting or ignoring is induced

by the nature of the foundation itself.

In its depth and inclusiveness,

our present intellectual foundation appears not as interpretation but as

reality itself.

It thus forms a closed circle, avoids direct

confrontation, and thus perpetuates itself.
Russel Jacoby calls this process of forgetting, social amnesia.
His interpretation of intellectual foundations is more psychological

than the one

I

present, but his argument supports my main contentions.

For Jacoby, social amnesia means that the roots of memory are driven out

of mind by the social and economic dynamic of the society.

Thus an

intellectual foundation works to preserve the status quo by presenting
the human and social relationships of society, as natural and

unchangeable relations between things.

Jacoby feels that most new

theories are so anxious to leave behind the dated past that they

unwitting, fall into it, advancing new labels for old ideas.

He says of

some of these modern theorists:
The facility with which they present barren comments as
widsom cannot be explained by personal defects rather it is
derived from the movement of society that is squeezing out
of existence autonomous mind and thought. What is happening
is not only the decline of thought, but its repression.
;

In my paper

theorists.

I

shall avoid direct confrontation with these modern

direct
My argument is made in more general terms, and any

inevitably lead away
examination or criticism of these theorists would

from my central concerns.

use
Nevertheless, it would be helpful if my

foundation
of the term, "our present intellectual

were not totally
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^^stiract.

For tho most part,

his own connotations.

I

will assuma that the reader can supply

However, in case he does not wish to let me

suggest, as an example, one of my own.

Mine is a particularly

meaningful connotation for me because it suggests some of the weaknesses
of our present intellectual foundation, within a special context.

context is the broad and sensitive mind of George Dennison.

That

Although

Dennison cannot be said to have achieved a perspective which extends

beyond the bounds of our present foundation, as Pynchon perhaps has, he
nevertheless sees with great clarity.

When

I

claim that our

intellectual foundation pervasively influences many aspects of our
lives, this is one of the connotations

I

may have in mind:

Here's George Dennison very involved in teaching
(O.K.
children, and realizing at the same time that so many of the
problems which confront him really stem from the way our
society thinks about itself and its children. Here Dennison
is criticizing a piece by Mary Alice White from Urban
Review
First a paragraph from Ms. White, and then
Dennison's criticism.)
.

(Ms. White)

What we would propose... is that we should learn still more
about how children learn, and how different children learn
differently, before any solutions are proposed. When we
have enough data, we think it may be possible to construct a
better fit between the objectives of the curriculum and the
pupil's perceptions; and certainly a better fit between
those objectives, the evaluative system, and the pupil's
evaluative map.
(Dennison says:)

These words are such a quintessence of the self-absorption
underline
of bureaucratic research, that I feel obliged to
this
that
them, as it were, in red. Who would suppose
educator was writing in 1968? Drop-outs, illiteracy,
of spirit,
vandalism, savagery, loss of intelligence, loss
into rage- these
apathy rising into nausea, nausea rising
and families in
are the facts for many millions of pupils
They are such facts
their experience of the public schools.

)
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as indicate the basic responsibility of educators.
Yet how
responsible this one manages to sound while she holds them
at arm's length in deference to her trivial data, her
batter fits and "evaluative maps," and her animistic

belief that curriculum itself possesses "objectives."
(At another point, Dennison in criticizing Bruner, is trying
to make a distinction between true thought and mere

intellection.

How is thought reduced to mere intellection? Ultimately, as
I shall try to show, by a failure of love.
More obviously
by failure of imagination, sympathy, observation failure of
response. Nor is the absence of response a merely negative
phenomenon. We do not find a gap where response should be.
We find instead the attempt to control. This displacement
corresponds exactly to the failure of thought that we refer
to when we speak disdainfully of "abstractions;" for we do
not mean that thought should use no abstractions, but that
when abstractions are allowed to usurp the place that
belongs to what can only be called the body of the world,
they no longer appear as vital components of thought, but as
mere abstractions.

—

Bruner tells us that every child experiences a "deep-sensed
commitment to the web of social reciprocity." Now in a
rough-and-ready way this seems to be a true statement about
life.
At the same time it is quite obvious that children do
not experience webs and commitment, but rather experience
other children, adults, games, objects, etc. Are we
haggling about words? Far from it. We v/ant to speak of
motives, desires, needs. We want to know how experience
transpires for the child himself, and for the adult himself.
We want to know what the quick of it is, the life of it. It
is fatal to our investigation to fall into the error of
believing that our own abstract descriptions "commitment to
the web, etc." actually transpire as facts in the immediate
experience of those we are observing. To allow this to
happen is to lose sight of the object of study. It is to
begin to tabulate one's own abstractions under the
impression that one is speaking, still, of the organic
unfolding of life. Whether we are aware of it or not, we
12
have begun to limit and control the phenomena.

—

—

The Relation of Skills to Our Intellectual Foundation

philosophical.
My paper might loosely be characterized as

The

serve to elaborate
quotations from Dennison are an example of this; they

.
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part of my philosophical argument.

will

I

skills?

Why then do

I

begin with, and why

later write a whole section on skills, particularly on physical

The best answer,

I

think, is the one

I

have already suggested:

my interest in philosophical questions arises from and will return to my

central interest, which is physical skills.

There are, however, more

"logical" justifications for my concern with skills.

Physical skills,

I

will claim, participate in the same structure as do all other skills,
the whole range of human abilities.

Therefore, to work toward a new

understanding of the structure of knowledge is to work toward a new
understanding of skills.

While the structure of physical skills is

difficult to explore because such skills do not have and may never
extensively have the articulate components which our more intellectual
skills have, this short-coming has a certain advantage which,

served as a catalyst for this paper.

believe,

I

Because physical skills are less

articulate processes of knowing, they are, therefore, less burdened with
the inadequacies of our present intellectual foundation.

In the

practice of physical skills, the constraints and pre-suppositions of our

present foundation are not so immediately present.

Thus, the practice

of these skills sometimes allows the participant to break through our

present inadequacies and to experience intimations of another way of
being.

Such intimations are the impetus for my present exploration.

Dennison speaks of the "gsy intelligence" of children,

that once

intelligence
children are in motion among themselves the quality of gay

becomes apparent immediately and characterizes their games.

No one

of human
needs to be reminded that this is one of the loveliest

traits

That quality of gay intelligence is a part of the

.
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intimations

I

feel in the practice of skills.

Though our present

intellectual foundation be circular, forming passageways
of routine
always cogent enough, always herding us through time,
though that

foundation must be essentially explored from within and by
means of its
own definitions, there are still possibilities for another way
of being.
Rilke, to whom "being here is much," knew one of the secrets of
such

possibilities:

like the children at their games, he always left a

space

The Unicorn

This is the animal that never existed.
one; but just the same they loved it;

None of them ever knew

the way it moved, the way it

stood looking at them in pure tranquility.

Of course, there wasn't any.

But because they loved it, one became an animal.
space.

They always left a

And in the space they had hollowed out for it, lightly it would

lift its head, and hardly need to exist.

They nourished it, not with

grain, but only, always with the possibility it might be.

And this gave

so much strength to it that out of its forehead grew a horn.

Up to a virgin, silverly it came.

her glass, it was.

14

One horn.

And there within her, there within

CHAPTER

II

DESCARTES: AN EXPLORATION OF OUR
INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION

A General Introduction to Descartes

An historical generalization would suggest that the world into

which Descartes emerged was

a

world ready for change.

In the same way

that scholars theorize that particular men and certain significant

epochs in history come together, so Descartes and the first decades of
The moment

the 17th century seemed to be one of these unique meetings.

had been prepared by the Parisian Doctors in the 14th century who had
initiated modern medicine, also by Copernicus, by Galileo, and by other
scientists

—a

moment to define the physical and mathematical sciences

according to their own value and to demand their free status.
Similarly, another kind of growth was ready to begin:

a growth which

would consist in a process of reflection, in a turning back of thought
upon itself, making it more explicitly aware of itself and its problems.

Mind was ready for revolt.
and by scholasticism.

talents

—a

It had too long been fettered by the church

Into this moment of history came a man of special

genuis, trained in the logic of mathematics, and possessing

of knowledge.
the overwhelming egoism to attempt the reconstruction

world ready for change, a man of special talents:

a unique meeting.

the meeting:
Thomas, a French historian, offers this view of

men stand out
During this long period of time, five or six
rest of the
the
and
as having thought and created ideas;
the time of
world has worked upon these thoughts. From
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A

^
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Christ until the time of Descartes, I perceive a vacuum
of
two thousand years.
In that general torpor, a man was
needed who would again raise up mankind, who would add new
^^9or to understanding, a man who would have enough daring
to overthrow, enough genius to reconstruct.
That man was
Descartes
.

Other verdicts, however, have not been as generous.

For while

Descartes claimed to have reconstructed the foundations of knowledge

solely with the aid of reason and truth, his philosophy, as

I

shall

attempt to show, was neither as reasonable nor as truthful as he
claimed.
Descartes' philosophy was essentially a formalism, a set of formal

definitions and procedures designed to establish and guarantee
certainty.

Each definition had to be wholly explicit, and no step in

the procedure could be susceptible to doubt.

Descartes' was a mind

dedicated to a kind of abstract and formal logic.

Just as Piaget's work

seemed greatly influenced by his early training in biology or Polanyi's

by his training in chemistry, so Descartes' seemed influenced by his
training in mathematics.

Before he became a philosopher, Descartes was,

and remained, a mathematician.

It was as a mathematician that he

extended the professional mark of his calling to knowledge as a whole.
As a mathematician, Descartes had shown that it was possible, by

applying algebra to geometrical problems, to describe the properties of

whole families of curves by means of simple equations.

He believed that

this method, which in the field of mathematics had been so successful,
reach
might be extended to other fields; and thus enable the enquirer to
a similar certainty-

Descartes' work can be viewed as attempting to

establish a universal mathematics within philosophy;

a unification of

.
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sciences, guided by mathematics, in that each of their

components was to be equal in clarity and distinctness, therefore,
in
certainty, to algebra and geometry.

Descartes' method was one of posing

and getting rid of problems, one after the other; and establishing
at

each step certainties never more to be overthrown.

Paradigmatic of this method and its influence was Laplace's

conception that if an omnicient observer knew the position of all the
particles in the universe at time t^, he would then be able to predict
their position at time t^, and so would know everything there was to

Laplace's ideal was one of wholly explicit knowledge.

know.

This was

also essentially Newton's ideal; and it has been the ideal, not only of

philosophers and physicists, but the ideal of the life-scientists as
well

—a

dream that all science could be reduced ultimately to certain

knowledge.

Thus it was hoped, for instance, that one day all

explanations in biology would ultimately be reduced to explanations in
terms of physics and chemistry, which were, in turn, really quantitative

explanations in terms of mathematics.

In this dream, all science was

ideally, applied mathematics; and as the more "backward" sciences

advanced, they moved inexorably closer to this single model.

It was a

model of a one-level world, where there were bits of matter moved by

mechanical laws, and nothing else.

Wholes were explicable by analysis

their
into their parts, and events by their precedent events, which were

causes

46

An Eclectic View of Descartes' Philosophy

Descartes' philosophy showed not only a dedication to the ideal of

certainty, but also a sense of mission, and a scorn of all knowledge
that was not so singularly founded.

After his training in mathematics,

Descartes left the university and began a private study and reflection.
In November of 1619, at the age of twenty-three, in the midst of a long

meditation, Descartes had a prophetic dream.

The "Spirit of Truth"

descended and revealed to him the "admirable science," a unified program
of science, governed by reason and done by the hand of a single master.

Descartes' study had led him to believe that despite the efforts of

previous philosophers, "humanity had been unable to advance by

a

single

step in the pursuit of wisdom and had been but a child up to the
present, governed by its appitites and senses."

never had certain knowledge of anything.

But

2

Man had therefore

nov;,

through the program

of unified science, revealed in his dream, man would become master of

himself and capable of adjusting everything to the level of reason.
With the certainty made possible within a unified science, man would
reach his true maturity and become in Descartes' phrase, "lord and

possessor of nature."
Like most prophetic dreams, Descartes' revealed a vision of an

important and unique fate.

His mission was claer.

If the Spirit of

consecreate
Truth had descended upon him, it was in order that he might

himself to the definitive founding of Science.

For him was reserved the

French historian
role of the great engineer, in the words of the
the intellect, a city
Maritian, "an engineer o f the modern city of
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entirely geometrical and straight as a die, in no way resembling
those
ancient, straggling and badly proportioned cities of the past."

To

become such an engineer, Descartes had to overthrow all that men had
tried to build up through past ages, "an heroic enterprise, one which he

had no right to hold back from, but one which would never again be

necessary to undertake."

3

In short, Descartes' dream commanded him to

reconstruct human knowledge.
At twenty-three years of age, Descartes dedicated himself to the

building of a new and unified philosophy, which would guarantee science
a universal and infallible method of reasoning,

and which would thus

make possible the reconstruction of human knowledge.

He began his

philosophy by reflecting within his own mind and from that reflection

proposed a method by which he could work toward certainty.

His method

was to find principles which were self-evident, and "then starting with
the intuitive apprehension of all these ideas that were absolutely

simple, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all others, by precisely

similar steps."

4

Through this method, the mind would function almost

mathematically, starting with a few basic truths and from there move
toward all further knowledge.

Instead of spreading itself outwardly,

the mind had only to study within itself, in order, there, to become

aware of the truth, the seeds of which were all there inborn.

procedure was simple.

The

In geometry one looked for some geometrical

relatives which
absolute and then arranged in proper order the series of

were dependent on that absolute.

So in philosophy, one had to look for

the various relatives,
some metaphysical absolute and then move toward
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which when arranged in their proper order, would give an
absolutely true
science of reality.

Descartes

dream, the intuition of a unified science to be

achieved primarily by reflection, by casting the mind back into
itself,
iri

embryo, many of the basic principles still existing within

our present intellectual foundation:

the indubitability of knowledge

achieved by correct method, the total explicitness of basic truths, and
the unity of the basic structure of all science.

Descartes' was the

dream of a great and powerful mind, a mind destined to influence man's
conception of knowledge and of himself for generations to come.
Maritian says of this influence:
Descartes dream and early work implied in his youth of
twenty- three who was to lay anev; the foundation of
knowledge, an unusual strength of intellectual
concentration, passion for truth, energy of will, and a
fearless self-confidence accompanied by a hyperbolical scorn
of the past.
It brought with it the out and out dogmatism
which was to characterize and compromise the metaphysics
of the modern, and by way of reaction, lead to the facile
skepticism of the empiricists. It presupposed the
possibility of a single science, accounting for everything,
easily possessed by man, and bearing, as does mathematics,
on knowledge made to the measure of mind. Above all it
actually isolated the human mind in the creation of Science,
which the mind deduced altogether from seeds of truth innate
within itself; and which, being true, as well as being only
an unfolding of our thought, became, in fact, the rule of
Thus, along with universal mathematism of
reality.
objectivity, it instilled the Cartesian doctrine of ideas
the principles of
and the Cartesian doctrine of evidence:
modern subjectivism.”^
'

—

Before

I

—

discuss how Descartes justified these principles,

consider their implications.

These three basic principles contained

within
within Descartes' mathematical formalism are still major forces
our present intellectual foundation.

The explicitness of truth, the
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indubitability of method and the unity of science
are still the ideals
of many of our disciplines.
changed, as
intact.

I

shall later demonstrate; but their force and intent
remain

But why; what is their appeal?

of nature be true?

Newton

They may have become disguised or subtly

s

Why should our mathematicizing

There is no intrinsic reason, for example, why

geometrical proof of Kepler's second law should demonstrate

anything about what goes on in the sky.

Why should the more complex

be explained out of and exhausted by those orders which are
simplest, and ultimately by the most simple, the one "real" order, which
is matter in motion?

These are the principles which my metahpor of the

interface implicitly argues against.

It is precisely this over-emphasis

on formalism which has allowed our disciplines to neglect the complexity
of the world and to insist that because mathematical formulae can be

written on one line, all living things must also be of one sort and on
one level.

It is hard to understand how any human being can move

through the complex diversities of his life and still believe in the

kind of reductionism spawned by these Cartesian principles.

people do; Descartes' influence is still powerful.

Yet many

Despite the many

obvious objections against these Cartesian principles, they are still

deeply ingrained

in

our disciplines and in our intellectual foundation.

The supposed certainty offered by Cartesian philosophy held and still

holds great appeal for man.

Descartes' justification for his basic

principles was powerful and pursuasive.
concept
In his quest for certainty, Descartes' most fundamental

was the Cartesian intuition.

This intuition, or as he later came to

of knowledge.
call it, the clear and distinct idea, was the basic unit
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the underlying building block for all further knowledge.

In order for

the program of a unified science to succeed, the basic unit
had to be

wholly explicit and incapable of being doubted,
Direc tion of the Mind

,

in Rules for the

Descartes stated, "In the subjects we propose to

investigate, our inquiries should be directed, not to v/hat others have
thought, nor to what we ourselves conjecture, but to what we can clearly

and perspicuously behold and with certainty deduce; for knowledge is won
in no other way."

g

That which was "clear and perspicuously to behold"

was to become his basic unit of knowledge, the Cartesian intuition.

The

Cartesian intuition was a conception of a pure and attentive mind, a
conception so plain that no doubt remained concerning what was
understood.

Marjorie Grene, a contemporary critic, discusses the clear

and distinct idea in her book. The Knower and the Known

.

She notes that

it is a conception of the mind, that is something the mind does, not

something that comes to us passively.

The clear and distinct idea is

"self-guaranteeing because it is responsible, independent, an act of
complete attention, resting self-sufficiently within the firm bounds of
its own bright light:

nothing more."

seeing clearly all that it sees and wanting

7

Descartes felt it imperative that his basic unit of knowledge have
the qualities of explicitness and indubitability

standards, even for a genius to set for himself.

These are demanding

.

So much of man's

experience and knowledge is susceptible to questioning and multiple
seems
interpretation, that certainty, within man's given situation,

rarely possible.

man
Descartes’ solution to this dilemma was to view

and his acquisition of knowledge in an extreme way.

Descartes
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characterized man as almost totally

a

mental being, and centered man's

acquisition of knowledge almost wholly within the mind.

For Descartes,

the basic structures of true knowledge already existed within
the mind;

these structures needed only to acquire content to become
functional.
Therefore, the structure of the Cartesian intuition was already existent

within the mind.

The intuition was, hov/ever, not completely isolated;

order to acquire content, the mind had to be focussed on an
object.

Perception's role was, therefore, to break up the object into

"atoms of evidence," v/hich would correspond to ideas already present

within the mind.
Almost like a symbol in mathematics, the clear and distinct idea,
in the last analysis, was a unit, not directly of reality, but of

problem solving.

The "reality" of the object did not matter; it was the

ordering of what was before the mind, to make it accessible to

understanding that counted.

For the process to take place, perception

had to be limited; be disciplined.
but did not interact.

Mind was "focussed" on the world,

For the process to succeed, the clear and

distinct idea had to be, of necessity, the act of a pure and attentive
mind:

the act of a mind unclouded by irrelevancies or obscurities, by

the drift of imagination or the impact of sense.

Somehow a structure,

already present within the mind, so narrowed and purified the mind's

interaction with the world, that what the mind finally allowed itself to
see was explicitly before it; and thus these explicit visions

unquestionably confirmed those structures which had originated the
interaction.

this
The Cartesian unit of knov/ledge was the result of

self-contained clarity of mind, severely disciplined, and uniquely
focussed on its object of understanding.
In its explicitness and indubility, the clear and distinct idea

was Descartes' basic concept in his quest for certainty.
in that it could not be analysed

It was simple

into further parts, and absolute in

that it could be understood in itself without reference to anything
else.

In the use of the clear and distinct idea as a basic building

block in constructing

a

unified science, Descartes' method

v/as

really

only an extension of the principles inherent in this basic concept.

The

first step in the construction of knowledge, the acquisition of the

clear and distinct idea, was already intellectual; it was made possible
by the suspension of the crude and misleading information purveyed by
the senses.

knowledge.

The clear and distinct idea was the essence of Cartesian
The next step in the method was required only because no

finite mind c culd contain all that it knew within the grasp of a .single
intuition.

Somehow the intuitions had to be combined, but combined in

such a way that no step in the process was at all obscure or accessible
to doubt.

The Cartesian method was not really either logical deduction

or induction; it was not an exhibition of conclusions following validly

from premises nor of general laws following from their parts.

It was

mind
rather the movement of that same self-guaranteeing attention of

which might
from one intuition to the next, by the simplist technique

offer itself as a guide.

The Cartesian method was not a logical

argument, but an event, an action.

the
It was the natural movement of

next,
mind from one clear and distinct idea to the

certainty.
acts, all equal in purity, clarity and

8

a long

chain of such
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Through the Cartesian intuition and method, Descartes
proposed to

construct a unified science,

a

unified intellectual discipline which

would be equivalent to human wisdom.

Descartes believed that science

was in its essence unified because it was the activity of intellect
alone; and intellect was composed of structures within the mind, which

were everywhere the same.

As the product of intellect alone, science

was the cultivation of pure intellectual vision; and intellectual vision

had no compartments, no varieties.

Descartes himself offered this

advice to scientists:
If, therefore, anyone wishes to search out the truth of
things in serious earnest, he ought not to select one

special science; for all the sciences are conjoined with one
another and interdependent; he ought rather to think how to
increase the natural light of reason, not for the purpose of
resolving this or that difficulty of scholastic type, but in
order that his understanding may light his will^to its
proper choice in all the contingencies of life.

These concepts, the Cartesian intuition, the Cartesian method, and
the Cartesian unity of the sciences, may become clearer if

Cartesian content to them.

I

add some

In the actual operation of these concepts,

Descartes proposed to make doubt his major guarantor of certainty.

In

the midst of universal doubt, he found one thing that he certainly and

infallibly knew

— the

Descartes' mind, wholly

fact that he doubted.

attentive and cleared of the clutter of the senses, turned to the
intrinsic evidence of its own existence.

This event

the cogito

this

act of a pure and attentive mind, was the first Cartesian intuition.

God was the next major intuition.

Through

a

series of steps which

Descartes considered, not a logical argument, but

a

movement from

God:
intuition to intuition, he moved to the intuition of

ideas had a
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cause; one had an idea of God; nothing less than God was
adequate to

cause the idea of God; God existed.

From the clear and distinct idea of

God, there followed the existence of the material world:

matter and its

properties underlay the principles of mechanics; the principles of

mechanics were beautifully clear; God in his goodness would not allow
man to be deceived about anything so clear; matter existed.
In the Cartesian intuition of the cogito and the intuition of the

existence of matter, Descartes, as he had implicitly done from the very
beginning, distinctly divided the world into two ultimate and

irreducible substances:

matter and consciousness.

extensa," extended* substance

,

Matter was

*'res

occupying space, and ultimately

describable by the physical magnitudes of space and time.

Res extensa

included not just the material world but also man's body, which could be

described and understood as having the same machine-like characteristics
as did inanimate matter.

Consciousness, "res cogitans," was wholly

other than matter and time.

It was non-spatial, indivisible,

instantaneous, self-directed and purely active.

Matter was the subject

of the sciences and consciousness the knowing entity.

Although this

dualism seemed to characterize all of the material world in the same
way,

it was not so much the similarity of all matter as it was the

singularity of the knowing mind, which was the driving force behind the
dualism.

The sciences were unified because the "intuitions" of science

a
were already within the mind; science was essentially a formalism,

mathematical kind of knowing.
by God:

Scientific ideas were pre-existent, given

physics,
simple ideas like the premises of mathematics and

which were true merely by the nature of their form

Thus within the

.
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strict thoorstical definitions of Cartesicin dualism, scientific evidence

became a quality of ideas, ideas which would constitute reality, only if
they were purely and absolutely luminous; further these ideas were not
the property of matter but already present within the mind.

was ideas, and ideas were not means but already things.

Evidence

It was as

things they were attained by thought, as if they were pictures which

thought discovered within itself.

Cartesian dualism was just not

theoretical but an operational separation of mind from v/orld.
Thus in Descartes' philosophy, there could exist only matter and

consciousness.

Man was divided.

But this should come as no surprise.

The concept of duality was already implicit in the first Cartesian

both certainty and the unity of knowledge depend on this

principle:
duality.

The wholly attentive and self-guaranteeing quality of mind

could only exist if the mind was cut off from all implications of its
connection with the crudeness of our bodies and senses.

In seeking to

understand Descartes' philosophy, and the general theories of man and
nature implied therein, the duality of man comes even before the

Cartesian intuition; it was the implicit base on which all else was
constructed
All of these Cartesian concepts may seem so narrow, so self-

justifying, so at odds with human experience, as to be useless.
scientists,
Nevertheless, they held great appeal for philosophers and

hold great appeal today.
and with some modification, they still seem to
by scholasticism, and
The sciences of his day had long been fettered

metaphysics from science.
Descartes, by a master stroke, separated

By

twenty- third year, Descartes
this stroke, perceived in a dream of his
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effectively laid the groundwork for modern science.
influence may be easier to follow if
of the four Cartesian concepts

I

i

abstract, as

have described.

Cartesian principles or theses:

Descartes'
I

did earlier, two

In this way, there are

the principle of indubility,

of self —evidence or explicitness, of the unity of science, and of the

duality of man.

Marjorie Grene says of these theses:

These principles are not isolated; they form a structure.
There is knowledge which is incapable of being doubted
because there is knowledge which is self-evident, selfcontained; the sum of evident knowledge is wisdom, which is
the same everywhere; and both the evidence and the unity of
knowledge are possible because, and only because, knowledge
is the work of the intellect alone.
Were the mind not
cleanly and essentially separate from the body, in nature
and function, the program would collapse.
These principles, powerfully combined within the Cartesian system,

greatly influenced science, philosophy, and most of man's other

disciplines as well.

These principles have been both embraced and

resisted, but they have never been clearly rejected or overcome.

They

have become so deeply embedded in our disciplines and in our structures
of thought, that they have come to form much of our present intellectual

foundation.

Descartes' influence has been powerful and pervasive.

Some General Aspects of Descartes'
Influence on "Objectivism"

This first position paper is designed to elucidate the origins of
through
our present intellectual foundation, and to trace those origins

culture's
their evolution into what may be generally recognized as our

present conceptions of man and his abilities.

exploration is twofold.

First,

I

The purpose of this

believe that the inadequacy of our
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present conception of skills is deeply founded within
this intellectual
foundation, and that no resolution to the problem

I

have come across in

my work with skills can be achieved without some
understanding of the

fundamental conceptions and forces within that foundation.

Second, my

resolution to the problem will be basically to suggest new
fundamental

conceptions of man and his abilities, new basic principles which

I

hope

may eventually lead to a reformulation of our intellectual foundation.
Because

I

can offer only new principles and not their elaboration into a

new foundation, it seems important for me to establish that an

intellectual foundation, can and indeed does, evolve from basic
principles.

I

can thus at least feel that

I

have proposed the first

logic step in such a reformulation.

Before
I

I

go on to suggest two major lines of Cartesian influence,

would like to reflect for a moment on the general emphasis of

Descartes' philosophy.

Most simply stated, that philosophy was

constructed to answer the question, how is knowledge acquired; and the
answer given was, truth is manifest to a mind properly circumscribed.
Descartes' philosophy was basically a conception of knowledge as totally

objective

— impersonal,

explicit and permanent.

For Descartes, knowledge

was achieved by the power of reason alone, relying on nothing outside
itself.

What made knowledge possible was the intrinsic certainty of the

knowing mind itself, needing no support beyond the luminous selfevidence of its own clear and distinct ideas.

All of Descartes'

philosophy was constructed in support of this ideal of certainty.
and
Descartes was first a mathematician; his discoveries in mathematics,
of
other scientific discoveries of the period, particularly those
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GalilGO, indicated to Descartes that it would now be possible for

science to begin the acquisition of all knowledge.

Once this new

scientific method was extended to all subject matters, it would be

possible to solve all the problems which had ever confronted mankind.
To guarantee this acquisition of certain knowledge, Descartes had only
to free science

— to

get everyone off science’s back.

In particular, he

had to free science from all metaphysical concerns and from the

contamination of any personal factors or human perspectives
from all mentation which could be susceptible to doubt.
not difficult.

— that

is

But this was

To free science Descartes had only to get men to think

correctly, to pursuade them of a better, simpler more rational way of

looking at the acquisition of knowledge, to offer men

a

new perspective,

a new ontology.

To free science and to guarantee a conception of totally objective

knowledge, Descartes built his philosophy.

In this reconstruction of

knowledge, Descartes' underlying principle, the one that defended all
the rest, was his dualism.

Unlike future thinkers who would center the

quest for certainty within a one leveled ontology, Descartes was still
too much of a moral philosopher to believe that human nature differed

only in complexity from the mechanical universe.

Therefore, he set mind

within the
apart from all the rest of existence and centered certainty
mind.

Descartes looked at the precision of his own algebraic

and he was convinced
discoveries, and at Galileo's mechanical theories;

that this was not only the
beyond a doubt that the theories were right—
at the universe.
best way, but the only true way of looking

Descartes

and the n,ethod of this
constructed his philoaohpy to defend the truth
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scientific vision.

His philosophy was itself a formal structure,
much

like his own mathematical theories.

The principle of a dualism made

such a formal and mechanistic philosophy possible.

Guided by the

principle of a dualism, Descartes fused his conviction of the uniqueness

with his conviction of the indubitable truth of a mathematical

conception of knowledge; and through a series of clear and precise
steps, constructed, what was to him, an irrefutable foundation for

knowledge.

Cartesian dualism divided existence into mathematicizing mind and
extended matter.

Mind was uniquely structured for the acquisition of

knowledge and matter uniquely structured to be known.
was almost

a

matter/anti-matter division.

different, each a system unto itself.
matter,

including man's physical body.

Cartesian dualism

Mind and matter were wholly

The material world contained all
It was a closed system,

entire

in itself and containing all that was needed for its explanation.

Within the material world, all explanation was on one level, in terms of
least particulars.

Wholes were explicable by their parts, and events by

their precedent events, which were their causes.

The material world was

matter, extended substance, existing within spatical and temporal

dimensions, capable of motion, of dividing and combining, but

essentially dumb, having no outsxde purpose or direction.
anti-matter, everything that matter was not.

Mind was

It was non-spatial,

instantaneous, indivisible, self-directed and purely active.

Yet

uniquely
despite their completely different natures, animate mind was

suited to knowing inanimated matter.

Innately within the mind were to

by God and
be found clear and distinct ideas, which were guaranteed
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''^hich

WGre themsGlves indubitablG truths, corresponding precisely with

the structures of nature.

Descartes himself claimed that his division of existence was so

clearly founded as to be indubitable.

Nevertheless,

I

suggest that

Cartesian dualism was a metaphor; just as my interface is a metaphor.
It was a way of looking at existence.

Descartes' metaphor was implied,

if not already present, in his dream of a unified science.

Possessing

complex scientific skills, devoted to the kind of certain knowledge
science seemed to make possible, and yet unwilling to relinquish the
special place moral philosophy had reserved for man, Descartes had an

intimation or a series of intimations that these disparate ideals could
be combined within a single vision.

To achieve this vision, Descartes'

metaphor focussed narrowly on specific mental abilities and on certain
aspects of the world, to the exclusion of all else.

Thus the metaphor

avoided all the uncertainties of perception and mentation by defining
them away, and similarly avoided all the complexities of the world by

choosing not to see them.

Instead Descartes' metaphor defined and

reduced existence in such a way that everything, both the knower and the
known, fit into a simple, formal structure.

The world of matter was a

closed system of material causality; the world of mind, not only

perfectly suited to understand this closed system, but somehow already
containing and thus guaranteeing the certainty of that explanation.
of
Descartes' metaphor, his vision of existence, was one

tremendous appeal and influence.

The historical generalization

suggested earlier proved to be true.

I

Descartes' particular genius was

the 17th century.
specially suited for those first decades of
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Descartes

vision of manifest truth and all powerful reason did free

science, and offered it the kind of unimpeded progress it had never

before had.

Although specific details and arguments in his philosophy

were slowly discarded, the major thrust and implications of the
Cartesian principles remained dominate.

In return, the success of

science seemed to confirm Descartes' vision and solidified his
influence.

The hope of an exact science, founded on the automatic

manipulation of unambiguous objective variables became a prominent ideal
of not just science but philosophy as well.

Indeed, as

I

have claimed

before, his influence reached into the very heart of our intellectual
foundation.

Although Descartes' vision has been partly resisted or has

been supplemented, we still, even today, stand on Cartesian ground.

We

rely unthinkingly on the principles Descartes proposed.
The power and pervasiveness of Descartes' vision is manifest in
two lines of thought which followed.

These lines developed and diverged

as some of the more fragile aspects of Cartesian dualism began to erode.

One line, which

I

have referred to earlier as subjective, was, in

effect, a continuation of metaphysics, but now operating within the

structures of Cartesian dualism.

The other line, the objective, was

had
basically a continuation of the unified program of science Descartes
of his
envisioned, but without some of the more encumbering aspects

philosophy.

knowledge
Descartes had defended his conception of explicit

hiiman or dubitable elements
by building a philosophy which excluded all

from the acquisition of knowledge.

The simplest defense would have been

centering the acquisition of knowledge
to exclude all human elements by
that closed system of material
within the material world itself, within
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causality.

However, Descartes still felt that mind was somehow
unique.

Therefore, he narrowed, limited and purified mind until it
was safe to

center the acquisition of knowledge within it.
of acquisition was somewhat mysterious:

Even then, the process

mind did not actually think; it

only beheld what was already there.

But in the last analysis, those

mysterious elements did not matter.

The process was indubitable anyway

because it was guaranteed by God

— it

had God's seal of approval.

As science developed, however, this conception of knowledge

,

as

centered mysteriously within the mind, became burdensome and unstable.
The questions of how non-material awareness arose from physiological

processes and how it effected the acquisition of knowledge seemed
extraneous to science’s main concerns.

Moreover, in the years that

followed, faith in God dwindled, and wisdom, also greatly influenced by

the success of science, became ever more secular.

Descartes' real

import to science was not this strange isolation of the knowing mind,

but rather the conception that truth was manifest; that explicit and
indubitable knowledge was possible.

If man was essentially dualistic in

his nature, fine; so much the easier to exclude all human perspectives

from science.

Let the metaphysicians worry about the mind.

For

science, knowledge became a province not of mind, but of the brain which

was wholly a part of the material world.

world of scientific description.

Awareness need not enter the

If awareness arose at all, it was only

reciprocity.
a by-product of physiological processes and had no

dualistic faith,
Thus for science in the years that followed, the
gave way to a
that God made and kept united knowledge and its objects,

complex order could be
one leveled conception of knowledge where all
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explained out of simpler order, and ultimately out of the one real order

which was matter in motion.

This was a conception of knowledge which

have previously characterized as objectivism, and

I

I

will continue to use

the term although materialism might be more philosophically accurate.

Objectivism was bascially a one level ontology where everything,
including man himself, was explicable in terms of least particulars.

Taking its lead from Descartes, objectivism was a continued narrowing of
the conception and means of knowledge, an exclusion of all dubitable

elements.

The last elements of the unique power of mind, which

Descartes had seemed to include, were not eliminated; and the reason was

separated wholly from experience.

Science finally became not

explanation, but merely description.

Scientific theories were denied

any claim to inherent rationality, but became merely the most economical

adaptation of thought to facts.

12

Although Cartesian philosophy greatly limited our intellectual

powers and narrowed our conceptions of knowledge, it still allowed
reason to be the final judge of reality.

Thus for Descartes, the

mathematical conceptions of the clear and distinct ideas were the final
reality.

were
In the Cartesian system, numbers and geometrical forms

reveal its
assumed to be inherent in the material world, and thus to

perfection and harmony.

Starting with Newton, an even greater

conception of
limitation, an even more "objective and mechanistic"

existence began to prevail.

Newton was deeply influenced by Descartes,

genius.
and like him was imbued with mathematical

But at the same time

could be read not from the
Newton believed that mathematical insight
phenomena.
mind itself, but from the perceived

Thus while Newton

—

claimed for his mechanics the Cartesian ideals of explicitness and

indubitability

,

he centered his claim not with the clear and distinct

ideas of the mind, but within the material world itself.

From Newton

onward, rationality, which was for Descartes at least partially a power

of the mind, given and guaranteed by God, moved outside the mind, and

became another factor somehow implicitly existing in the material world.
With Newton, pure mathematics which had formerly been the key to
nature's mysteries, became strictly separated from the application of

mathematics to the formulation of empirical laws.

Mind was denied the

power to apprehend reality, and theory could no longer reveal nature's
perfection.

Mathematics, rather, came to represent, as Polanyi says,

"all rational thinking which appeared necessarily true; while reality

was summed up in the events of the world which were seen as contingent
that is, merely such as happened to be the case."

13

After Newton, the

separation of reason and experience was taken even further, and

mathematics was denied the capacity of stating anything beyond a set of
tautologies.

Scientific theory was denied the claim to any inherent

rationality.

Scientific theory became only a convenient summary of

experience,

a

quantitative correlation of cause and effect.

Therefore,

anything
scientific theories could never go beyond experience or affirm

which could not be tested by experience.
forsaken for mere description.

Scientific explanation was
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More Specific Aspects of Descartes'
Influence on Objectivism

Thomas saw Descartes as one of the five or six great intellects of
all time, a man with "the daring to overthrow" and "the genius to

reconstruct."

As befits such a genius, his influence on succeeding

generations has been manifold.

By a master stroke, Descartes separated

metaphysics from science, and in so doing, effectively laid the
groundwork for modern science.
universal method and doubt

—a

His ideal of a mathematical gnosis, of

single Science in the pure state, offered

science an all-powerful rationale.

With this rationale, science grew to

become absolute, the final arbitrator, unquestionably correct.

Although

some of the specifics of the Cartesian system changed and evolved, the

power of the rationale remained.

In his quest for absolute certainty,

Descartes gave to science intimations of a potential mastery and
certitude, intimations which were in time themselves to become
the unquestioning possession of unquestionable knowledge.

certitudes:

While Cartesian philosophy and the subsequent principles of

objectivism freed science and gave it an unassailable authority
did not seem to affect the actual workings of science.

,

they

The techniques

and operations of the sciences, particularly the hard sciences like
from
physics, chemistry and astronomy seemed to develop independently

these principles.

Thus while science claimed, and maybe even believed

principles
that it was operating through the objective

I

outlined in the

processes of discovery
last section, it was actually operating through
of the human mind; these
much more consistent with the actual workings

processes

1

will discuss later.

hard
Descartes' major Influence on the

,
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sciences was, therefore, not so much to change sciences

's

as to change what science claimed or thought it was doing,

inner workings

Descartes

did not so much change the content of science; rather he changed man's

conception of science.

When the hard sciences claimed to be only

experimental, never venturing beyond experience by affirming anything
that could not be tested by experience

,

they were robbing themselves

and more importantly they were robbing a culture, which looked to them
as a model.

They were depriving mankind of

adequate to the human situation,

a

a

conception of knowing

conception that acknowledged the

elements of passion, beauty and profundity which must be a part of any

process of discovery.
Nevertheless, in any strict accounting, Descartes cannot be said
to have influenced the hard sciences as greatly as he influenced many

other of our disciplines

.

Because he did not change the actual workings

of the hard sciences, they have been able to develop in a relatively

"natural" manner:

they have made discoveries, have apprehended reality,

more skillfully, more truly than have any of our other disciplines.
Descartes' major influence has been on philosophy, and on the
later,
biological, social and psychological sciences, which, developing

and on the
attempted to model themselves on the Cartesian principles

objectivism.
misleading conceptions of knowing proffered by
and objectivist tradition
The philosophical influence of Descartes

positivist movement which arose
is perhaps best exemplified in the

toward the end of the 19th century.

Positivism denied to scientific

theories any claim to inherent rationality.

Scientific theory was

experience, the most economical
merely a convenient summary of
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adaptation of thought to facts.

Positivism was at oncG a quest for an

indubitable rationale for science, and a total reaction against the
inherent power of reason.

Positivism reached its extreme conclusion in

a movement known as logical positivism which grew in the 1920 's around a

group of men who became known as the Vienna Circle.

One of the main

programs of the logical positivists was an attempt to drive

a logical

wedge between what was on one hand verifiable and scientific, hence
meaningful; and what on the other hand was not verifiable and
scientific, hence not meaningful.

Just as Descartes had attempted to narrow and define reality so
that the all powerful reason of the self-contained mind would be the
final arbitrator of knowledge, so the logical positivists attempted to

define reality so that experience would arbitrate.

The logical

positivists recognized only two kinds of meaningful statements, analytic
and synthetic.

Statements concerning the relations of ideas were

analytic; they were true by virtue of their form.

amounted almost to tautologies,

2+2=4,

Analytic statements

and could be demonstrated by

simple logical methods without appeal to experience.

Synthetic

statements could be verified or falsified by experience.

Statements

which fit neither category were merely sophistry and illusion.

A.

Ayer, a noted positivist, explained further:

The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of
apparent statements of fact is the criterion of
verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually
knows
significant to any given person, if and only if, he
express
to
how to verify the proposition which it purports
him, under
lead
would
observations
what
that is, if he knows
as being true,
certain conditions, to accept the proposition
If on the other hand, tne
or reject it as being false.
the
putative proposition is of such a character that

—

J.
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assumption of its truth or falsehood is consistent with any
assumptions whatsoever concerning the nature of his future
experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a
tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence may be
emotionally significant to him, but it is not literally
significant.
Just as Descartes sought to eliminate, from the acquisition of
knowledge, all aspects of human persepctive which might be dubitable, so
the positivists sought to guarantee a hard core of certain knowledge by

eliminating from science, and really from all discovery, the passionate,
personal, human appraisal of theory.

For both Descartes and the

positivists, this unique utopia of infallible truth could be reached

when each item in the acquisition of knowledge could be specified.
Descartes sought to specify his basic unit of knowledge by separating
reason from all dubitable influence and by offering reason the precise

mathematical certainty of the Cartesian intuition.

With the

positivists, reason was separated wholly from experience; the only

specifiable units of knowledge became not intuitions but mechanical
certainties.

Instead of a great natural machine and over against it the

mathematician's mind, intent on grapsing clearly and distinctly its

working order, the positivists proposed the spread of time-space events
system
in nature and over against these a kind of map or time-table, a
of knowing equally mechnical.

The Cartesian quest for certainty led

mathematical
from the already limited conception of self-contained
in which science
truths guaranteed by God, to the positivist conception,

moment, one must be
became only description, and in which, at any

whenever an item of that
prepared to drop his quest for knowledge,

knowledge could not be verified by experience.

.

69

Here, in its sterile splendor, can be seen part of the Cartesian

legacy to the modern world.

The Cartesian quest for a manifest truth,

wholly specifiable in its least particulars, leads to a conception of
knowledge adequate perhaps to computers, but not to us as knowing
beings.

As

I

suggested in my introduction, we are not automatic pilots,

but real pilots

—balancing,

precariously yet precisely, through

processes of knowing far different from those proposed by the
positivists.

If we actually sought to so specify our knowledge, we

should have fallen long ago.

Yet positivists still maintained that

certain knowledge was our birthright and our destiny.

The separation of

mind, the quest for certainty, led the positivists to this isolation.

For the logical positivists, it was true that one might have images and

even feelings
thoughts.

irrelevant.

— that

is passion, beauty, profundity

— connected

with his

That fact might be of minor importance, but logically it was
What gave meaning to a proposition were not the attendant

images, but its verifiability.

With positivism, the human mind had

completely lost its power to apprehend reality.

What was real, what was

meaningful, not only in science but in men's daily lives as well, became

only that which could be proven, verified by experience.
credo,
Long before the positivists attempted to establish their

objectivism was already a powerful force in the world of ideas.

The

philosophical
objectivism of the 17th and 18th centuries was both a
the physical sciences.
influence and an ever-developing rationale for
to serve as a foundation—
In the 19th century, objectivism also began

newly developing life
not just a rationale, but a model— for the

sciences

objectivism seemed to
The certainty and justification which
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have given the physical sciences held great attraction for biology,
zoology, and later for psychology and sociology.

Objectivism tended to

narrow the life-sciences and reduce them to a study of parts, of
details, rather than a study of the organism as a whole.

In biology,

objectivist theories and explanations tended to be in terms of chemical
and physical properties; in psychology, explanations were in terms of
the behavior of the organism; and in the social sciences, particularly
in ethology, in terms of evolutionary and genetic development.

Much of the objectivist influence on the life-sciences can also be
traced back to its Cartesian roots.

which the objectivists have played

Of all the scientific issues in
a role, one of the most deeply rooted

was the mind-body problem, a problem, which even before Descartes, was
of great interest to scientists and philosophers.

Although the

parameters of the problem changed as discoveries in biology and genetics
altered the scientific knowledge of man, the basic definitions of the

problem still remained those which Cartesian philosophy gave to the
world.

Before the 17th century, the physical and biological world,

alike, were populated v/ith spirits which were cosubstantial with the

physical bodies they inhabited.

For most thinkers, the body was the

them.
natural home of the soul, and there was no incompatibility between

of the soul
Medieval men were full of humors, shadowy characteristics

which permeated all portions of the body.

Until the scientific

was, for the most
revolution and its great patriarch, Descartes, there

which mind and soul, as
part, no mind-body dualism in the sense in
mechanical world, became major
unsubstantial entities in a deterministic

intellectual problems.

15
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When the scientific revolution demystified the universe, and Descartes reduced the body to a machine driven by an hydraulic system of

vital liquids coarsing down the nerves, there was logically no place
left for the mind.

Descartes, needing to reconcile a mechanistic

universe with his own moral philosophy, placed the mind along with its
guarantor, God, in a kind of pre-cognitive realm inside the brain, where
it was the source of truth but could itself never be known.

With the

advance of science and the decline of religious influence in the 18th

and 19th centuries, the objectivists no longer needed the concept of

mind to explain the acquisition of knowledge.

Nevertheless, especially

in the life-sciences, the vexing notion of dualism remained.

The life-sciences, which had to deal with complex drives of human

nature, could not dismiss the problem as easily as the physical sciences

seemed to.

The question remained:

the essential knower

— how

how did awareness arise, where was

did the body which was a part of the world,

connect with the mind inside the brain inside the head, that infinite
regress back to the essential knower?

The objectivists'

attempts to

reconcile the mind-body problem were founded on the premise that if the
then
brain’s connections to the body could be specified closely enough,

specified.
the mind, the essential knower, would somehow also be

Toward

brain-body intersuch specification, the objectivists built models of
action.

clockwork model
The mechanically minded 18th century preferred a

limbs like a master puppeteer.
in which the brain twitched the body's

By

gave rise to descriptions
the 19th century, the discovery of electricity

based on electrical attractions and repulsions.

But these models,

Newtonian mechanics and the
especially compared to the precision of
objective.
Mendeleev periodic table, seemed hardly

What was needed was
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for the brain to be analyzed, for its constituent parts to be localized

and their functions specified.
The phrenoligists first attempted this localization by claiming to

distinguish, through the skull, such separate brain areas as mathematics
and love of children.

Later in the 19th century, Ferrier and Broca gave

this kind of model a more rational basis by proposing that different

parts of the brain controlled different body functions, such as speech,

hearing and sight.

With the technique of anatomical dissection, the

localization models became much more precise.

Sherrington, in the early

20th century, built a model for postural control that was pictured in

terms of specific connections from sense organ to muscle, a conception

that implied a separate connection of every sensory cell with every

motor center.

Research, using electronic stimulation, guided by an

electron microscope, produced even more detail localization models.
Despite their detailed specification, even these more recent

objectivist models did little to solve the essential mind-body problem.
Just as Descartes, once he had created the dualism, side-stepped the

problem by defining mind in

a

way that could not be questioned, so the

objectivists seemingly defined away the problem.

As they subjected the

of mind
mind to ever more detailed analysis, they restricted the role

further and further.

The 18th century could still talk of "mind"

vagueness of their
mechanically connected to the body, and in the very
some uniqueness for the
concepts, still preserve some "otherness,"

essential knower.

toward brain
But as objectivists’ research turned

altogether.
analysis, the concept of mind was banished

Henceforth, w

physical body.
was being connected was physical brain with

The mind-

—
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body problem had again been surreptitously defined away.

For the

objectivists, the Cartesian cogito, the "I" that thinks, seemed not to
exist.

Descartes considered consciousness a unity, separate,
incorruptible, immortal; and nevertheless capable of certain knowledge
all this guaranteed by God.

Man's body was a machine ruled by a mind

totally separate from the body.

Since animals did not have immortal

souls, their minds were of the same siibstance as their bodies; all

living things in nature, except those that were humanly conscious, were

really only highly complex machines.

With the decline of religious

influence, with the advance of the objective brain-body models described
above, and v/ith the rise of evolutionary doctrines of natural selection,
Thus the

man lost his exemption and became only the "naked ape."

description of both men and animals could be given in terms of the
arrangement and operation of physical parts in space and time.

The laws

of motion of such animal-machines were, therefore, nothing but complex
forms of the laws of physics and chemistry.

Over the years, scientific advances dictated certain changes in
the analogy, but the machine image remained dominant.

Consideration of

most of the
purposive or intelligent behavior was all but removed from

been similar.
life-sciences, and in much of psychology the results have
made a coherent
The radical disconnection of mind from body
impossible.
understanding of the world in terms of them

As the

mind shrivelled to,
knowledge of physical nature increased, the

Ryle's phrase,

m

else vanished altogether
"a ghost in the machine," or

into the computer-like brain.

earlier.
Laplace's conception, mentioned
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that if an omniscient observer knew the position of all the particles
in
the universe at time t^...was a description of a universe wholly without

mind.

This displacement of mind from the world seemed to offer the kind

of certainty science was supposed to have.

mind became an objectivist ideal,

a

Thus the displacement of

model for aspiring sciences.

One of the best examples of a science modeled on this ideal was in
a psychology which came to be known as behaviorism.

Behaviorism, also

strongly influenced by positivism, emerged as a revolt against the

excessive use of introspective methods.
effect, by James Watson.

Behaviorism was begun, in

In a paper he published just before the

outbreak of the First World War, Watson declared, "the time has come

when psychology must discard all references to consciousness.

Its sole

task must be the prediction and control of behavior; and introspection

can form no part of its method."

16

By behavior, Watson meant observable

activities, what physicists called public events.

All mental events

were private and could only be made public by introspective statements.
Therefore, within the positivist doctrine, mental events had to be

excluded from the domain of psychological science.

Behaviorism first

intended to objectify psychology by excluding consciousness, images and

other "subjective phenomena," as objects of study.

Later this came to

imply that the excluded phenomena did not exist.
human beings
It was difficult, however, for psychology to study

without reference to consciousness.

Unlike the biological sciences

behaviorists had
which confined their human studies to physiology, the
interaction.
to include some reference to mind-body

In an effort to

excluded the direct
remain true to its objective ideals, behaviorism

—
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study of human beings.

Instead, it experimented with animals under

laboratory conditions, and then ascribed the results of those
experiments to human behavior.

The basic design of those experiments

animal, box, lever, food pellets

— is

all too well known.

For

behaviorism, this type of experiment became the archetypal model for all
learning, not only animal but human as well.

physiological concept of the reflex arc:

The model was based on the

the new-born organism came

into the world equipped with a number of simple, unconditioned reflexes;

what it learned in its lifetime was

a

matter of conditioning those

reflexes, that is connecting them, one to the next, by a kind of

learning which resulted from interaction with the environment.

Each

connection, each learning event, was conceived of as a stimulus and
response, as an S-R unit.

Whether the stimulus came first, or whether,

as later in behaviorism, the response was followed by a reinforcing

stimulus, did not seem to matter.

What was important was that all

learning could be conceived of as a series of S— R units, one linked to
the next.

With this S-R model of learning and with the transposition of

the results of their experiments to human behavior, the behaviorists
felt that they had objectified psychology and made it a true science.

They had indeed excluded consciousness from their study

,

totally

brain as sort
displacing mind from the world, but only by treating the
only permissible knowledge of
of a black box, a mysterious computer, the
output.
which was to found in statements of input and
the question of how an
If one confronted a behaviorist with

possible, his answer would
individual learned, of how knowledge was

modified by objectivism.
contain the basic Cartesian principles, as

For
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a behaviorist,

truth was also manifsst to a mind proparly circumscribed.

The technique of problem solving for the behaviorists was merely the

manipulation of simple variables which eventually led to the emission of
the proper response.

One began with the S-R unit, which was the

simplest and most obvious unit of experience, a unit proven beyond all

doubt by strict scientific experiments under laboratory conditions.

The

S-R unit was the behaviorist building block for all knowledge, a unit so
clear and distinct as to be indubitable.

To form a theory, one merely

sought within further experiments, some obvious combination of such S-R
units.

Thus through an almost formal science of human nature, starting

with the simplest, most explicit units of knowledge, one arrived at a
kind of knowledge equal in clarity and distinctness to the "mindless"
sciences of physics and chemistry.

17

What this behaviorist theory of learning became, more than
anything else, was a kind of extreme form of environmentalism.

The

human brain became a kind of tabula rasa, a computer which could never
adjust or affect its own program, but must always learn and react in a
simple, mechanistic way.

As behaviorism grew, it became interested in

showing how human beings could be better fitted to their environment,
best fit
that is how they could be shaped into particular categories to

society's needs.

This kind of "reductionism" not only reduced human

events into
beings into programmed automatons, but reduced sociological

behavioral one;

for example, the alienation of youth in advanced

of adequate
industrial societies could be explained by the lack

reinforcing stimulae during upbringing.

In this view society was kind

individuals, rather than being.
of a reified abstract which controlled
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itself, the product of those individuals.

This is essentially the same

view of society parodied by Huxley's Brave New World

,

but despite Huxley

and many other critics, this behaviorist conception of man and society

has become deeply ingrained in our present intellectual foundation.

Why this unquestioning acceptance of an ultimately degrading and
defeating doctrine?
clue.
^
about.

true.

B.

F.

Skinner, a leading behaviorist, provided a

Skinner claimed that no theory ever changed what it was
18

.

a

theory

.

Within the objectivist framework of behaviorism, this was

Man was changed by the environment,

controlled by society.

which was in turn largely

The doctrine was self-fulfilling:

as soon as an

individual accepted it, he tended to become passive and did indeed begin
to fit into the category he believed that society had created for him.

For that individual and for the behaviorists themselves, theories only

reflected the conditions that already existed.

Yet the remarkable thing

about men and society was that they were changed by theories, precisely

because theories were created by and therefore modified consciousness.
It was only by dehumanizing man, by doing away with consciousness, that

the behaviorist doctrine made sense.

If the basic behaviorist premise

was accepted, if one believed that all learning was essentially a

mechanical series of S-R links, then all of the rest of the doctrine
inevitably followed.
theory
Skinner's doctrine, that no theory changes what it is a

within our present
about, epitomizes the objectivist s vision of reality
'

intellectual foundation.

has
The Cartesian quest for certain knowledge

which neither mankind,
brought us to a conception of existence in
himself, nor his knowledge, has any meaning.

Descartes believed that
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once the new simplicity and clarity were extended to all subject
matters, mankind would have solved all the problems ever to confront the

human mind.

But the extension of the supposed methods of physics and

chemistry to all disciplines, has led rather to a caricature of
knowledge.

The incoherence of a vision of existence dominated by the

separation of mind from the acquisition of knowledge, and by the attempt
at the complete specification of the units and processes of knowledge,

has led to a world in which man himself has no place.

The irrational

faith that more complex orders must be explained out of and exhausted
by,

those that are simplest, and ultimately out of the one real order of

matter in motion, forms a conception of existence in no way adequate to
the human situation.

Neither mankind himself nor his acquisition of

knowledge can be explained within a foundation which denies the power of
mind.

Nor, as

I

shall now go on to explain, can an adequate conception

be arrived at by remaining subjectively within the confines of that
mind.

Rather we must find

a

new vision, a coherent conception of

ourselves as knowing beings within a knowable world.

Descartes' Influence on Subjectivism

influence has
My exploration of the Cartesian principles and their

been able,

I

hope, to suggest some of the inadequacies within our

present intellectual foundation.

The various tenets of objectivism have

these inadequacies, but
been, perhaps, the most prominent source of
another, and radically
within our present foundation there exists

which has proven equally
different conception of existence, a conception
harmful.

power of the objective
Despite the success of science and the
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doctrine, there have been other thinkers, the subjective philosophers

and writers, who have been unwilling to center their conception of

existence wholly within the material world.

Yet because of the

influence of the Cartesian system, there existed for these subjective

thinkers no middle ground; if they wished to include mind in their

explanations of existence, then they were forced to make those

explanations wholly in terms of mind.

The inadequacies of both

objectivism and subjectivism stem from that time, early in the 17th
century, when Descartes, in pursuit of manifest truth, split apart the

inner life of consciousness from the external world.

As m.an's knowledge

of physical nature increased by leaps and bounds, the mind, understood
as disembodied spirit, shriveled within that objective world to a mere

ghost in the machine.

Despite the ingenuity of some of Descartes'

remarks about the interaction of mind and body, the radical

disconnection of the two has made a coherent understanding and
conception of existence, in terms of them, impossible.
In his quest for certain knowledge, Descartes separated mind from

matter.

The separation was total, a kind of matter/anti-matter division

extended world
in which mind was conceived of as wholly other than the

of matter.

To many of the writers who followed, this extreme, two

anything but
leveled ontology seemed to preclude mind's knowledge of
itself.

knowledge
Yet for Descartes, despite the separation,

and indubitable knowledge— was possible.

explicit

Set off from all contaminating

matter; mind was still
influence, from feeling, from the body, from

pure and unique ability of
granted the one attribute of consequence-the

mathematical reason.

mind discovered
As a subject matter for reason,
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innately within itself, guaranteed by God, the clear and distinct idea—
a unit of knowledge which by itself would serve as the building block

for all further knowledge.

This Cartesian conception of knowledge,

especially as it developed into the simpler, one leveled ontology of
objectivism, offered the hard sciences a powerful rational.
also done, as

I

Yet it has

have suggested, great damage to man's disciplines and to

his conception of himself and his abilities.

objectivism, or as

I

Whether as an influence on

shall now show, on subjectivism, the Cartesian

system has so narrowed man's conception of existence that an adequate

understanding of life has become impossible.
Burdened with the secularization of thought in the 17th and 18th
centuries, and deprived of its props in God and innate ideas, the

Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter became unstable.

Without its

Cartesian rationale, mind lost its innate ability to apprehend the
world; henceforth, with the total separation of mind and matter, each

part of the divided cosmology had to attempt to account for the whole.

Although Descartes had originally premised the dualism, it was the

objectivists who severed the final connections.

Within the objective

conception of existence, mind was no longer needed.

First with Newton's

conception of mathematical truth not as an attribute of mind but
method, a
inherent in nature, then with the success of the scientific

experimental
method which with its techniques of observation, its
least particulars- with
evidence, its reduction of all order into its

objectivists separated reason
this all-powerful vision of science, the
level conception of existence
totally from experience and created a one

sufficient unto itself.

of existence,
Within this objective conception

,
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mind was so isolated that it became only a kind of private vagary.

Thought could attain only itself.
by its own internal exigencies.

It was not ruled by interaction but

For the ob jectivists

,

mind became a

world shut up, absolute, by itself alone.
Thus when the faith that God made and kept united man's thoughts

and their object gave way to the more irrational faith that complex
/

orders must be explained out of those orders that were simplest, man was
left with no alternative for any form of life except to be either a mere

body spread out in space or to be a mere bit of subjectivity completely
and secretly within.

Still though, over against the ob jectivists

,

there

were thinkers who sought to center their conception of existence within
that mind.

These thinkers protested against an objectivist spirit which

seemed to make man a pawn in the power of deterministic forces.

For

such subjective thinkers, the objectivist tradition exemplified by

Laplacean science or more recently by behaviorism, contained no concepts

which could make intelligible the existence of conscious life.

The

atomic topography of the central nervous system was not consciousness
and only the grossest psuedo-substitution could equate mind with its

conditions.

The subjectivists, however, despite this antipathy, were

arose— that is
still bound by those principles, from which objectivism
subjectivists
Cartesian certainty and Cartesian dualism; and thus the

within that "mere bit
were forced to seek their conception of existence
of subjectivity."

be his unique
In order to offer man what they felt to

birthright, the freedom of self-determination

,

they were forced to regard

rest of creation.
the human race as different from all the

To gain the

forced to turn his back on all
freedom of self-determination, man was
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theories or situations which might deny or reduce that freedom.

have been many subjective thinkers; and as with the ob jectivists

There
,

their

influence on our present conceptions of existence has been manifold.

Because, however, the subjective themes relevant to my purposes, have

remained more constant than those within objectivism,

I

think

I

will be

able to adequately convey the subjective influence on our present intel-

lectual foundation through the exploration of the work of a single writer.

Jean Paul Sartre, in his book. Being and Nothingness

,

well

exemplified the subjective influence on our present intellectual
foundation.

The cogito was for Sartre, the only proper starting point

for philosophy, but the "I" for Sartre, as for all Cartesian thinkers,

had to be radically other than, over against, the real, the given, the
out there.

Sartre carried Descartes' "anti-matter" pre-suppositions to

their natural conclusions.

If consciousness had to be wholly other than

matter, then there could be no innate ideas, no mysterious apprehension

of the material world.

Given the Cartesian pre-suppositions, it was only

as nothingness that consciousness could exist.

negation, an emptiness.
lack of what?

Human reality was a

This negation was felt as dread and as lack.

A

A lack of the impossible synthesis of mind and the world.

But because emptiness and lack were always, in principle, a desire
what it
wanting to be filled, human reality was both the aspiration to be

was not and the incapacity of such being.

condemned to be free"

—

As Sartre said,

"we are

we choose ourselves, we make ourselves be, as

being, unrealizable
the unrealized, and by the very nature of our

completion of ourselves.
it could have
Because Sartre's cogito was wholly self-contained,

no knowledge of anything outside itself.

For all Cartesian thinkers
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"real" knowledge had to be explicit:

any shadowy intimations the mind

might acquire were by definition unreal.

Thus for Sartre, the only

knowledge the mind could have was of itself.

Consciousness could

neither appropriate into itself specific aspects of the world

— an

object, a specific theory, the knowledge of another person; nor could it

surrender itself to the more general aspects of being

— to

the factual

contingencies, the social lore, the intellectual disciplines of the
world.

Knowledge only haunted the world as an unrealizable.

Sartre

said, "this perpetually indicated by impossible fusion of essence

(consciousness) and existence (the world) does not belong either to the

present or the future."

20

For Sartre, an attempt by consciousness to
that

acquire knowledge of anything other than itself was inauthentic:
attempt was made in what he called "bad faith."

Man's authentic

existence could be only to seek in some isolated, empty center, the

utter self-sufficiency of his original choice of himself.
Sartre's philosophy was, however, not some pessimistic quest for
Rather his was an attempt to understand

meaninglessness and alienation.

human existence; what he did was to face with appalling honesty, the
consequences inherent within our present philosophical foundation.
with
Sartre began with the cogito, but rather than a cogito co-existent

pre-ref lective
its own clear and distinct ideas, Sartre began with a

Cartesian system.
cogito, which he argued, was presupposed by the
Sartre argued,
"Every positional consciousness of an object,"
itself."
same time a non-positional consciousness of

21

is at the

Such a pre-

regress back to the
reflective cogito stopped one from an infinite

essential knower-to know that

I

know that

I

know.

Sartre’s cogito was
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thG Gssencs from which all elsG started, but it was an essence which

could only be self-directed.

The only authentic possibility for

consciousness, Sartre argued, was pure reflection, a kind of pre-

reflective reflexiveness in which consciousness could only face its

otherness than being.
Sartre's starting point may seem to differ greatly from
Descartes'.

The Cartesian cogito has been stripped of its props in God

and substance, and carried to its extreme conclusions.

But despite this

transformation, Sartre’s cogito is still similar to Descartes' in at
least four ways.

Just as Descartes' cogito was anti-matter

that matter was not, so too was Sartre's.

instantaneous.
instant.

22

— everything

First, Sartre's cogito was

All temporality was a decompression of the original

Consciousness could be only that which

v/as

Murdoch put it, "the agent, thin as a needle, appears
flash of the choosing will."
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not time:
in

as Iris

the quick

Second, the cogito was self-directed.

Because consciousness was wholly other than matter, it had to be purely
internal; knowing only itself.
active.

Thirdly, Sartre's cogito was purely

It could neither have the object, nor surrender to it, but

could act only within itself.

The cogito was a center of total

responsibility, but a responsibility turned inward.

could be self-assertion.

Fourthly, and

I

Its only action

include this attribute again

pre-ref lective
because it is essentially Cartesian, Sartre's cogito was

or precognitive.

Because all knowledge as defined within the Cartesian

abandoning the primacy of
system had to be explicit, it was only by

being of the knower.
knowledge that Sartre could discover the true
knowledge, before feeling.
Sartre, consciousness had to come before

For

before anything else.
inind,

The Cartesian concept of a pure and attentive

minus its innate ideas, became for Sartre, the non— substantial

absolute of pure, inward intuition.
Sartre's starting point, his cogito, contained in essence the

whole of his argument.

Consciousness was the only entity in the world

which had the potential for meaning.

Yet it had this potential only

because of its uniqueness, its total separation from anything else.

The

world for Sartre must always remain unknown, an undifferentiated
plenitude of matter.
reality.

Consciousness could never apprehend an external

Its only authentic existence was in the recognition of its

otherness than being; only by keeping itself pure and uncontaminated,
only in its nihilating recoil for the meaningless of matter, could the

cogito find its unique existence.

"Nothingness is the peculiar

possibility of being and its unique possibility.
•

..24

As long as the cogito kept always before itself the recognition of
its uniqueness, its separation, its otherness than being

maintain its authentic existence.

it could then

The cogito was free to choose its own

being, its values, its meaning, as long as it recognized that such

choices were totally subjective.

Because reality could never be

apprehended, consciousness must remain always totally responsible
neither God nor
recognizing always that there was no true reality, that
that such choices must
nature nor society could corroborate its choices,

remain always a kind of game.

a
To the authentic man, life was absurd,

chose to give it.
game which had whatever values the players

The only

by consciousness of its own
authentic knowledge could be the recognition

being, that is its otherness than being.

Either on the level of
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reflection, consciousness could rise to face itself
as pure lack— in
freedom, anguish, total responsibility; or else it could
sink into bad
faith, the complacent taking of its values as substantive
realities.

Thus for Sartre, man was denied all ability to apprehend
reality, and

knowledge must remain always and wholly subjective.

Conclusion

I

now conclude my exploration on what

present intellectual foundation.

I

have characterized as our

My exploration has been selective.

Its purpose has been to substantiate some of our culture's underlying

conceptions of knowledge.

I

have attempted first to establish the

existence of an intellectual foundation and then to suggest its basic
structure.

For the most part my exploration has been abstract.

I

have

described our present foundation as dependent on a few basic principles
and have traced their influence on a few representative disciplines.

I

have included exemplification only to the extent necessary to show that
my ideas have some connection to the actual world.

conclusion,

I

Here, at the

would like to briefly summerize my argument.

An intellectual foundation is an interpretation of the world, a

vision of existence among many possible visions.

As long as it seems

the valid interpretation, it exherts the compelling claim to being

accepted as the only true picture of the world, indeed as truth itself.
Ever since the efflorescence of the physical sciences in the 17th
disparate
century, our intellectual foundation has been dominated by two

visions of reality:

one which takes the supposed structure of those

one model of
sciences, and especially physics and mathematics, as the

87

existence— as the sole provider of relevant truth, order and lawfulness;
and the other which in revolt against this model takes human

consciousness, in purity and isolation, as the single certainty in an

otherwise unknowable world.
Both of these visions of existence have been greatly influenced by

conception of knowledge proposed by Descartes early in the 17th

a

century.

Descartes' goal was to construct a system which would

guarantee explicit knowledge.

Toward this end, he proposed a formal

model of explanation which both isolated mind and mechanized nature.

Descartes sought a unified intellectual discipline in which

a

single

human ability, isolated within an insubstantial mind, would apprehend a

wholly external world.

Within the Cartesian system, the conceptions of

both nature and mind are severely limited.

All explanation within

nature is on one level in terms of least particulars.

Mind is so

withdrawn from the fabric of existence that it becomes finally
unknowable.

Knowledge leaves the plane of fallibility and instead

reaches some unique utopia of infallible truth.
Franz Kafka, himself as much as any of us a product of the present

intellectual foundation, said that he had never once, from within
himself, felt truly alive.

The spiritual desparation of our

age— what

I

the
have characterized earlier as the great game of pretending that

reality
world we comprehend in sterile sobriety is the only and ultimate

there

is— was

not escape.

yet he could
as clearly recognized by Kafka as by any man;
all of life
The intimations of meaning and coherence in

forever unrealized.
remained for him, as they do for most of us,

In

dilemma of modern man:
Great Wall of China Kafka characterized this

^
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He is thirsty, and is cut off from a spring by a mere clump
of bushes. But he is divided against himself: one part
overlooks the whole, sees that he is standing here and that
the spring is just beside him, but another part notices
nothing, has at most a divination that the first part sees
at all. But as he notices nothing, he cannot drink. 25
It is time now, I suggest, that we begin to overcome the

constrictions of our present intellectual foundation, that we find a

conception of existence which will allow us to see both ourselves and
our knowledge as complex and many-leveled achievements, a conception

adequate to all our intimations.

CHAPTER III
POLANYI AND A REFORMULATION OF OUR
PRESENT INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION

Introduction

My philosophical exploration now leads toward a reformulation of

our present intellectual foundation.

In this chapter

I

shall attempt to

work toward a new understanding of human abilities and the world they
apprehend, to break away from the structure of understanding embodied in
our present intellectual foundation and to seek within a reformulation
of that foundation a conception of existence more coherent with and more

adequate to human experience.

An interest in skills initiated and

continues to motivate my exploration.

The inadequacy of our present

conception of skills led me in the last chapter to explore the
foundation on which that conception was founded.

I

now continue that

exploration and seek in what Michael Polanyi calls a "post critical
philosophy, an alternative to the Cartesian principles— an alternative
within
which may lead both toward a new intellectual foundation, and
skills.
that new foundation toward a more adequate conception of

this introduction

I

In

will backtrack for a moment, briefly reviewing the

and broadly
central conceptions of our present intellectual foundation

suggesting the inadequacies of those conceptions.
following,

I

v;ill

In the section

an
offer one further view of Descartes through

which the Cartesian system was
examination of the paradigm of science on
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founded.

Then using this examination as a perspective,

I

hope to be

ready to proceed toward the next major step in my exploration

— the

discovery of a tenable alternative to the Cartesain principles, an
alternative which, standing in opposition to the principles that lie at
the very heart of our present intellectual foundation, will argue both

against the conceptions of that foundation and toward new and more
adequate conceptions
In the last chapter my exploration led from the philosophy of

Descartes to its development into and influence upon objectivism and
subjectivism.

A brief review of the major conceptions of our present

intellectual foundation must emphasize both philosophies.

These two

broad philosophical visions, both strongly dependent on the central
Cartesian principles, are the major forces in our present intellectual
foundation.

They dominate our scientific disciplines; our theories of

child raising, of education; our literature; our relations with one
another; our perceptions of our abilities, of our world; our perceptions
of our significance and meaning within that world.

2

The tenets of

objectivism have become the ideals of most of the scientific
disciplines, and in many parts of our culture these ideals have in turn

become unquestioned truths:
knowledge can be specified

the ideal that both the means and ends of

— made

explicit, the ideal of reason as

ideal of scientific
analysis and the mind as a mathematical machine, the

adaptation of thought to
theory as description, as the most economical
by affirming anything that
facts, as never venturing beyond experience
and exact science based on
cannot be tested, the ideal of a universal
variables, the ideal of
the automatic manipulation of unambiguous
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atoitiism,

of a one level world in which whatever one asserts expressed in

the last analysis some change in the configuration of bits of matter

described by physics, the ideal finally of

a

Laplacean universe, of a

self-regulating machine in which man is just another cog.

At the same

time though perhaps in a less specific way, the conceptions of

subjectivism are also

a

major influence:

the conception of

consciousness as separate and self-directed, as having no logical place
in or connection to the "objective" world, the conception of man's

relation to and knowledge of external reality as arbitrary and
artificial, thus the conception of man's only authentic and knowable

existence as being wholly inward and self-contained, of nothingness as
the "peculiar possibility of being and its unique possibility."

3

A full examination of any one of the conceptions within either

objectivism or subjectivism could in itself be the subject for
dissertation.

a

However, my exploration of our present intellectual

foundation is not an end in itself but a means toward new and better
conceptions.

My exploration of objectivism and subjectivism, indeed my

whole dissertation, can be seen primarily as an inquiry into the nature
of human abilities and the nature of the reality they seek to apprehend
those
and secondarily as an attempt to understand the ways in which
to
abilities can rightly claim to apprehend that reality, or conversely

of
understand which features of our experience can claim the status

knowledge or can claim to contribute to knowledge.

In the last chapter

conceptions of man and
my exploration indicated that our present
constricted as to be
knowledge are not only inadequate, but so

essentially misconceptions.

Neither the objective nor the subjective
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philosophies makes possible an adequate nor a rational conceotion of
existence.

In its quest for certainty, objectivism has reduced the

conception of science, and thereby all existence, to a one level

physicalism in which reality is ultimately describable as a single flat
level of phenomena and in which the means to that description, the human
intellect, can be seemingly so refined as to be considered a

mathematical inference machine.

In reaction against the impersonality

of such a philosophy, subjectivism has sought its own kind of certainty

within an even more constricted conception of existence, a conception
whose only reality lies wholly within the mind, and where thus all
external knowledge is equally arbitrary and inauthentic

—a

conception in

which man is forced to seek in some isolated, empty center the utter
self-sufficiency of his original choice of himself.
The inadequacy of cur present conceptions of existence can be

broadly suggested in several ways.

Subjectivism seems to offer the

least acceptable vision of existence.

Subjectivism accepts the

underlying Cartesian premise that all authentic knowledge must be
explicit, and then seeks to overcome the dehumanizing effects of that

premise by denying the possibility of any authentic knowledge of
external reality, and retreating into the confines of the mind.
too rare in nature
However, from an ontological perspective, minds seem
is.
to count as the fundamental sort of thing there

Some of the other

subjective
Cartesian premises of subjectivism, particularly the
less than adequate
characterization of consciousness, also seem a

foundation for human understanding.

In addition, while the whole

as argued by Sartre, is
exit" panorama of subjectivism, especially

no
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logically consistent with its own premises, the authentic
possibilities
for human existence allowed by that logic are so limited as
to call

those premises and thus the whole system into doubt. ^

The one authentic

possibility which Sartre hints at, that of "pure" reflection, involves
such a radical conversion, such a total inwardness, that it seems too

illusive and too empty a goal for mankind.

Within the context of my

exploration, subjectivism offers the most obviously inadequate

understanding of existence.

In my criticism of the Cartesian

principles, this inadequacy, and particularly the inadequacy of the

subjective characterization of consciousness, should become even
clearer.

The inadequacies of objectivism, while probably greater than those
of subjectivism and certainly more demeaning, are at the same time less

obvious.

The tenets of objectivism remain the prominent ideals of many

scientists and philosophers.

Objectivism is a stronger and more

articulate influence within the general culture, and broad anti-

objectivist arguments are not often convincing.

Objectivism owes much

of this support to its success as a model for the hard sciences, but as
I

have argued in the last chapter, the objective model bears little

resemblance to the actual workings of those sciences.

The processes of

discovery and understanding by which science progresses and is sustained
can in no way be represented by the objective canons of wholly explicit
truth.

Within the hard sciences the conceptions of objectivism are

inadequate because they are false:

they misrepresent the workings of

and
science and deny to its practitioners the acknowledgement

satisfaction of their complex and personal achievements.

This
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inadequacy should become clearer both in my examination of the paradigm
of science on which the Cartesian principles are founded and then in my

criticism of the principles themselves.
When one moves from physics and the other hard sciences on whose
workings the objective canons are modeled, and turns instead to biology
and the life sciences which adopted this model, the conceptions of

objectivism become even less adequate but seemingly more intrenched.
The conception that all explanation in biology must ultimately be one

leveled in terms of least particulars simply does not allow for an

adequate understanding of living things.

The atomistic models of

objectivism fail to offer an adequate understanding because one-to-one
relationships among least parts do not exist as such in nature.

For

example, the concept of the reflex arc, the concept, by the way, which
forms the biological basis for the S-R model of behaviorism,^ is simply

not born out by recent physiological research.

More generally

inadequate is the mechanistic interpretation of evolution and the

dominance of that interpretation within biology

— the

concept that all

living things are solely adaptation machines, the concept, therefore,
that there is just one level of existence and that from the laws of that
level, all higher levels, or rather all larger systems, can be derived.

objectivist
The existence of the conception itself argues against the

position:

of
the existence of any statement presupposes the existence

and ink cannot
more than just matter in motion— the chemistry of paper

account solely for the existence of

a

book, nor can physics and

living things.
chemistry alone account for the existence of

Biology

things; analysis within
demands the recognition of individual living

95

biology is always within the context set by such recognition.

Analysis

living things which analysizes those things away contradicts itself

by destroying its own sxabject matter.

The inadequacies of these

objective conceptions within the life sciences will, again, become
clearer in my criticism of the Cartesian principles.

However, an even

better understanding of these inadequacies may be found later in the
chapter within the context of Polanyi's alternative to the principles on

which objectivism is founded.
Such broad attempts to suggest the inadequacies of our present

intellectual foundation are, as
convincing.

I

I

have acknowledged, often less than

myself have difficulty accepting my own arguments.

Part

of the difficulty stems from the circular nature of our intellectual
foundation:

that foundation tends toward self- justification, first

through a structure which denies its own existence

— that

is through an

underlying conception of manifest truth which denies that knowledge has
any non-explicit roots, and second through the inherent power of any

such foundation

—a

power which can assimilate even the most disparate

ideas into its own vision of existence.

Both philosophical visions

within our foundation have a deep rooted appeal which is difficult to
overcome.

The

The anti-objectivist position is difficult to accept.

position is uncomfortable because it breaks through the security of

a

simple one level physicalism without providing an alternative
foundation.

of
It demands that one think hierarchically, in terms

The

way.
levels of reality, and we no longer know how to think that
to accept,
arguments against subjectivism are almost as difficult

meaningful place
seem to leave man with no uniqueness, with no

m

they
the
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universe.

To be told that our present foundation is inadequate does not

in itself allow us to understand that inadequacy, or to accept

wholeheartedly an alternative which seems to be defined only through
negation.

The anti-ob jectivist position, like the anti-subjectivist

one, seems here reasonable only in the perverse sense that its negation
is self-contradictory;

it is not reasonable in the more substantive

sense of fitting smoothly into a new intellectual foundation, a

foundation in which human beings, acknowledging both the power of the

human mind and the success of science, nevertheless need not thereby
negate either their own personal significance nor their connection to

and knowledge of the world in which they dwell.
This difficulty was foreshadowed in my work with physical skills,

and

I

have, therefore, purused my philosophical exploration in such a

way that the problems inherent in such an enterprise may be, if not
In the last chapter

overcome, then at least circumvented.
to isolate certain principles which

intellectual foundation, and

I

I

I

attempted

felt lay at the heart of our

suggested that if these principles could

be replaced with more adequate principles, then we might have, if not a
The

new intellectual foundation, then at least the beginnings thereof.

basic principles of our present intellectual foundation take science as
the paradigm case of knowledge; yet as

I

have suggested and will now

argue directly, the conception of science

— and

to some extent the

based,
conception of all knowledge— on which those principles are

essentially false.

is

For over three hundred years the quest for

has led both the
certainty, for explicit and indubitable knowledge,

ever more illusive and
interpreters and protestors of science toward
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convoluted visions, fundamental misinterpretations not just of
science

but of all reality.

These misinterpretations, essentially embodied at

the very beginning of the scientific revolution by the Cartesian
/

have grown to dominate and demean human life.

Beginning

with Descartes' ideal of self-guaranteeing truth within a totally

isolated mind and progressing through the ever more constricted models
of the objectivists and subjectivists, we have arrived on one hand at a

wholly formalizable, wholly explicit vision of reality, a perfection of
knowledge through the exclusion of the knowing mind; or on the other
hand, at a vision v/hich in revolt against the limitations of objectivism
turns to the other extreme and so emphasizes the knowing mind that the

only reality becomes that isolated pinpoint of subjectivity within.
My philosophical exploration has, to this point, revealed the

inadequacy of our present intellectual foundation.

I

have discovered

that the conceptions of neither objectivism nor subjectivism offer an

adequate understanding of the nature of human abilities nor of the
nature of the reality which those abilities seek to know.

The objective

conceptions of a mechanical mind and a one level reality certainty do
not adequately represent human existence; nor do the subjective

conceptions of an isolated mind and an arbitrary and inauthentic
reality.

In my examination of the objective and subjective conceptions

and in my attempts to directly suggest their inadequacies,

discovered how difficult such conceptions are to overcome.

I

have also
To escape

of
the inadequacies of both the objective and subjective visions

existence and to begin

a

reformulation of our present intellectual

foundation— the
foundation, one must go to the very heart of that

,
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underlying Cartesian principles must be squarely faced
and overcome.
Inevitably inherent in such an enterprise are the same
weaknesses which
exist in the broad criticisms

I

have already presented:

my arguments

must still be made and understood within the context of our present
foundation.

However,

I

hope that by beginning with the most basic

P^i^^ciples of that foundation and by offering not only a criticism of

those principles but more importantly offering a tenable alternative,

may succeed in suggesting if not

a

I

new foundation, then at least the

beginnings thereof.

The Cartesian Principles and the
Paradigm of Science

The Cartesian principles, which

our intellectual foundation

— the

I

have argued lie at the heart of

principles of indubitability

explicitness, the unity of science and the duality of man

— attempted

and

in large measure succeeded in establishing a conception of existence

which would henceforth form the basis for much of mankind's
understanding of himself and his world.

The Cartesian principles have

been the most basic influence witliin philosophy for the last three

hundred years; the conceptions of both objectivism and subjectivism were
founded and are still strongly dependent upon these principles.

No

matter what philosophy one ascribes to, or as is more probably the case,
our
no matter how irrevocably one is caught up in the whole complex of

intellectual foundation, that strange combination of idealism and
life, one is
despair which characterizes so much of our vision of modern

structures of
at a still more basic level caught up in those deeper
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undsrs tanding which Descartes so long ago created.

Any attempt to

overcome the inadequacies of our present intellectual foundation can
succeed only by squarely facing and overcoming these most basic
structures of our understanding.
I

plan eventually to work against the Cartesian principles from

several perspectives, using not just philosophical arguments but

psychological and physiological ones as well.

The work of Michael

Polanyi provides the major basis for my arguments and provides also the
basis for a tenable alternative to the Cartesian principles.

Before

I

begin my direct arguments, let me briefly offer, both as a context for
those arguments and as an introduction to the work of Polanyi, two

contrasting views of science.
the paradigm case of knowledge.

The Cartesian principles take science as
However,

I

suggest, it is not the

actual workings of science which form that paradigm, but rather a

misrepresentation of those workings, a misrepresentation of both the
means and ends of science, of both the nature of human abilities and the
nature of reality.

The conception of science on which the Cartesian

principles are based is that of a wholly explicit kind of knowing, of a
hard
series of pure intellectual certainties leading to a permanent,
core of impersonal and indubitable knowledge.

The Cartesian principles

manifest to a mind
offer a model of scientific knowing in which truth is

properly circumscribed,

a

model in which the mathematical abstractions

truths— the indubitable and
of the disembodied intellect become explicit
simple, one level
self-guaranteeing apprehension of a world whose

anlaytic structure of those
structure exactly mirrors the formal,

apprehensions.

pursuit of scientific
In thus isolating mind in the

.
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wisdom and in mechanizing the world which that mind seeks to apprehend,
the Cartesian principles seem to offer a unique utopia of infallible

truth; but for human beings whose minds must exist within a body and

whose world is not a gigantic clockwork machine, this utopia has proven
to be a less than adequate dwelling place.

The Cartesian principles, in

their quest for certainty, essentially falsify the processes of

scientific discovery; and in so misrepresenting their scientific
paradigm, they also misrepresent both the means and ends of human
existence, the complexities of human knowing and the manifold levels of

reality
Science, Michael Polanyi maintains, does not proceed by a series

of pure intellectual certainties;

neither its methods nor its findings

are indubitable, nor can they be adequately represented within a one

Science is done by human beings, and

level structure of reality.^

nothing any human being does bears the wholly self-evident character of
the Cartesian principles.

We and the fabric of the world are one in

such a way that we can never withdraw one item from the whole nexus and
say of that item that it is so explicit, so firmly established that it

could not conceivably by otherwise.

Science lives by discovery, and

discovery cannot be explained in wholly formalizable, wholly explicit
terms.

Discovery is the attempt to understand the unknown, to describe

the indescribable.

As such it is paradoxical and cannot be represented

in explicit Cartesian terms.

^

If a scientist is looking for a thing of

groping to find a
whose nature he knows nothing at all, if he is
is a puzzle, a
problem, if at the center of his attention there

but does not realize what
conflict, if he succeeds in making a discovery
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he has discovered, if the scientific community accepts
a discovery but

cannot specify the reasons for its acceptance— then how
can science be

characterized as "true and evident cognition"?

VJhere are the explicit

apprehensions, the clear and distinct ideas, where are the series
of
logical connections which never leave the plane of infallibility,
where

indeed is that hard core of certainty which discovery is suppose to

achieve?
Science, as Polanyi demonstrates in Personal Knowledge

operate in a unique utopia of infallible truth.

does not

,

It is not the activity

of some secret, infallible part of the Cartesian mind, the cultivation

of pure and self-guaranteeing intellectual vision, nor does it reveal
the mechanical certainty of the objectivists

.

Although their methods

may be tremendously refined, scientists, like all human beings, are
trying

to

make sense of some aspect of experience, trying to find

pattern in what is otherwise disorder.

a

As such, science is not wholly a

series of pure intellectual certainties, a mathematical analysis from

evidence to conclusion, a one level description of the world; but rather
is a process of trial and error in which hunches,

the imaginative use of

example, definition and redefinition must play their role

—a

role which

seeks not the summary of one flat level of pure phenomena but the

discovery of stable mechanisms in nature.

Einstein's discovery of the

"Special Theory of Relativity" is a good example of this.

shows in Personal Knowledge

,

As Polanyi

Einstein's processes of discovery cannot be

represented within the Cartesian framework.

Einstein did not

v/ork,

as

evidence of
most textbooks would have us believe, from the experimental

Michelson and Morley

— he

did not proceed from an analysis of that
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evidence, through a series of clear and distinct steps, and thereby

arrive at this theory.

Rather through intuition, through the power of

mind, following no one definite method, no series of explicit steps, and

unaided by any experimental evidence that had not been available for
fifty years, Einstein discovered and committed himself to a four-

dimensional conception of reality, a conception which both he and the
scientific community accepted as true, not primarily because of its
logical agreement with experimental evidence, not because of some

indubitable proof, but because of its greater intellectual satisfaction

— its

coherence, its beauty, its profundity, its grandeur, its boldness

and directness of thought.

8

Polanyi maintains that no matter how seemingly abstract or

purified the discoveries of science,, they still cannot be adequately

understood or represented within the scientific paradigm on which
Descartes based his system.

e = me

2

may be a universal truth and indeed

we believe it to be so, but neither our acceptance of the theory nor its

discovery has the wholly explicit, wholly proven character of the

Cartesain system.

Polanyi agrees that the paradigm case of knowledge in

not a
modern culture must be science, but the paradigm of science is

of discovery
model of a wholly manifest and explicit truth but rather
we do not yet know.
the recognition of a problem, the seeking of what

wholly explicit, that we can
If we insist that all cognitive acts are
attention, then discovery
know only what is plainly at the center of our

cannot advance beyond what is
becomes an impossibility, and knowledge

already known.

as essential to
Instead, Polanyi asserts, we must admit

of groping which constitutes the
the very nature of mind, the kind
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recognition and solving of a problem.

Polanyi's solution to the paradox

of discovery rests on the distinction he makes between two kinds of

awareness, focal and subsidiary.

knowledge can be wholly focal.
aspect looms large.

His central thesis is that no
In the case of a problem, the subsidiary

The scientist does not know in the focal sense what

hs is looking for, and yet he can look for it because he relies in

looking for it on clues to its nature, clues which he holds in

subsidiary rather than focal awareness.
The concept of focal and subsidiary awareness forms the central

structure of Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge.

For Polanyi, all

discovery must be arrived at by tacit powers of mind.
discovery, the scientist does not

knov/,

In any case of

in the focal sense, what he is

looking for; and yet he can look for it because he relies in looking for
it on clues to its nature, clues through which he anticipates what he

has not yet plainly understood.

rather than focal awareness.

Such clues are held in subsidiary

Focally, at the center of his attention,

he is av/are of the problem only as a puzzle, a conflict.

The clues of

which he is subsidiarily aware do have a bearing on the solution; they
are in fact aspects of the entity he seeks to comprehend.

At the same

time, these clues are also aspects of himself, of his attitudes, skills,

memories, hunches.

The scientist's explicit awareness, his focal

consciousness, is always founded in and carried by the tacit acceptance
his world.
of something not explicit, which binds him to and within

Knowledge must always be rooted in these personal elements.

The

from and
impersonal, the more explicit aspects of knowledge, arise
the search for and
return to the scientist's personal participation in
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acceptance of the entity to be known.

Tacit knowing directs the

scientist from the subsidiary particulars towards his discovery
a theory,

a focal whole, which those particulars signify.

— toward

They guide

him toward the comprehension of a reality which, in many cases, has the
same structure as his knowing of it:

that is of a whole of parts, a

comprehensive entity, whose significance ranges in ways perhaps

unguessed by him beyond its specifiable particulars.^*^
Polanyi believes then, as did Descartes, that science is the

rightful paradigm for knowledge; but science, Polanyi maintains, cannot
be explained within a framework of wholly explicit truth.

Science lives

by discovery, and discovery, Polanyi believes, can be better understood

within a framework of tacit knowledge.

This contrast between the

explicit and tact conceptions of science should serve as

a

context for

the argument which follows, and it may serve also as an introduction to

Polanyi 's theory.

However, it is meant to be only the briefest

introduction to that theory, and not be a full explanation or convincing
demonstration.

On first glance, Polanyi 's conceptions of knowledge must

seem equally as arbitrary and illogical as any of the conceptions
been criticizing.

I

have

Especially from an objective perspective, the theory

of tacit knowledge must seem almost a subjective crying in the dark, a

sundering of knowledge away from the objective world of common sense, a
separation equally as severe as Sartre's.

comprehensive explanation of Polanyi

's

^

Indeed, the more

theory which eventually follows

tacit
may not succeed in convincing the reader of the truth of the

conception of knowledge.

Nevertheless,

I

believe that Polanyi 's theory

of scientific
may make possible a cogent solution to the paradox
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discovery, and thereby a solution to many of the
inconsistencies and

inadequacies within our present intellectual foundation.

The theory of

tacit knowledge seems to offer both a valid criticism of the
Cartesian

principles and a tenable alternative to those principles.

It is my hope

that Polanyi's theory may eventually make possible a conception
of

knowledge more adequate to the understanding of both human abilities and
of the world they seek to apprehend.

A Challenge of the Cartesian Principles

Taking an explicit conception of science, i.e. true and evident
cognition, as a paradigm, Descartes created his philosophical

conceptions.

There are four principles or theses which lie at the heart

of Descartes' conceptions.

These principles form the framework for all

of Cartesian philosophy, and thereby as

intellectual foundation.

I

have argued for our present

Any attempt to form a new intellectual

foundation must begin by squarely facing and overcoming these Cartesian
principles.

The principles are again:

first, indubitability

;

second,

total explicitness; third, the unity of science; and fourth, the duality

of man.

These principles, as Marjorie Grene shows, are not isolated but
"There is knowledge which is incapable of being

form a structure:

doubted because there is knowledge which is self-evident, selfcontained; the sum of evident knowledge is wisdom which is the same

everywhere; and both the self-evidence and unity of knowledge are

possible because, and only because knowledge is the work of the
intellect alone.

12
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It is these Cartesian principles and their joint structure to

which Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge may provide
and a tenable alternative

— thus

a valid

criticism

the means through which we may work

toward a new intellectual foundation.

In my first two chapters,

have

I

offered several views of our present intellectual foundation, not with
the hope of presenting a single overpowering argument, but rather with
the hope that one or another of these perspectives might lead the reader

toward the beginnings of

a

critical understanding.

In the same way, an

understanding of the alternative foundation suggested by Polanyi's
theory may require more than a single perspective.

slowly begins to understand Personal Knowledge

,

As one reads and

Polanyi's most

comprehensive presentation of the theory of tacit knowledge, it becomes
clear that the book could have started from almost any point within the

theory and have been equally successful.

Polanyi's theory is most

pursuasive not in its individual aspects but in its comprehensive power.
In the theory of tacit knowledge, there seems to be no logical beginning

or end.

Neither is there a single perspective which affords the best

view of the theory.

Indeed, Polanyi's later works confirm this thesis

another as central.
by treating first one aspect of the theory and then
the theory of
Therefore, as the reader continues his acquaintance with

Cartesian principles
tacit knowledge— next from the perspective of the
and subsequently from other perspectives,

I

suggest that he not allow an

various tenets of Polanyi’s
overly critical frame of mind to reject the

theory until its whole impact may be felt.
foundation, all four of the
To begin to form a new intellectual

and challenged in terms of
Cartesain principles must be challenged,
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alternative theory.

Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge suggests

first, that because knov/ledge is personal, it is susceptible to doubt,
to criticism.

Second, because knowledge is rooted in an act of tacit

knowing, it is never wholly explicit.

A change of focus, an examination

of a subsidiary clue, can always bring to the level of attention

criticism

— what

was previously unquestioned because submerged.

— and

to

Third,

since knowledge is a balance of tacit and explicit elements, it can

never be at one time wholly explicit.

The elements which are tacit in

one context may become explicit in another.
every investigation must be partial.

Given our finite powers,

Further, because science is not

reductive but seeks to discvoer comprehensive entities, there is no one
single reality of atoms in motion.

Therefore,

on

the grounds of both

method and content, science must be partial and plural.

Fourth,

knowledge is not the work of the disembodied intellect.

Because all

knowing must involve subsidiary elements, clues which are dependent upon
and inextricably enmeshed with the whole range of human skills,

knowledge must be personal

physical person.

— the

achievement of the whole, psycho-

Man cannot be reduced to either the mechanical motion

of matter or to pure mind, but must exist as a unity.

substantiate
A closer examination of these challenges may serve to

ways in which
the validity of their criticism and may also suggest

Polanyi's theory provides a tenable alternative.

Let me take the first

explicitness, together and
two Cartesian principles, indubitability and

compare them with the theory of tacit knowledge.

When Descartes began

building blocks, ideas which were
his philosophy, he wanted to find as
could not be susceptible to doubt.
so clear and distinct that they

The

108

luminousness, the total explicitness of each of these primary acts of

understanding would guarantee the indubitable truth of its content.

The

Cartesian clear and distinct idea is the act of a pure and attentive
mind, grasping what is before it in a single and instantaneous act of

attention.

What is before the mind, what it grasps, is wholly explicit,

wholly focal.

The theory of tacit knowledge challenges the principles

of indubitability and explictness.

maintains, can be wholly focal.

15

No act of attention, Polanyi
All knowledge, from the most basic

acts of sensory awareness to the abstractions of mathematics, must

reside in a from-to relation in which the knower relies on clues already

assimilated to his bodily being in order to attend through them, or from
them, to things in the world.

Knowledge, therefore, can never be wholly

focal, but relies always on subsidiaries in order to focus on events or

entities to which these subsidiaries point.

Take the case, mentioned in

The Boston Studies of the Philosophy of Science, of a naturalist

identifying a new species of a familiar genus.
says,

"Why,

He spots a worm and

it's Rhyncodemus, but it's not bilineatus; it's an entirely

new species."

16

Such recognition cannot be represented as the

apprehension of a single clear and distinct idea.

The individual

one, but
features of the genus are not listed by the naturalist one by

recognized implicitly in their coherent physiognomy.

Such features are

and understand
clues which he has interiorized in order to focus on

entities in the world.
the elements which led
The naturalist-scientist cannot specify all
to
yet he believes that recognition
to his recognition of a new species;

be true.

this type of recognition
By the logic of tacit knowledge,
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cannot be indubitable; yet such recognition plays a role in almost
all

scientific discovery.

most exact of sciences.

The possibility of error is inherent in even the

For years, scientists counted 43 chromosomes in

the nuclei of hiaman cells; now it turns out there are only 46.^^
Pol3-nyi believes that all knowledge involves the use and interpretation

of clues of which the knower is only subsidiarily aware, perhaps even

wholly unaware in terms of the entity upon which they bear.

Some clues

may alter; those that are submerged may become focal.

Knowledge is,

therefore, always subject to reflection and revision.

Even the most

purified knowledge of mathematics depends for its comprehension on
knowing what its symbols mean, and this knowledge, as distinct from the
symbols themselves, is necessarily tacit.

distinct idea is simply a fiction.

The Cartesian clear and

No subject matter, no concept,

however precise, can be as Descartes thought wholly at the center of
attention.

Therefore, no subject, no concept, is ever vjholly explicit

and indubitable.
The challenge of the third Cartesian principle, the unity of
science, follows from the challenge of the first and second.

Descartes

believed that because knowledge was wholly explicit it could be unified.
If science is in its entirety true and evident cognition, the

apprehension of explicit and indubitable ideas; if it is, as the fourth
vision
Cartesian principle shows, the cultivation of pure intellectual
not only the
which has no compartments or varieties; and if science is

ultimate realities—
apprehension of explicit ideas but of explicit and

could eventually be
then Descartes was confident that all science
into one essential
reduced to its ultimate particulars and unified

.
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structure.

Both because of the nature of the human mind and
because of

the nature of reality, Descartes believed that science
must ultimately

be everywhere the same.

This third Cartesian principle can be

challenged on both epistemological and ontological grounds.

Polanyi has

shown that because of the nature of the human mind, the clear and

distinct idea is an impossibility.

Because all knov/ledge is partly

tacit and must rely on subsidiary clues which exist at many levels of
awareness, knowledge can never be wholly focal, wholly explicit.
the roots of knowledge can never be shown to be everywhere
the same

Knowing, Polanyi believes, is not a wholly defined process but

essentially skill-like.

As the craftsman uses tools of which, in their

use, he is only subsidiarily aware, so the scientist uses abstract

tools--concepts

,

maxims, skills of recognition, of measurement

to spy out the hidden pattern he is seeking.

— in

order

Any skillful act of

knowing implies an unspecif iable context out of which focal observations
arise.

Many of the subsidiary elements and skills within such a context

are unspecif iable in such a way that they can never be transferred

neutrally from scientist to scientist.

The unspecif iable skills of any

science must be assimilated within the framework of that science.

To

become a naturalist, to learn the recognition of species, to be able to
tell a Rhyncodemus from a bilineatus, one must commit oneself to

becoming a naturalist, to learning skills which cannot be explicitly
taught.

elements
The tacit theory of knowing implies that unspecif iable

exist in all acts of knov;ing.

e = me

may seem an explicit and

formula nor
indubitable proposition, but neither the discovery of that

Ill

its acceptance and understanding can be wholly specified.

That

discovery and understanding depend rather on skills which can only be
learned within the framework of physics.

Those skills of physics would

not enable a scientist to recognize a Rhynocodemus

,

just as the skills

of naturalism would not enable a scientist to become a competent judge
of relativity.

Nor finally could some scientist who had mastered the

skills of both disciplines somehow combine those skills into a single
science.

Because unspecif iable and skill-like elements exist within the

framework of each science and because these elements cannot be

explicitly taught or combined, the sciences by their nature must be
diverse and cannot be said to be a unity.
Polanyi's epistemological arguments, valid as they may seem, are
not sufficient challenge to the third Cartesian principle.

In fact, it

must be admitted that while a unity of method may still be a scientific
ideal, the complexity and specialization of the sciences has made

epistemological unity, even to the most ardent objectivist, more of an
abstract than a practical goal.

It is rather in ontology,

and

particularly in the ontology of the life sciences, that the damaging
effects of the third Cartesian principle are still dominate.

For

because of the
Descartes, the unity of science was possible not only
of res extensa.
nature of res cogitans but also because of the nature

basic building blocks,
If all knowledge could be constructed from

ideas

remain as to their
so ultimately simple that no doubt could
and especially to his
understanding, then it was clear to Descartes

because there existed in the
objective followers that this was possible
structure, a structure composed
external world a correspondingly simple
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again of basic building blocks, elementary particals out of which the

whole of nature was constructed.

If nature's ultimate reality thus lay

with its least parts and if science's job was to study this reality,
then it was obvious that all science was at heart a unity. Particularly

within the life sciences, this principle of reducibility is still
dominate.

Ruducibility means that all scientific laws, including those

of the life sciences, can be translated into and are derivable from the

basic and universal laws of matter in motion.

Whatever one truly

asserts about the world, about molecules, trees or human beings, must

express in the last analysis some change in the configurations of these

fundamental particals of matter as described by physics and mathematics.
Therefore, the goal of all science is a unity of atomistic explanation,

and as biology and the other life sciences perfect themselves, they move
ever closer to this unity.
He

Polanyi disagrees with this view of a unified science.

maintains that the goal of science is not a unity of atomistic

explanation but rather the understanding of particular comprehensive
entities, not the summary of one flat level of pure phenomena but the

discovery of various kinds of stable mechanisms in nature.

A theory or

of
model succeeds in science not by comprehending all the phenomena

the case of a
every kind, but rather by leading scientists to see, in
are produced.
particular set of puzzling phenomena how those phenomena

and finite skills
Polanyi has already shown that given the specialized

investigation must be partial and
of any particular science, every

perspectival.

because the
This is so, moreover, Polanyi maintains,

ultimate reality, nor does
loast parts of nature do not constitute its
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an understanding of those parts constitute an understanding of all of

nature.

As

I

have already suggested, the existence of knowledge has

ontological implications.

If the universe was in fact Laplacean, then

knowledge of it would be impossible.

Just as Descartes' epistemology

suggests a reductive ontology; so the structure of tacit knowledge
suggests a many leveled conception of reality, a conception in which the
simplest, most tangible parts are not assumed to have the greatest
reality.

Thus a focal whole cannot be specified solely in terms of its

siobsidiary particulars.

sum of its parts.

A comprehensive entity must be more than the

A comprehensive entity depends on its parts as the

conditions of its existence, but those parts exist as parts only as so

constituted by the unifying principles of the whole.
that explains the parts.

It is the whole

The reductive compulsion of the life sciences

may one day succeed in isolating every least particular of every living
thing, but such a study will not constitute either an ultimate

understanding of life nor a union of biology with the "ideal" sciences
of physics and chemistry.

For most of this century it has been the compulsion of the life
sciences, and particularly of biology, to seek the ideal of unity

implied in the third Cartesian principle.

20

The theory of tacit knowing

of
suggests that such a goal is illusive; but because of the prestige
and
reductivism, Polanyi's arguments are still difficult to understand

accept.

Before

I

let
go on to challenge the fourth Cartesian principle,

of the sciences.
me suggest one more argument against the unity
a molecular science and
Reductivism claims that biology is essentially

be shown to ultimately govern
that the laws of physics and chemistry can
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all living things.

Because DNA molecules are the basic building blocks

things, the physical and chemical laws which govern DNA must,

therefore, also ultimately govern and thus explain all the structures

and processes of life.

Polanyi challenges this reductivist claim.

He

grants that the structure and processes of growth can be shown to be

dependent on DNA molecules, but this power of DNA, Polanyi maintains,
does not demonstrate that biology is reducible to biochemistry.

Polanyi

argues that what makes DNA do its work is not its chemistry but the

sequence of the bases along the DNA chain.
forms the code for the developing organism.

It is this sequence which

While the orderly structure

of the molecule is due to a maximum of stability corresponding to a

minimum of potential energy, and is thus determined by the laws of
physics and chemistry, the sequence of bases on the DNA spiral is not so
determined.

For this sequence there is no question of energy at all,

and statistically all sequences are equiprobable.
is possible physico-chemically

;

Any sequence of bases

therefore, while the molecule is

dependent on the laws of physics and chemistry, these laws cannot
specify which sequence will succeed in functioning as

a code.

In fact,

it is this improbability which is precisely the measure of the

information any particular sequence can provide.

Polanyi writes that

the
"it is the physical indeterminancy of the sequence that produces

improbability of occurrence of any particular sequence and thereby
enables it to have a meaning

—a

meaning that has a mathematically

improbability of
determinate information content equal to the numerical
the arrangement."^^

of
Such a system may be dependent on the laws

in terms of these
physics and chemistry, but it cannot be specified
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laws.

The understanding of any entity, be it a DNA molecule or

a

human

being, must appreciate the coherence of that entity, and thus

acknowledge the existence of a value absent from its constituent
particulars.

Because this coherence involves higher levels of

organization and function, levels which differ for different entities;
because these levels cannot be specified or understood in terms of one
single and ultimate level of molecules in motion; and because, as

I

have

argued above, the understanding of different kinds of entities requires

different skills, skills which can be learned only within the context of
a particular science

— the

There

sciences must, therefore, be diverse.

cannot be said to exist one ultimate and ideal science toward which all
the rest must aspire.
As the challenge of the third Cartesian principle is related to
the challenge of the first and second, so the challenge of the fourth

principle is related to the previous challenges to all three.

Within

the Cartesian system, the fourth principle, the duality of man, can be

seen as basic to all the others; similarly the challenge to that fourth

principle is basic both to a valid criticism of all the principles and
to an acceptance of a tenable alternative.

indubitability

,

In the Cartesian system,

explicitness and unity are first possible because

mind is
knowledge is the work of the intellect alone, because the
nature and function.
cleanly and essentially separate from the body in
the clear and distinct idea
The Cartesian building block for knowledge,

indubitability from the very
is guaranteed its explicitness and
disembodied intellect alone.
beginning because it is the work of the
the
Cartesian clear and distinct ideas,
The first and most basic of the

—
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cogito, is not an argument but an event

— the

act of a pure and attentive

mind, the first of a long chain of such acts all equal in purity,

clarity and certainty.

The whole of Cartesian science begins and

ultimately depends on the dualism implicit in the cogito:

the mind

first cognizant of itself and its own separateness, turns in clarity of

vision to arrange and solve all the problems which may confront it.
One of Polanyi's central theses contradicts the principle of

duality.

Knowledge is not a one-to-one relationship between a

disembodied (or later machine-like) intellect and an atomistic reality
a simplistic grasping of one bit of information after another.

maintains, rather, that knowledge is personal

disembodied intellect

—but

— not

Polanyi

the work of the

an achievement of the whole, inalienable,

psycho-physical person, making sense of one aspect or another of his
situation in the world.
challenged.

The fourth Cartesian principle must also be

Man is not a duality but a unity.

He cannot be reduced

objectively to mere matter or subjectively to pure mind, but he must
rather be understood in the sense of personhood

— that

is in tlie sense of

complexities of organization and levels of existence, levels which can

never be logically cut off from dependence on their bodily roots.

Both

reality can
the development of human abilities and their apprehension of
be seen as the achievements of an embodied being.

Admittedly some

are
levels of awareness are so abstract that their bodily roots

implies that
difficult to trace, but the whole logic of tacit knowing

those bodily roots are still present.

Knowledge is an achievement,

from its roots in the
risen both phylogenetically and individually,

learning processes of human skills.

It begins with the child's first
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motions, the achievement of upright posture, the attainment of a spatio-

temporal orientation, the acquisition of language and culture;

and it

develops into further and further dimensions of mental, emotional,

spiritual and bodily orientation

—but

always of the total psycho-

physical person whose orientation it is.
The whole structure of tacit knowing argues against the fourth

Cartesian principle.

The human intellect can be shown, in no aspect of

its development or functioning, to be wholly divorced from its bodily
roots.

The infant's acquisition of skills and language, the student's

learning the various structures of hiiman thought, the scientist's

assimilation of more specialized skills and information

— all

these

processes, themselves tacit achievements, go on to form a continuous and

never wholly specifiable core by which and through which human beings
are able to strive toward further achievements of knowing and being.

Descartes felt that man, among all the forms of life, had some special

exemption which would allow him to separate his thoughts from their
"crude" bodily roots; but there exists no total discontinuity between

mind and body, nor between man and animal.
considered a form of orientation.

All knowing can be

The organism's placing of itself in

salmon in the
the environment, the dinoflagellate in the plankton, the
and is shaped by
stream, prefigures the process by which man both shapes
from what he has
his bodily being within the world, reaching out

assimilated toward what he seeks.

The from-to structure of tacit

achievement are inextricably
knowing implies that the roots of all human

enmeshed in man's bodily processes of being.
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I

have one further argument to make against the Cartesian

principles, but before

I

do let me pause here momentarily to place these

challenges within the framework of my own philosophical exploration.
The primary purpose of that exploration has been to work toward a new
xanders tending of human abilities and the world they apprehend, to break

away from the structure of understanding embodied in our present

intellectual foundation and to seek within a reformulation of that

foundation a conception of existence more coherent with and more
My challenges of the Cartesian principles

adequate to human experience.

form a transition within my exploration:

they are both my last direct

criticism of our present structure of understanding and at the same time
my first presentation of what

and adequate structure.

I

hope will eventually be a more coherent

The Cartesian principles have led, over the

past three hundred years, toward a constricted and demeaning structure
of understanding, a structure which offers man neither a significant
place in nor a logical connection to the world in which he dwells

,

a

structure which Whitehead calls "a mystic chant over an untelligible

universe."

Our Cartesian heritage has led us to a dead end; the

search for explicit knowledge and the premises of that search

disembodied intellect and an atomistic reality

,

a

have led our

understanding ever further from an adequate resolution.

Polanyi

s

structure of
theory of tacit knowledge suggests a more adequate

understanding.

Polanyi begins his theory with man's inextricable

embodiment within a world.

for
He thus relinquishes both the quest

achetypes; and suggests
explicit knowledge and the simplistic Cartesian

kind of knowledge, a knowledge to be
in their stead a personal yet valid
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achieved by complex and varied ways of human knowing, a knowledge to be
found within manifold levels of reality.

This new structure of

understanding should become clearer both in my final argument against
the Cartesian principles and subsequently in my presentation of

Polanyi's own argument.

Before

I

turn from Descartes and consider the theory of tacit

knowledge from some of Polanyi's own perspectives,

I

would like to take

my arguments against the Cartesian principles, and particularly against
the fourth principle, one step further, and challenge dualism in terms

of the objective and subjective components into which it evolved.

Such

a challenge should serve not only to substantiate the validity of my

criticism but also to unify several of the arguments
made.

I

have already

Ever since Descartes first postulated res cogitans and res

extensa and thereby split apart the inner world of consciousness from
all external reality, the radical disconnection of the two has made a

coherent understanding of human consciousness impossible.

I

have

already spent some time in criticizing the objective half of this
dichotomy.

None of the reductive disciplines, be it cybernetics,

behaviorism, or neuropsychology seems by itself to offer an adequate

understanding of the human mind:

thought cannot be understood solely as

the compulsive outcome of its own neural processes.

The simplistic

knower
ontology of objectivism, in effect, denies the existence of the

and thereby

I

would argue the existence of the known.

succeed in knowing anything.

Only persons can

Without an adequate conception of

knowledge.
consciousness, there can be no rational foundation for

objectivists

,

The

half of Cartesian
in ascribing solely to the materialistic
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dualism, are in effect denying themselves a rational basis for their

disciplines.

Edwin Straus, an eminant psychiatrist whose views of

knowledge are in many ways similar to Polanyi’s, points out that
knowledge, in even the most abstract of sciences, is inexplicable

without some conception of consciousness:
The physicist's observations begin and end within the field
of human action. In it and from it he develops the
mathematical and physical conception of space. The personal
relation of the observer to his environment differs in
principle from the spatio-temporal relations of the things
observed.
If the observer's original relations to space and
time corresponded to those in which the observed objects and
their ultimate hypostatizations such as atoms and
electrons, are conceived, defined and measured, he could
never devise a science of physics.
,

Straus' argument is basically the same one

I

have previously made in

denying the adequacy of objectivism's one level ontology; and the
central point remains the same:

ontological implications

— the

the existence of knowledge has

science of physics, as does any form of

knowledge, implies the existence of consciousness.

Perhaps, by its very

nature, consciousness is fated always to appear mysterious, even

paradoxical, and thereby always to cast doubt upon the veridity of
consciousness can
knowledge; but its enegmatic nature does not mean that
be removed from the processes of knowledge.

The ontological arguments

valid as the
against objectivism's denial of consciousness are as
Descartes'
epistemological arguments which Polanyi makes against

separation of consciousness.

Despite the Cartesian dichotomy of res

attempts of objectivism to
cogitans and res extensa, and despite the

conception of knowledge solely
carry dualism even further and form a
it appears that human
within the material half of that division,

.
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consciousness can be neither ontologically nor epistemologically

separated from the processes of science
Cartesian dualism can also be challenged in terms of its
subjective component.

Subjectivism attempts to overcome the

inadequacies, and particularly the dehumanizing effects, of an objective

philosophy founded wholly within res extensa; but when one looks at the
conceptions of mem and knowledge which evolve from the other half of

Cartesian dualism, it appears that subjectivism's attempt to understand
existence solely in terms of res cogitans is equally inadequate.

problem is here again the underlying Cartesian principles.

The

There can be

no real escape from the dehumanizing effects of Cartesian science by a

philosophy which still secretly ascribes to Descartes' basic conceptions
of man and knowledge.

Although subjectivism attempts to resist the

limitations of objectivism, it has not in essence rejected the

principles on which objectivism is founded

— in

particular the principle

that all authentic knowledge must be explicit, and the principle that

man is basically dualistic.

The subjectivists have set, as Sartre has

done, some quintessential inner truth over against the impersonal world

of knowledge, but they have not squarely faced the basic problem

inherent in any modern acceptance of the Cartesian principles:

without

always be
God as guarantor of its apprehensions, consciousness must

suspect within any Cartesian framework.

The search for explicit

in the liniverseknowledge leaves human consciousness no adequate place

spirit, body or mind.
there can be only atomism or isolation, nature or

illustrative to look again at
In this regard, it is particularly
the subjective conception of human consciousness.

In my original

122

examination of subjectivism,

showed that Sartre's conception of

I

consciousness, the conception

I

used as a subjective model, is

essentially still Cartesian in at least four ways

:

it is pre-

ref lective, instantaneous, self-directed and purely active.

Descartes

took,

Just as

the cogito as his first clear and distinct idea and used

the supposed certainty and isolation of that act of attention as a

justification for his philosophy, so Sartre takes the defining
characteristics of the Cartesian cogito to their ultimate conclusions
and bases his philosophy on the even more isolated conception of

—a

consciousness implied in the Cartesian original

conception of a mind

turned so wholly inward that it can find its only authentic existence in
negation.

I

have already broadly suggested the inadequacies of such a

conception, but again, as with objectivism, the greatest inadequacies
can be seen in a challenge of the Cartesian roots.

If one re-examines

the Cartesian roots of Sartre's conception of consciousness, now in the

light of the theory of tacit knowledge, their logic becomes suspect.

25

Polanyi believes first, that because all knowledge entails both

subsidiary and focal awareness, there can exist no ultimate and prereflective pin point of consciousness

— what

I

referred to in my previous

discussion of Sartre as "a non substantial absolute."
is not a total inwardness, but a from- to structure;

it exists primarily

in its interaction with and assimilation of the world.

consciousness cannot be instantaneous.

The knowing mind

Secondly,

Its from- to structure implies a

effort must be lived and
stretch not only of attention but of effort;

living takes time.

but
Thirdly, consciousness is not self-directed,

primarily other-directed.

above, the
As in the example of orientation

.
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processes of interiorization exist primarily in order to focus on

something in the world

what we seek.

—we

reach out from what we have assimilated to

Therefore, fourthly, consciousness is not purely active,

a form of self-assertion acting wholly within itself.

potency

— the

pure exteriority of objectivism

— cannot

Just as pure

account for the

existence of conscious life, so neither can pure activity.

Rather

consciousness exists apart from either of these conceptions.

It may be

described as a tension between what we are and what we seek, as a
balance, as a surrender.

something other

— something

It is all of these things, but it is also

which will be described and understood only

after years of living and working within a new conception of
consciousness

The substance of this criticism is that pure and unextended
consciousness cannot exist.

In denying the Cartesian roots of Sartre's

philosophy, the theory of tacit knowledge denies the whole basis for
that philosophy and by implication the basis for subjectivism.

Any

philosophy founded within the fictions of the Cartesian system can never
offer an adequate conception of human consciousness.

Just as the

cogito, that first self-referring act of a wholly pure and attentive
substantial
mind, is an impossibility, so also is the existence of a non

absolute

— Sartre's

pre-ref lective distellation of the cogito.

The

mind and the
"fusion of essence and existence," that conjunction of

but forever
world which Sartre believed to be perpetually indicated
through which
impossible, turns out instead to be the very process

consciousness does exist.

The subjective assimilation of the world into total inwardness
turns out to be as self-contradictory as the objective reduction of

consciousness into the pure exteriority of atomism.

The examination of

dualism in terms of its objective and subjective evolutions reveals that

neither of these philosophies is any more logical or adequate than the
Cartesian original.

In centering their conceptions of mem and knowledge

wholly within a single half of that dualism, neither objectivism nor

subjectivism succeeds in overcoming the problems inherent in the
Cartesian division.

Neither the one level descriptions of positivist

science nor the subjective gesturings of the alienated self can offer an

adequate conception of human existence.

When examined in the light of

the theory of tacit knowledge, objectivism and subjectivism both betray

almost the same inadequacies as do the Cartesian principles on which
these philosophies are based.

The search for explicit and indubitable

knowledge can end only in one or another of these equally selfcontradictory alternatives.
The perspective of tacit knowledge serves then to illuminate the

inadequacy of the Cartesian principles and thereby the inadequacy of the

major structures of understanding within our present intellectual
foundation.

In turn,

the Cartesian principles offer, as did the

paradigm of science, a perspective for the understanding of Polanyi's
theory.

and
The theory of tacit knowledge does offer a valid criticism

a tenable alternative to our Cartesian heritage.

Our one certainty can

nor an objective atomistic
be neither a subjective disembodied intellect
than an arbitrary
reality; our structure of understanding must be more

formalism based on one or the other of these certainties.

We must begin
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rather with the acknowledgement of ourselves as embodied within a world,
and we must base our understanding on the philosophic structure which
flows from such an acknowledgement
as a comprehensive realism.

—a

structure which might be described

In seeking to overcome the constricted

structures of understanding within our present intellectual foundation,
we are directed by Polanyi's theory toward such a realism, toward a new

and more personal kind of understanding.

Witliin the framework of my

philosophical exploration, it is time now to seek this understamding
from the perspectives Polanyi himself suggests.

from Descartes is complete.

The transition away

Using this critical understanding of the

Cartesian principles and their influence as a base, my exploration can
now proceed toward those goals which first inspired it

— toward

the

beginnings of an intellectual foundation more adequate to the
understanding of human existence, and most particularly, more adequate
to the understanding of human skills.

CHAPTER

IV

TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF SKILLS

Introduction

This exploration was inspired, as

I

showed in the first chapter,

by certain intimations of meaning and coherence within the practice of

physical skills.

Because an adequate understanding of those intimations

seemed impossible within the present conception of skills,

I

was led in

the second chapter to explore the intellectual foundation on which that

conception was founded.

My exploration suggested that many of the

general conceptions of existence within that foundation were inadequate,
and that a more adequate understanding of skills could be best achieved
In the third

within a new and more adequate intellectual foundation.
chapter,

I

foundation

discovered what

— both

I

hope to be the beginnings of that new

a valid criticism and a tenable alternative to the

principles which lie at the very heart of our present foundation.

My

exploration now leads back toward the intimations which first inspired
it,

and attempts to discover within a selective examination of that

alternative the beginnings of a more adequate conception of skills.
In the past two chapters

I

have been working toward a structure of

more adequate
understanding which might allow the discovery of this

understanding of skills.

More specifically, the purpose of my

toward
exploration in these chapters has been to work
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a

new
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understanding of human abilities and the reality they seek to aporehend,
to break away the structure of understanding embodied in our present

intellectual foundation and to seek, within

a

reformulation of that

foundation, conceptions of existence more adequate to human experience.

Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge seems to offer such
conceptions.

Polanyi believes that no conceptions can have that kind of

formal certainty which is still so greatly our Cartesian heritage.

clear and distinct idea, and all that flows from it is a fiction.

The

An

intellectual foundation cannot begin with the arbitrary goal of finding

explicit knowledge and then artifically define both abilities and
reality so as to guarantee that goal.
To assume, within the immensity of time and space, that it is we

who are somehow perfectly suited for the indubitable apprehension of
reality is at best improbable-

Rather, Polanyi believes, we must begin

by looking at ourselves as knowers

activitv of knowina

— and

— as

embodied beings engaged in the

from that beainninq see what we can sav about

our abilities and about the realitv we seek to know.

From such a

becinninq and especially from an examination of the kind of knowing
involved in sceintific discovery, the groping and intuition which

constitute a significant part of man’s most profound intellectual
acknowledgements
achievements, Polanyi is led to one of his fundamental

knowing beings.
the ineradicable ambiguity of our situation as
apprehensions, both the
Although our abilities are capable of profound

nature of our existence within
complex nature of those abilities and the

universe requires of us a certain
an immense and intricately structured

modesty toward experience.

Polanyi believes that we can indeed
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apprehend reality, but he shows that our apprehensions are neither

passively indubitable nor mechanically certain.

Our apprehension of

reality requires an active comprehension of the things known; even the

most abstract of apprehensions requires, in some way, the personal
participation of the knower.
guarantee.

For such knowing, there can be no final

Given the nature of our abilities and our place within

reality, there can be no absolute foundation, no single certainty, no

ultimate clear and distinct idea.

Every apprehension must rely, in the

final analysis, on an appraisal of our own arts of knowing.

Any

apprehension or any ccnception which ignors our true situation as
knowing beings must be suspect.

The structure of understanding

suggested by Polanyi relinquishes man's age old dream of certainty and
the foundation of arbitrary formalisms which inevitably flow from such a

dream.

He begins instead with an acknowledgement of both man's

strengths and limitations:

with both man's most profound intellectual

discoveries and with the personal foundation on which those discoveries

must ultimately rest.

The conception of human abilities and the

conception of reality suggested by Polanyi 's theory of tacit knowledge
seem to form an intellectual foundation more adequate and more coherent

with human experience.
of existence,

I

physical skills.

It is my hope that within Polanyi 's conceptions

may be able to work toward a more adequate conception of
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Conceptions of Existence Inherent in
the Theory of Tacit Knowledge;
Polanyi's Conception of Human Abilities

Although the purpose of my exploration is now first to work toward
an understanding of the conceptions of existence inherent in the theory
of tacit knowledge, and then to work through those conceptions toward

a

more adequate conception of skills, my exploration will be also, of
necessity, an exegesis of Polanyi’s theory.

As

I

move closer to this

new conception of skills, my focus will inevitably become more
selective; but nevertheless, all of the material within this chapter

should lead the reader not only toward a more adequate conception of
skills but also toward a more comprehensive understanding of Polanyi.

At the end of the last chapter within a criticism of our present

intellectual foundation,
theory.

I

presented several brief views of Polanyi's

In opposition to the Cartesian paradigm of science, Polanyi's

theory appears as a more personal conception of science.

Polanyi shows

that the processes of discovery cannot be represented within a framework
of wholly explicit knowledge.

He suggests rather that science makes its

advances into the unknown through a kind of groping or intuition in

which the scientist interiorizes various kinds of clues in order to
attend through them toward the coherent pattern which he seeks to
discover.

Within the perspective of a criticism of the Cartesian

complex
principles, the theory of tacit knowledge takes on a more

appearance.

tacit
Polanyi suggests that the from- to structure of

knowledge is essentially a skill-like process:

the subsidiary elements

bits of information which we can
of knowledge are not merely subliminal
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acquire and discard at will

— rather

they have been assimilated by us,

have become aspects of our being, in such a way that they are

inextricably part of the whole context through which we focus on and
dwell in the world.

Polanyi suqgests further that just as tacit

knowledge directs us from subsidiary particulars to a focal whole, so
directs us to the comprehension of
as our knowing of it:

a

it

reality having the same structure

that is to a whole of parts whose significance

ranges in ways perhaps unguessed by us beyond its specifiable

particulars or even beyond the presently visible outline of the whole.
At the very end of the last chapter in comparison with Sartean

consciousness, Polanyi

's

theory seems to become more inclusive.

Within

this perspective, the from-to structure of tacit knowing seems not so

much a specialized explanation for the workings of science, but an

explanation for the workings and even the existence of all conscious
activity.

These views of Polanyi'

s

theory already suggest both the

conception of human abilities and the conception of reality toward which
I

am working.

However, rather than sum up those conceptions here,

might be able to present them more intelligibly if

I

I

first looked at the

theory of tacit knowledge from one of Polanyi 's own perspectives, and
then worked, as the theory itself does,

abilities toward

a

from a conception of human

conception of reality.

In The Tac it Dimension

fundamental aspects of
Polanyi offers his most systematic view of the

suggests the
tacit knowing, and this view perhaps most clearly
theory.^
conception of human abilities inherent in the

Polanyi begins

more than they can tell.
here with the fact that human beings know

One
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can recognize a person's face and its moods without being able to tell

by what signs he knows it.
recognition

I

This is basically the same kind of

mentioned earlier by which a naturalist is able to tell

Rhyncodemus from a bilineatus.

a

Both our daily lives and our descriptive

sciences are highly dependent on the recognition of characteristic

physiognomies

—a

kind of recognition which cannot be fully described.

2

Polanyi cites the Gestalt theories of perception as a possible

explanation for such recognition, but while Gestalt theory assumes that

perception is an automatic activity taking place through the
"spontaneous equilibration of particulars as they are impressed on the

retina or on the brain

,

Polanyi sees such recognition rather as the

outcome of "an active shaping of experience."
In order to clarify the structure of such recognition

— "to

show in

isolation the principle mechanism by which knowledge is tacitly
acquired," Polanyi cites two recent experiments in subception.

Polanyi

'

s

Because

descriptions of these experiments are important to the

conclusions which follow,

I

will quote him here:

The authors presented a person with a large number of
nonsense syllables, and after showing certain of the
syllables, they administered an electric shock. Presently
the person showed symptoms of anticipating the shock at the
sight of "shock syllables"; yet, on questioning, he could
not identify them. He had come to know when to expect a
He
shock, but he could not tell what made him expect it.
when
have
we
which
that
had acquired a knowledge similar to
tell...
crr.noc
we
we know a person's face by signs which
by
Another variant of this phenomenon was demonstrated
shock
to
a
Ericsen and Kuethe. They exposed a person
to certain shoe
whenever he happened to utter associations
forestall the
words." Presently, the person learned to
associations, but,
shock by avoiding the utterance of such
did not know he was
on questioning, it appeared that he
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doing this. Here the subject got to know a practical
operation, but could not tell how he worked it. This kind
of subception has the structure of a skill, for a skill
combines elementary muscular acts which are not
identifiable, according to relations that we cannot define.^
These experiments show what is meant by saying that one can know more

than one can tell.

remain tacit.

In both experiments, the shock-producing particulars

The subject cannot identify them, yet he relies on his

awareness of them for anticipating the electric shock.
Polanyi uses these experiments to suggest several of the

fundamental aspects of tacit knowing.

The subject in the experiment

knows the shock-producing particulars only by relying on his awareness

of them for attending to the electric shock.
them remains tacit.

Hence his knowledge of

The experiment reveals how one comes to know such

subsidiary, or as Polanyi here calls them, "proximal" particulars.

Polanyi calls this the "functional" relation between the two terms of
tacit knowing:

the subject knows the first term only by relying on his

awareness of it for attending to the second.

In non-experimental

situations such as perception when the focal or "distal" term is not
single element like

a

a

shock but is rather an integration of particulars,

it
it can be said that the "functional" import of tacit knowing is that

guides one from the proximal, interiorized particulars to the

integration of

a

coherent, distal whole.

This functional relation or

awareness of the
structure can be seen when one relies on his subsidiary

appearance of
features of a face for attending to the characteristic
of a combination of
that face, or when one relies on his awareness

movements to the
muscular acts for attending from those elementary

achievement of their joint pvarpose.
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Polanyi also uses the experiments in subception to illustrate
several other fundamental aspects of tacit knowing.

Within the

experimental setting it may be said that even though one does not learn

specifically to recognize the shock syllables as distinct from other
syllables, one does become aware of facing a shock syllable in terms of
the apprehension it evokes in one.

One becomes aware of the shock

syllables in terms of that on which he is focusing.

In the case of a

physiognomy, it may be said that one is aware of specific features in
terms of the physiognomy toward which he is attending; in the case of a
skill, one is aware of the muscular moves in terms of the performance

toward which one's attention is directed.
of tacit knowing:

Polanyi says of this aspect

"we are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit

knowing in the appearance of the distal term; we are aware of that from

which we are attending to another thing, in the appearance of that
thing.

Polanyi calls this the "phenomenal" structure of tacit

knowing.

Within the functional and phenomenal aspects of tacit knowing

Polanyi sees a third aspect.

When the sight of certain syllables makes

the subject expect an electric shock, it may be said that those

syllables signify the approach of

a

shook

— that

is their meaning.

One

meaning
knows these syllables in terms of their meaning; it is their

toward which his attention is directed.

In

<-he

same way it can be said

its features:
that a characteristic physiognomy is the meaning of

identifies

a

one

features for
physiognomy by relying on his awareness of its

attending to their joint meaning.

Tacit knowing directs one from

Polanyi calls this the
particulars to the whole which they signify;

"sematic" aspect of tacit knowing.
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It is important to note here one of the characteristics of this

semantic aspect.

The meaning of the features of a physiognomy is

observed at the same spot where the features are situated; hence it is
difficult to separate mentally the features from their meaning.

Yet the

fact remains that the two are distinct, since one may know a physiognomy

without being able to specify its features.

To illustrate more clearly

this separation of meaning from that which is meant, Polanyi uses the

example of learning a typical medical skill

— the

use of a probe.

As a

medical student learns to use a probe, his awareness of its impact on
his hand is slowly transformed into a sense of its point touching the

objects he is exploring.

Polanyi explains that "this is how an

interpretative effort transposes meaningless feelings into meaningful
ones, and places these at some distance from the original feelings."

6

The student becomes aware of the feelings in his hand in terms of their

meaning located at the tip of the probe to which he is attending.

This

structure is seen in the use of any tool, and it also applies in the use

.7

of more articulate tools such as languages and scientific theories.

Polanyi tells how the correspondence he reads at breakfast arrives in

many languages.

However, he usually remains unaware of the language in

some part
which a particular letter is written unless he wishes to share

of that letter with his son who speaks only English,

At that point he

letter needs to be
must focus on the language itself to see whether the

translated.

can be
In reading his breakfast correspondence, Polanyi

particular letter only in terms of
said to be aware of the language of a
its meaning.

the semantic aspect of
It is one of the characteristics of

knowing meaning tends to be
tacit knowing that in all such acts of
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displaced away from the proximal particulars toward the distal whole

which those particulars signify.
These three fundamental aspects of tacit knowing, when combined

with the views of Polanyi's theory already presented in the last
chapter, suggest a conception of human abilities which is inherent in
all of Polanyi's work.

Polanyi believes that human abilities always

involve at least two different kinds of things or two different kinds of
awareness.

The use of a human ability can be described as our attending

from proximal particulars to a distal whole, or it can be described as

involving two kinds of awareness, subsidiary and focal, through which we
strive in every endeavor, whether practical or theoretical, to master or
to contemplate our environment.

Polanyi believes that this two-level

description is required for several reasons.

Some subsidiary elements

are, because of the nature of our abilities, unknowable or

unspecif iable

,

and yet can be shown to contribute to a focal whole; such

unspecif lability
perception.

,

as

I

shall later show, is particularly apparent in

In addition, the way in which many of these subsidiary

elements are initially integrated is also unspecif iable.

However, more

important than either physiological or psychological reasons is the
logical relation which pertains between the subsidiary elements and the
focal whole.®

Even in cases where the subsidiary particulars can be

they
identified apart from their general contribution to the focal hole,

do not mean the same thing in isolation.

discovery must cross

a

Polanyi believes that just as

logical gap, so all our apprehensions involve a

integration through which we
kind of creation, a not-wholly-specif iable

move toward a new way of understanding.

Neither the clues to

a
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scientific problem nor the features of a physiognomy constitute

knowledge of the whole.

a

Because human abilities do not function wholly

through explicit integration, the subsidiary particulars of any act of

apprehension subtly change their appearance or meaning as they are
integrated toward a focal whole.

Thus although certain particulars may

be specified in isolation, that specification does not constitute a

specification of those particulars as they pertain to the whole.

As the

above argument suggests, Polanyi believes that human abilities are to a
large degree active and thus involve the dimension of achievement.

The

proximal particulars are not just given us; through an effort of our
bodies we also actively assimilate these particulars in order both to
attend toward

— and

of our attention.

in a sense to discover

— the

central object or purpose

As the experiments in subception showed, and as all

perception more generally reveals, we apprehend that object in terms of
Human abilities can thus be described

pattern and, therefore, meaning.

as skills entailing the active apprehension of both pattern and meaning
in terms of clues bearing on it.

Perhaps

I

can better suggest the conception of human abilities

inherent in Polanyi 's theory if

I

examine more closely that

unspecifiable context of assimilations out of which all our
apprehensions seem to arise.

Let us examine some of the tools which

form a part of this context.

First look at the medical probe which

mentioned earlier.

I

his hand
The student uses the probe as he would use

probe as though it were an
and feels the impacts of the tip of the

extension of his arm.

awareness of
Polanyi says that "our subsidiary

act of making them form a part
tools and probes can be regarded as the
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of our own body

We pour ourselves into them and assimilate them as

parts of our own existence.
them."

9

We accept them existentially by dwelling in

However, tools are felt not only in terms of our own body; they

are also felt in terms of the entity toward which we are attending.
This is easier to understand if one thinks about the use, not of a

probe, but of a less tangible tool such as a scientific theory or a

skillful motion.

Polanyi says "whenever

v;e

use certain things for

attending from them to other things, these things change their
appearance; they appear to us now in terms of the entities to which we
are attending from them.

.

.

.We are attending from the scientific theory

to things seen in its light, and are aware of the theory, while thus

using it, in terms of the spectacle that it serves to explain."

10

We

are aware of a tool then both in terms of our body and in terms of that

entity toward which we are attending.

Taking the term from Dilthey and

Lipps, Polanyi calls this use of tools "indwelling."

Indwelling

includes both the sense of assimilation and of extension.
a thing function as the

proximal term of tacit knowing

,

"When we make

we incorporate

it in our body and extend our body to include it so that we come to

dwell in it."^^

Indwelling is a means of making certain things function

of observing them
as the proximal term of tacit knowing so that instead
in terms of our context
in themselves, we may become aware of them both
in terms of their bearing
of previous assimilations but more importantly

constitute.
on the comprehensive entity which they

assimilation and indwelling as
If one imagines this process of
of pregnancy and continuing
beginning sometime soon after the inception

then one comes close to the
throughout the lifetime of an individual/^
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conception of human abilities inherent in Polanyi’s theory.

The

structure of our abilities is genetically given us and in that sense
they are ours.

But from our first sensations of uterine warmth, through

all our "higher" forms of learning and on to our knowledge of impending
death, those abilities are formed through a kind of sharing of ourselves

with the world.

In the development of our abilities, we both assimilate

the world to ourselves and give ourselves to it so that we dwell in it.

Human abilities can be represented neither as the function of some
inner, arbitrary, significance-conferring "I," nor as a series of

explicit, mechanical steps.

Our apprehensions and knowledge of reality

are neither chosen arbitrarily from zero, nor are they indubitably given
us.

Our cibilities are aspects both of our facticity and our

transcendence.

They are achieved both through our seeking to have

assimilation of the world, and throiigh our surrender

possessed by the world.

— bur

— our

being

Thus we live always in a tension or a balance

between what we seek and what we are, between the world whose facticity
we share and ourselves whose shaping makes that world a world.

13

From

our first beginnings, all of our abilities are formed through such a

sharing of ourselves, and all our

apprehensions must ultimately rest on

this foundation.
of tacit
This conception of human abilities inherent in the theory

knowledge stands in some contrast to our present conception.
skills,
may suggest about a new conception of physical

explore.

I

What it

shall go on to

suggests about
What Polanyi’s more comprehensive conception

concerned as it is almost
our present conception of human abilities—
sum
I shall here once more
exclusively with "intellectual" abilities—
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up.

First there is no single and essential human ability

attentive mind

— either

—a

pure and

mysteriously yet indubitably apprehending reality

as per Descartes, or wholly isolated as per Sartre.

To comprehend

— all

the way from our most basic apprehensions to the grandest visions of an

Einstein

— is

to rely on oneself bodily in order to envisage a coherent,

intelligible spectacle beyond oneself.

Second, acknowledging that it is

the structure of our bodies and our senses

unknowable

—which

— and

not something wholly

begins the processes of comprehension, nevertheless

those processes cannot be mechanically traced and explicitly known.

Our

abilities are so formed that our comprehensions- must erst ultimately on
an unspecif iable context, a context both of assimilations to, and

extensions of, ourselves.

As Marjorie Grene says, in a passage that

harks back to the paradigm of science:
Our explicit awareness, the focal core of consciousness, is
always founded in and carried by the tacit acceptance of
something not explicit, which binds, heavily and concretely,
ourselves to and within a world- This means that knowledge
The impersonal aspect of knowledge
is always personal.
arises from and returns to personal participation in the
search for and acceptance of the object to be known.

Polanyi's Conception of Reality

Of the conceptions inherent in Polanyi's theory of tacit
which seems
knowledge, it is the above conception of human abilities

most relevant to the purposes of this exploration.

However, before

I

of skills, it is also
begin to work toward a more adequate conception

and the conception of reality
necessary to examine the veridical claims,

inherent in Polanyi's theory.

What must be asked first, is how the

claim to apprehend reality, and
abilities described above can rightly
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second, what is the nature of the reality thus apprehended.

One of the

dominate ideals of our present intellectual foundation is to establish

a

strictly detached, objective knowledge, and any falling short of this
ideal is accepted only as a temporary imperfection.

Polanyi's conception of human abilities suggests

However, if as

— that

tacit knowing

forms an indispensible part of all our apprehensions of reality, then
the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would in

effect aim at the destruction of all knowledge.

To conceive of

knowledge as the explicit integration of specified particulars is both
logically and psychologically inadequate.

adhered to, would first, as

I

Such a model, if it were

have shown through the paradox of

discovery, effectively eliminate the quest for all further knowledge;
and would second, as Polanyi's conception of human abilities shows, so

misrepresent our situation within the universe that we could never
achieve an adequate understanding of our own existence.

Given the

nature of our abilities, Polanyi believes that it is both futile and

demeaning to seek strictly impersonal verification for our
apprehensions.

Yet despite our limitations, Polanyi also believes that

and that many
through our abilities we do come in contact with reality,

times we rightly apprehend the reality which we

thxis

contact.

a fusion of the
Polanyi describes true apprehension of reality as

personal with the objective.

such
He attempts to understand and justify

human abilities, not
apprehension, just as he attempted to understand
but through an
abstractly through a set of arbitrary formalisms

examination of human beings seeking knowledge.

Here again, as

specifically the recognition
often the case, Polanyi's model is science,

—
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of a scientific problem.

So there will be no mistake here, let me first

present the most basic conclusions to which Polanyi

'

s

theory must lead.^^

Polanyi notes that when a scientist sees a problem, he sees something
that is hidden.

He has an intimation of the coherence of hitherto not

comprehended particulars.
intimation

— for

There exist no rules to account for such an

the way a good idea is found for starting an inquiry, and

there exist no firm rules either for the verification or refutation of
Given the structure of our abilities,

the final results of that inquiry.

neither the particulars which we assimilate nor the integration of those
Because only human beings can

particulars can be indubitably known.

achieve this kind of knowledge and because tacit knowing governs all
hiaman abilities, no item of information, no knowledge can be traced back

explicitly to its certain roots.

The scientist's intimations and

discoveries, and all of the learning

— personal,

cultural and scientific

which guide him in his exploration, are governed ultimately by tacit
knowing.

Because this is so, Polanyi must finally say that the problem

is good and will lead to a relevant truth if the intimation is true.

truth of our apprehensions must rest finally on our own beliefs.
says,

"I

Polanyi

reality,
declare myself committed to the belief in an external

gradually accessible to knowing, and
cin

The

intimation of such a reality.

I

regard all true understanding as

„16

our most basic
Polanyi believes that all our apprehensions, from

scientific discoveries, are
awareness of the world to our most profound
given the structure of tacit
achieved through tacit knowing; and that

must rest ultimately on our own
knowing, the truth of those apprehensions

beliefs and self-accreditation.

utraos
We develop our abilities to their

best way we know how; but
and we. use those abilities in the very

—
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ultimately it is our own self-set standards
about the business of knowing

—which

—our

belief in the way we go

accredits our apprehensions.

"We

can voice our ultimate convictions only from within our convictions

from within the whole system of acceptances that are logically prior to
any particular assertion of our own, prior to the holding of any

particular piece of knowledge."

17

Such justification may seem at best a

kind of sophistry, and more likely only a tautology, and indeed from many
perspectives such objections seem valid.
intellectual foundation, and as
are by their nature circular

believe one must have faith.

— to
18

Polanyi is proposing here a new

have mentioned before, such foundations

I

have faith one must believe, but to

What must be realized is that the same

objections could be brought against any foundation or even against any
statement.

A proper study of this very sentence

— that

is a study which

is both an exploration the sentence and an exegesis of the fundamental

beliefs, in the light of which we approach the sentence
same kind of acceptances which in Polanyi'

—would

seem so arbitrary.

s foiindation

Given the circular nature of intellectual foundation,

reveal the

I

would suggest

some
again that what is needed for a better understanding of Polanyi is

small suspension of disbelief.

I

would argue that what is required

ultimately for an understanding of Polanyi is a leap of faith

a long-

transforprepared-for but when it comes a sudden and almost a-critical

mation to a wholly new way of understanding.

I

would also argue that

enough to induce such a
Polanyi -s theory is at present not comprehensive
leap.

a New Conception
That is why this dissertation is entitled "Toward

aspect of that long preparation.
of Skills"; it is, in one sense, an

.

.
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Given then that we can account for this capacity of ours to know

more than we can tell only if we believe in capacity itself and in the

presence of an external reality with which we establish contact, what
more can be said to lead the reader toward a better understanding of the

veridical claims of tacit knowing?

Polanyi believes that there are

certain ways in which tacit knowing functions best.

In order to

apprehend the truth, we must commit ourselves to seeking the truth.
Commitment, like human abilities themselves, is

botli

internal and

external, both an appropriation and a surrender, both a belief and a

passion
We can assimilate an object as a tool if we believe it to be
actually useful to our purposes and the same holds for the
relation of meaning to what is meant and the relation of
parts to a whole.
The act of personal knowing can sustain
these relations only because the acting person believes that
they are opposite:
that he has not made them but discovered
them.
The effort of knowing is thus guided by a sense of
obligation towards the truth: by an effort to submit to
reality
Every act of personal assimilation by which we make a thing form an

extension of ourselves thorugh our subsidiary awareness of it
of a tool, the seeing of an object in a particular way
of ourselves, a manner of disposing of ourselves.

— is

— the

use

a commitment

Yet if we act

responsibly, if we act in service to the truth, then these commitments

become something more:

"the freedom of the subjective person to do as

he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act
as he must."^*^

This may seem an over-stating of any of our powers; and

commitment,
it is true, that even in those acts of knowing governed by

our
there is always the faith that nature must somehow conform to

intellectual desires.

Yet within commitment, such desires are not only

144

ours; they seem also to come, in a sense, from beyond us.

These desires

are a passion which seeks intellectual satisfaction not only as that

which satisfies itself but with universal intent.
Yielding to our intellectual passions, we desire to become
more satisfying to ourselves, and accept an obligation to
educate ourselves by the standards which our passions have
set to ourselves.
In this sense these passions are public,
not private
they delight in cherishing something external
:

to us,

for its own saJce.^^

For Polanyi, the veridical claims of tacit knowing rest finally with the

realization that we can voice our ultimate convictions only from within
those convictions; but with commitment and with the intellectual passion

which the commitment situation seems to instill in us

—a

passion for

mental excellence which believes itself to be fulfilling universal

obligations

— that

resting place seems, if not wholly secure, then at

least adequate to our situation as knowing beings.

Before proceeding toward a new conception of skills, it now
remains necessary only to examine the conception of reality inherent in
the theory of tacit knowledge.

I

should point out here that the

division of Polanyi 's theory into various conceptions is itself somewhat
arbitrary.

The structure of my examination here is more of a concession

to Descartes and my own structures of thought, than it is an accurate

reflection of Polanyi 's own ideas.

Polanyi 's theory suggests not so

or
much a distinction of knower from known, as it does a continuum

human
hierarchy of reality in which the knower, and indeed in which

abilities themselves, are one reality among others.
in several contexts,

implications.

As

I

have mentioned

the existence of knowledge has ontological

matter; there
There exists something other than bits of
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is also knowing mind.

The theory of tacit knowledge suggests not one or

two kinds of things within reality, but a whole variety of existences;
it suggests further than as knowing is not only passive but is also
an achievement, won through effort and through intelligent interaction

with one's surroundings, so also are many of the entities within
reality, themselves achievements.

The existence of these entities is

not given them; it is achieved by them
intelligence, they would not exist.

— save

for their own efforts and

Further as

I

have also mentioned,

because these entities have in a sense achieved themselves, their
existence is not wholly explicable in terms of the conditions from which
they originated.

The logic of achievement implies that such entities

exist on at least two levels at once:
conditions of its existence

,

the whole depends on the parts as

but the parts exist here as parts only as

so constituted by the unifying principle of the whole.

The theory of

tacit knowledge suggests, then, a conception of grades or levels of
reality, and suggests also that within this reality there are not only
types of existence but types of achievement.
In The Tacit Dimension

,

as Polanyi systematically examines the

various aspects of tacit knowing, he shows that human beings form

intellectually and practically an "interpreted universe populated by
entities, the particulars of which they interiorize for the sake of
.,22

comprehending their meaning in the shape of coherent entities."
the three aspects

I

From

have already discussed in regard to human abilities,

Polanyi "deduces" a fourth, the ontolotical aspect:

"since tacit

terms, we may
knowing establishes a meaningful relationship between two

entity which
identify it with the understanding of the comprehensive
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these two terms jointly constitute.

Thus the proximal term represents

the particulars of this entity, and we can say accordingly, that we

comprehend the entity by relying on our awareness of its particulars for
attending to their joint meaning." 23

comprehension of an entity

— and,

Here Polanyi suggests that the

by our convictions, a real entity

the same structure as the entity which is its object.

— has

He illustrates

this conception of reality by considering the situation where two

persons share the knowledge of the same comprehensive entity

— that

is

the knowledge of__an entity which one of them produces and the other

apprehends.

The entity here considered is the skillful performance of

the "producer."

The knower must here try to combine mentally the

movements which the producer/performer combines practically, and the

knower must combine them in a pattern similar to the performer's pattern
of movements.

Polanyi notes that two kinds of indwelling meet here:

"The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in them as parts of

his body while the watcher tries to correlate these moves by seeking to

dwell in them from outside.
them.

He dwells in these moves by interiorizing

By such exploratory indwelling the pupil gets the feel of the

master's skill and may learn to rival him."

24

Polanyi believes that

this "structural kinship" between subject and object is present not only
ij-j

the study of bodily performances but also in the study of mental

performances and indeed in all knowing.

All acts of knowing involve the

of
selection of clues which have "a presumed bearing on the presence

something they appear to indicate.

If we select these clues

comprehensive
skillfully, then we enter into the particulars of a

we have
entity; and if we integrate skillfully the particulars

—
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assimilated, then we come in contact with something that, in many cases,

accounts for the coherence of that entity.

Working from the idea of the correspondence between the structure
of comprehension and the structure of the comprehensive entity, Polanyi

suggests several other things about the nature of reality.

identifies the two terms of tacit knowing

— the

He again

proximal which includes

the particulars and the distal which is their comprehensive meaning

with two levels of reality; and he argues, as

I

have demonstrated in

regard to DNA, that within any comprehensive entity it is impossible to

represent the organizing principles of the higher level by the laws
governing its isolated particulars.

In regard to the various levels

which seem to exist within reality, Polanyi makes a further arg\ament,
one which harks both back to the veridical claims of tacit knowing and

forward to a more adequate conception of skills.

Polanyi demonstrates

how, through tacit knowing, we can know such disparate things as a

person and a scientific problem and even a cobblestone.

He then goes on

to argue that persons and problems are more real than cobblestones

because they carry the possibility of a greater range of interesting and

unexpected consequences.
The examples, which I have mentioned, point toward a new
aspect of this problem of philosophy. The structural
kinship between knowing a person and discovering a problem,
cobblestone,
and the alignment of both with our knowing of a
and a
person
a
call attention to the greater depth of
of
a
profundity
problem, as compared with the lesser
more
be
cobblestone. Persons and problems are felt to
themselves in
profound, because we expect them yet to reveal
evoke no
unexpected ways in the future, while cobblestones
thing to reveal itse
such expectation. This capacity of a
attribute to the fact
in unexpected ways in the future I
a reality,
that the thing observed is an aspect of
by our
exhausted
not
is
possessing a significance that
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conception of any single aspect of it. To trust that a
thing we know is real is, in this sense, to feel that it has
the independence and power for manifesting itself in yet
unthought of ways in the future. I shall say, accordingly,
that minds and problems possess a deeper reality than
cobblestones, although cobblestones are admittedly more real
in the sense of being more tangible.
And since I regard the
significance of a thing as more important than its
tangibility, I shall say that minds and problems are more
real than cobblestones.
This is to class our knowledge of
reality with the kind of foreknowledge which guides
scientists to discovery.
Polanyi is not arguing here that reality is unpredictcible or unreliaJDle;
reality is still characterized by many predicteible consequences.

What

he is arguing is that many comprehensive entities are much richer than

our predictions of them, and so are capable of indefinite consequences
as well.

Although the logic of predictability contributes to the

conception and thus to the acceptance of reality, we also conceive of

and accept reality for its depth, its significance, its profundity

— for

its capacity of infinite relevation.
The conception of reality inherent in the theory of tacit

knowledge is one which contains a variety of existences

—a

variety which

need not, and which indeed given the nature of our abilities, can never
be exhausted by the multiplicity of formulae which we devise for the

knowing of it.

Polanyi

's

theory suggests a hierarchy or continuum of

both
reality in which many kinds of entities, at many levels of reality,

exist and interact.

To some of these entities, existence is wholly

forever within
given, and these inflexible entities are seemingly locked

their place in the universe.

But to many of the entities, only the

have the capacity
basic structure of existence is given; these entities
to interact with their surroundings.

The existence of these flexible
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entities can be seen as a process, and to the extent
that the

interaction of such entities is skillful, their existence
can be seen as
an achievement.

The processes of both interaction and skillful

interaction expand the structure of reality.

These processes both

extend the existence of given entities and create new entities.

Often

what is created in these processes is not tangible or not wholly
tangible.

Nevertheless, Polanyi believes that these new entities are

real, and indeed that many of them are more real than the entities from

which they were created.

Perception; A Final View of Polanyi
Conceptions of Existence

I

's

have almost concluded my presentation of the conceptions of

existence inherent in the theory of tacit knowledge; but before

I

do,

I

would like to add one final persepctive from which these conceptions may
be viewed.

Up to this point, my descriptions have been rather abstract.

Therefore, in conclusion,

I

think it might be appropriate to balance out

my presentation by looking at Polanyi'

actual human ability.

s

conceptions in relation to an

Of all the examples of hiaman abilities Polanyi

uses to illustrate his theory, the one most basic to his argument is

perception.

For Polanyi, perception is a learned skill, developed

first and usually beyond recognition by the infant, but a skill also

capable of specialized and refined development throughout the lifetime

of the individual.

Like all human abilities, perception integrates

clues to which the individual is not directly attending, toward some

larger coherence.

As in man's most refined scientific skills.
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perception is an active process.

Our perceptual abilities select some

clues, reject others, and then integrate the assimilated particulars

according to standards which those abilities have both accepted and set
to themselves.

Perception thus interprets the world, and interprets it

in ways which are largely inaccessible to explicit investigation.

Nevertheless, despite the mediation involved in the perceptual processes

and despite their unspecifiability
offers us access to reality.

,

we still believe that perception

Polanyi notes that if all the functions of

perception could be eliminated by training oneself to look at things in
the way in which a newborn baby must first look at them

— "with

unperceiving eyes, letting the images sweep across the retina like a

motion picture which is continuously slipping through the gate of the

projecting lantern,"

one would still not thereby feel assured of

gaining access to a core of indubitable "virgin data."

Given our

situation within the world and given the nature of our abilities, we

must know the world through our tacit interpretation of it; nevertheless
we need not therefore relinquish all claims for the apprehension of a
true picture of reality.

which some
In any act of perception there exists a structure in

elements must always remain tacit.

This is so both because of the

logical relationship
nature of the visual mechanism and because of the

which pertains within the act.
complex.^®

The visual mechanism is active and

requires u.e
Perception is a process; an act of perception

to determine what is seen.
interaction of all parts of the visual field

on the active adjustment of
The original retinal images are dependent

both eyes, on body position.
pupils and lenses, on the convergence of
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head and neck muscles.

The images enter the brain along with

information from the processes which affected their formation,
and once
inside the brain the perception is co-determined by all
these messages

along with information from the internal ear and from various other
nonvisual parts of the brain.

In addition, all during this process, a

complex filtering action has been going on.
muscles are themselves filters

—we

The lens and positional

choose both consciously and

unconsciously what to look at and how to focus.

Further, the fibers in

the optic nerve run both ways; this suggests that not only is

information filtered as it moves from the retina into the brain, but
also that the retina itself can be predisposed to receive or reject

various kinds of information.

Most of the structures which contribute

to the formation of the final image are subsidiary

and cannot be experienced in themselves.

— they

remain tacit

Nevertheless, these subsidiary

structures both guide the eyes in shaping the retinal image and control
the processes within the brain which form the final image.

The structure of the visual mechanism suggests that many of the

elements of perception are by their nature subsidiary.

However, even

when some subsidiary elements within an act of perception can be
isolated, these elements, like the features of a face, cannot be

specified within the focal whole, and thus they remain tacit.

One of

the examples which Polanyi uses to demonstrate such logical
,

30

lanspecifiability is the viewing of a pair of steroscopic photograpns.
in the
If one views a pair of such photographs, say of a landscape,

photograph,
proper way so that each eye is forced to focus on a single
in depth, more
the objects within the landscape then appear distributed

—

.

152

rounded and real, harder and more tangible.

This result is due to a

slight difference between the two pictures, taken from two points a few
inches apart.

Polanyi notes that "all the information to be revealed by

the steroscopic viewing is contained in these scarcely perceptible

disparities."

31

Although we can here isolate the major subsidiaries

the two separate photographs

appear in the focal image.

,

we cannot know those photographs as they

Within the integrated focal whole, the

meaning of these subsidiary elements has changed; yet because no
explicit procedure or direction can produce this integration, we cainnot
specify the subsidiary elements within the focal whole.

concept is so central to Polanyi
once more.

's

Because this

theory, let me repeat the argument

The viewing of steroscopic photographs reveals one of the

more general structures of human perception.

In any act of perception

we fuse two different pictures of an object cast upon the retinas of our
eyes by forming its steroscopic image

.

We focus our attention on the

stero image and see the pictures only as they bear on that image

.

In

Polanyi 's terms, we are "focally aware of the stero image by being

subsidiarily aware of the two separate pictures."

32

Between this focal

discovery, a
and subsidiary awareness there exists, as there does in

logical gap.

Because this gap cannot be crossed by any explicit or

of perception
specifiable process of integration, even those elements

specified within the focal
which can be specified in isolation cannot be

whole.

unspecifiable
That is what is meant by calling them logically
are probably developed very
The skills of steroscopic integration

perceptual skills.
early in life, as are most of our

Thus it is

or understanding of thes
difficult to acquire a siobjective awareness
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processes.

However, specialized perceptual skills can be developed

later in life, and this development offers at least a clue as to how
such unspecif iable skills are learned.

One of Polanyi's examples is

that of learning the skills of radiology.

The student of radiology

begins by watching in a darkened room the shadowy traces on a
fluroescent screen placed against a patient's chest, and hears the

radiologist commenting to his assistants, in technical language, on the

significant features of these shadows.
student slowly begins to

maJce

Polanyi describes how the

sense of these shadows:

The student is completely puzzled, for he can see in the XRay picture of a chest only the shadows of the heart and the
ribs, with a few spidery blotches between. The experts seem
to be romancing; he can see nothing that they are talking
about. But as he goes on listening for a few weeks, looking
carefully at, the pictures of different cases, gradually a
rich panaroma of significant details will be revealed to
him: of physiological variations and pathological changes,
of scars, of chronic infections and signs of acute disease.
He has entered a new world. He still sees only a fraction
of what experts see, but the pictures are definitely making
sense now and so do most of the comments made on them.

Here can be seen the same kind of groping which Polanyi believes

characterizes discovery.
particulars.

The student is first aware only of shadowy

Yet over the weeks he is able to integrate those

particulars into a coherent meaningful whole, although he remains

substantially unaware of both those particulars and the processes
through which he is able to integrate them.

The learning of such

nature of the
perceptual skills thus both confirms the unspecifiable
the way in which
perceptual structures and processes, and also suggests
those processes are first developed.

154

My first description of the visual mechanisms and Polanyi's

steroscopic and radiological examples demonstrate the complexly

mediated yet largely unspecifiable structure of the perceptual
processes

.

There are several general conclusions which may be drawn

from these examples; but before

I

do this, let me suggest two other

themes which run through Polanyi's discussion of perception.

Polanyi

believes that perception, like all knowledge, requires certain prior
acceptances.

Except at the very close of Personal Knowledge

,

Polanyi

does not really argue the most basic ontological questions, but begins

rather with the acknowledgement of ourselves within a world, a world in

which we through our senses are trying to find our way.

Polanyi

believes that our perception of anything is already a form of
commitment; in seeing anything we have already chosen at some level of

our being to believe that life is not a dream, that there is something
to be seen,, and that our perceptual abilities are in some way suitable

for this seeing.

Thus for Polanyi perception already acknowledges a

kind of metaphysical commitment.

Our perceptions can be organized into

there are things
a system of knowledge only insofar as we believe that

them in
and events in the world causing those perceptions, and causing
an orderly and reliable way.

Further Polanyi believes that we must be

correctly— that we
convinced that we do, more often than not, see them
of reality.
have the ability to truly apprehend some aspects

For

that the structure of our
Polanyi, this means that we must be convinced

relationships in the
perceptions evidences structurally corresponding
things seen.
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Let me suggest one further theme.

Perception

Given the tacit structure of

the unspecifiable nature of both the assimilated particulars

and their integration into a focal whole

,

given that perception seems to

imply an almost a-critical ontological commitment, and yet given also
that perception is a highly mediated ability, what factors can we

nevertheless abstract from these perceptual processes which might
indicate to us the standards through which perception interprets
reality.

Polanyi abstracts several factors.

Although the world is

first presented to us as a series of flat, inverted images on our
retinas, images which are continually changing size, shape, color and

position, we never see, and in fact cannot see, reality in this way.

Rather we see stable, three-dimensional solid bodies out there in space.

Polanyi believes that we see things in this way first because it is more

reasonable

—because

in constructing an interpretive framework of the

world, things fit together better in this way.

But Polanyi also

believes that perception, like science, is not guided wholly by logic
and reason.

He believes that some of the standards perception sets to

elegance.
itself are aesthetic— standards such as beauty, symmetry and

also in
Finally Polanyi believes that these standards, as they are

ourselves.
science, are not only self-set but come from outside

again they involve a kind of acceptance.

Thus

Beauty not only influences our

in the things
perceptual abilities as a kind of formal attractiveness

seen; it also exhilarates and entrances us.

grabbed, we are possessed.

beauty we cannot explain.

At times our eyes are

by a
We seem to be taken up out of ourselves

factors, must
Here beauty, as other aesthetic

emotional vaguary
be seen not as a subjective or

,

but as an attribute of
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reality.

Beauty can be seen here as a part of reality; and with its

assimilation it will become in time a clue toward our further
perceptions of reality.
Given these various themes, descriptions and examples, what can we

conclude about perception?

To begin, although perception has not been

until now a focus of my philosophical exploration, it is interesting to

note that none of the conceptions based upon a Cartesian foundation

offer an adequate description of perception.

Perception is not a form

of pure intellectual vision nor is it wholly arbitrary

impingement of an alien world.
judgment added to sensation

— the

chaotic

Nor can perception be characterized as

—by

the time the perceptual images meet

anything which might be described as active judgment, they are already

wholly formed.

Perception exhibits basically the same structure as do

all h\aman abilities.

Perception is a skillful interaction with the

world, a selective assimilation of particulars which are integrated into
a focal whole.

Often, in turn, that focal whole itself becomes

assimilated in our quest for a larger coherence
a whole context of unspecifiable assimilations.

;

in this way we acquire

At times we come to

dwell in our perception as we dwell in a tool or a theory.

At such

to be
times, there is a sense of extension; and we seem both to rise and

pulled up out of ourselves.

Our awareness is extended, and we seem to

become both more strongly ourselves and more a part of the world.

Here

also as a
perception can be seen not only as skillful interaction but

creative sharing of ourselves.

Perception is an achievement; the basic

our efforts and
structures are genetically given us, but it is through

our desires that we learn the skills of perception.

In a larger sense

—
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perception can be seen as one of the major ways through which we achieve
ourselves, through which we assimilate the whole context of

unspecifiable particulars in which and through which we dwell in the
world.

Perception is itself a comprehensive entity and thus a reality

according to Polanyi's definitions, one of the more real things which
exist.

It is hierarchical;

the structure of the visual mechanism and an

examination of its working suggest that perception is a series of higher
and higher integrations.
ability.

Perception is in no sense an isolated or pure

At almost every level of integration other kinds of

information and other abilities can be seen to contribute to perception,
and at the higher levels it must be assumed that many parts of the
already assimilated context govern the formation of the final image.
The proper development of the perceptual abilities assiames the

concurrent development of many other kinds of abilities.
usually developed early in life.

Perception is

Although many of the processes of this

development are irreversible, specific perceptual skills can be

developed later in life.

Often such later development makes possible a

better apprehension of reality.

As seen in these later developments and

are
as evidenced in the original development, the perceptual processes

both selective and interpretive.

Yet because of the nature of these

processes, they cannot be explicitly known.

Nevertheless, we accredit

we do apprehend reality,
our perceptual abilities and are confident that
correctly.
and that more often than not, we apprehend it

Part of this

images we see, but the
confidence comes from the reasonableness of the

should remind us that
circular nature of any intellectual foundation
for perceptual confidence.
logical consistancy is not sufficient basis
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We must also recognize the role which intellectual passions play in
our

acceptance of reality, and must recognize also that all our acceptances
rest finally on our own beliefs.
This concludes my presentation of the conceptions of existence

inherent in the theory of tacit knowledge.
more ideas than

I

Although

I

have presented

have defended and although Polanyi's theory offers

conceptions more complex and more comprehensive than
able to describe, nevertheless

I

I

have here been

believe my presentation sufficient both

to suggest the beginnings of a more adequate intellectual foundation and
to allow me to work within those beginnings toward a more adequate

conception of skills.

In truth, much of my work is already done.

Polanyi's conceptions not only support but also contain many of the
aspects of a more adequate conception of physical skills.

It remains for

me now only to gather those aspects together.

Toward a New Conception of Skills

Descartes felt that man, among all the forms of life, had some
special exemption which would allow him to separate his thoughts from
their crude bodily roots, and for over three hundred years now the

intellectual foundation spawned by the Cartesian conception of pure

intellectual vision has led us toward an ever more inadequate
understanding of our existence.

Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit

coherent with and
knowledge suggests a structure of understanding more

more adequate to human experience.
not separation:

The essence of human experience is

the
our existence can be mderstood neither as

nor as the arbitrary
mechanical apprehension of a one level world,
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choice of a meaningless reality.

Polanyi's theory suggests rather that

we exist primarily in our interaction with and assimilation of the
world.

Inherent within this theory are complex and varied ways of human

knowing, and manifold kinds and levels of reality.

The age old dream of

certainty and the foundation of arbitrary formalisms which inevitably
flow from such a dream must be relinquished, and we must begin anew with
the acknowledgement that all our knowing, all hiaman achievements, are

inextricably enmeshed in man's bodily processes of being.

message from the Gods, we can have no firmer foundation.

Short of a
There exists

no total discontinuity between mind and body, nor between man and

animal, and our crude bodily roots must be logically seen as the

ultimate basis for all our understanding.
a form of orientation;

All knowing can be considered

the animal's actions within his environment can

be seen to prefigure the varied ways and processes by which man both

shapes and is shaped by his world, reaching out from what he has

assimilated to what he seeks.

Our Cartesian heritage has led us to

believe that we can find the essential meaning and coherence of our
existence only by denying our bodily roots and relying solely on our
pure intellectual abilities, but the theory of tacit knowledge suggests
whole range
not only are these intellectual abilities inseparable from a

have themselves
of physical skills but also that these physical skills
meaning.
the potential for the apprehension of coherence and

coherence and meaning
This exploration began with an intimation of

within the practice of physical skills, and
conceptions suggested by Polanyi's theory,

understand those intimations.

I

I

hope now that through the

may be better able to

In re-examining man's most profound
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intellectual activities, Polcinyi seems also to have discovered
a
structure within which all of human existence may be more
adequately
understood.

Polanyi's theory suggests a conception of human abilities

and a conception of reality, more comprehensive than those of our

P^®sent intellectual foundation; and

I

hope that Polanyi's conceptions

may eventually make possible a more adequate conception of physical
skills.

As a prelude to such a conception of skills,

I

have already

described how perception might be conceived within Polanyi's more
comprehensive framework; but allow me here to present one further aspect
of this description.

Marjorie Grene, working within Polanyi's

conceptions, describes, in one of her essays, those times at the

University of Davis when the smog over Sacramento lifts and the rain is
gone and she can suddenly see the Sierra mountains from her ninth floor

office window.

She reflects on this experience:

What is this kind of seeing? It is a perceptual experience
and in its intrinsic quality entirely immediate, not, as
some philosophers would say, the product of an inference or
suddenly the mountains are there.
a set of associations:
Yet it is somehow a hiaman perception, not just a biological
event. Nor do I mean that the gleaming whiteness of the
mountains forms an added titillation to an otherwise dull
To perceive the Sierra alters radically the world one
day.
34
is in.

Grene uses the phrase, mediated immediacy, to describe this kind of
seeing.

She believes that in any act of perception, the structure of

our previous assimilations

— the

natural, personal and cultural world

through which we have developed as humain beings
seeing.

permeate our very

Lifting up one's eyes unto the hills is then a hiaman

the perception
experience, perceptual and in this sense direct, yet made

before.
it is through the mediation of much that has come

Although our
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physical skills

airc

neither as subtle nor as complexly mediated as are

our perceptual abilities

,

I

nevertheless believe them to be capable of

meaningful and coherent apprehensions.
conception of skills, toward which
me to say

— that

I

It is my hope that the

am here working, will one day allow

to practice a particular physical skill, to interact

with the world in this special way, radically alters the world
I

I

am in.

have characterized my exploration as philosophical, and in

working toward a new conception of skills, the thrust of my argument is
still philosophical.

It is my hope that my exploration has been

consistent, and that my "discoveries" will have, in themselves, the

power to suggest a new conception of skills

.

It remains for me now only

to draw from Polanyi's comprehensive conceptions those aspects which may

be reasonably thought to characterize a more adequate conception of
skills.

I

have suggested several times, not as an apology but as a

philosophical perspective, that the nature of our present intellectual
foundation makes the detailed articulation of any new conception

extremely difficult.

In my own life, I have formed my views about

skills for so long within what is still essentially a Cartesian

framework that, even though

I

know those views to be inadequate, it is

difficult to imagine more adequate views in any specific detail.
Although

I

have attempted to "balance out" some of my philosophical

although
arguments by specific references to human abilities and

I

will

by presenting a few
here preface my final philosophical conclusions
sense has a
"non-Cartesian" views on basic physical skills, in no real

arguments must still stand or
balance been achieved; the philosophical
fall on their own merits.

must
The more adequate views about skills
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remain, for the most part, intimations; only the completion and

assimilation of the intellectual foundation inherent in Polanyi's
theory, or in similar theories, will allow those intimations their

proper fruition.
I

attempted to "balance out" my presentation of Polanyi's

conceptions of existence by ending that presentation with a look at an
actual hxaman ability

— perception,

and

I

will here attempt a similar

balance by prefacing my final conclusions with a brief look at an actual
physical skill.
walking.

One of the most basic of human skills is that of

Walking is usually so taken for granted that, except in the
the significance of the skill is hardly ever recognized.

hvtman infant,

Yet walking,

I

would maintain, not only predetermines many of the ways

in which we experience the world, but is in itself a meains of access

The Cartesian structures of

both to that world and to ourselves.

separation error in telling us that only perception, or at best our five
senses, offer us an understanding of existence.

continuity in all our styles of being.

There exists rather a

There are of course those

writers who would admit that physcial skills provide an immediate and

undifferentiated kind of immersion in reality, and these writers would
some sense
thus grant that if we focused on our walking, we might gain

of our "animal being" in the world.

I

maintain, however, that physical

apprehension,
skills are not only an immediate but a mediated kind of

immediate rootedness in
and that they reveal, therefore, not only our

being within the world.
reality, but also our complexly human ways of
is admittedly less complex
Although walking, like most physical skills,

human abilities
and less subtle than are other kinds of

,

and although
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this skill does not benefit from the kind of
articulate framework which

characterizes many of our "higher" abilities; walking has,
nevertheless
the potential for a valid apprehension of reality,

eind

can lead us,

therefore, toward an increased understanding of the meaning and
coherence

of our existence.
Polanyi's conceptions reveal some of the ways in which man's more
iritellec tual abilities may claim to apprehend meaning and coherence.

Let me here briefly suggest how a physical skill like walking might make

similar claims.

The processes of any physical skill are neither

mechanical nor limited wholly to the motor cortex of the brain.

Here

again, as with perception, only the basic structure of walking is given
US;

and each human being must, through his efforts of tacit knowing,

achieve the skill.

Just as in perception, so in physical skills a

progressive series of assimilations and integrations, both in the body

and brain, interpret and reinterpret our skill until a functional model
is achieved which seems to represent a true coherence between our bodies

and the various forces and elements within the world.

Karl Pirbram, an

eminent neuropsychologist, states that "a hierarchical process, similar
to that which characterizes the sensory systems, occurs in the motor

mechanisms";

and that the coherence or "image-of-achievement" which

both informs and is apprehended by these processes is not characterized
so much by "object" or "interests" as it is by the "play of forces"

—

forces both produced by those processes and inherent within the world.

The physiological processes of walking thus seem to suggest that,
a model of a
through the achievement of the skill of walking, one forms

that the
particular coherence between ourselves and the world, and
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practice of the skill thus has the potential for the
apprehension of

both ourselves and the world in terms of that model.
Let me consider walking from another perspective.

Its structure

suggests that walking has capacity for revealing various forces at
play
in the world, but

I

would also suggest that walking has a larger

significance and the capacity for more varied releva tion.

To walk, man

must first achieve upright posture, and upright posture conditions much
of human nature.

Erwin Straus, who has made a lifelong study of man's

way of knowing, states "there is no doubt that the shape and function of
the human body are determined in almost every detail by, and for, the

upright posture

.

36
"

Because upright posture so greatly influences our

way of being in the world,

I

would argue that it almost certainly plays

a major role within what I have referred to as "the whole context of

assimilations," and

I

would also argue that eventually, within a new

conception of skills, not only posture's influence upon other skills but
posture itself will have much to tell us about ourselves and the world.
Straus comments how the vertical dimension of upright posture already
carries "many specific and expressive meanings."

Physical skills also

evidence a more general aspect of our relationship to existence.

upright posture
achievements.

auid

walking are, as

I

Both

have already suggested,

They are skills won through our efforts; and even though

their basic structures is genetically given us, they are nevertheless a
form of commitment, a choosing of how we are to be in the world.

perception, there is nothing certain in the skill of walking.

As in

The child

it will
chooses to stand and to try walking in the expectation that

between himself
work, that this motion will evidence a true coherence
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and the world.

The human gait is a complex and expansive motion

performed in the expectation of many things, among them, the
expectation
that the leg brought forward will ultimately find solid
ground.

Straus

calls this "motion on credit; confidence and timidity, elation
and

depression, and stability and insecurity are all expressed in the human
gait."

37

The child's original choice, his learning to walk, and his

continued reliance on the skill suggest the kind of commitment to be
found in all human abilities.
There is another perspective which also suggests that physical
skills have the potential for a valid kind of apprehension.

Dance,

which can be seen in part as a skillful refinement and expansion of
walking and upright posture, suggests that physical skills can develop a
much larger and more comprehensive interpretative framework than is

normally thought to be possible.

Straus claims that dance expresses

"the tendency of lived body space to expand against its surroundings and
to actualize itself symbolically."

38

Dance, as does walking, as does

perception, interprets existence so as to create the space within which
we live.

We live within the world, not as we experience it directly,

but as we assimilate and interpret it toward a larger coherence.

"The

space in^which we live is as different from the schema of empty

Euclidean space (Straus means to convey here the sense of totally
unhuman and uninterpreted space) as the familiar world of colors differs
from the concept of physical optics.

filled and articulated space."

39

As experienced, space is always

In this way, the more complex

both a
experience of dance— and other physical skills— can be seen as

human and a valid form of apprehension.

I

would hope that within a new

CMM\o»pUotv of
tlrtMcti

will

thu
»sxiMM»l«4d,

liM

Crrtwewot'ko will

v'onw

Ivti

MHM'O

hvjt

\o chrtrrtot

hopn

of nl^yalortl aklllu
to

flixrtlly

h«3

v-amvI

h\»t

v-t*

wilhltv

rtohl*»vts»l

of oontnilloil myallclmu, moI aw
olvlno of ovira»ilvo» to

I'Mf

totally hiwrtnl
vinvll f

fo itint

of

apociflc

rt

that

aklll,

I

iwovlltrtt

ttk

anil

1

1

1

f(u

rto

V

t

of avu'h akllla

rt

In thrw.

mt won

iMtOjpvntlvo

rtlinllrtr

hrtt

^ vIw»iIIImv]

w»

nm a

tu^t

Wh.nt

nvay

won hi

I

now oonCMpl Ion of wklll* Im a klM»t
lon

aklllw.

ovirwolvoa to tha v»MkMow»\

v'f

I

aiw

avui^joat Ino

nolthtu a

ovMwploto oponlno of onr aonaca to an

Wtiat

la tho

annijoat

I

fnim

th*-»t

1 1

ov»r vian

rtlHllcrtt

out'

Ion nov

ror>llty.

at Oil

v-»M

i'l\v»rnot

rm m^uy phyalv'rtl nklllx,

t^rl

t»v«iMtvully thv>a comt» lo multirat
in-rtct icc»

Imj V > I't

which mow

rr<»m«^worK

t

t

>'ou\onilon»

Imo to tliwo wo nuy

(.'ou\o

lorlnoHHmt

to Mwoll

In

thoao mo»nont« focally vtppvohoiwl both onraolvoa ami

tho worhl wlu'lly In to»«\a of that aklll.

profaoo complotoil,

'll^o

*t»t]nwont

t

lot

wo votvtin to

amt ronolvulo thla phi loaoph leal

ho oiM\oopt Iona of oxlatot\oo Inhocont

wl\at

anijiioata,

a«»l't>inlty

If not

an

Wocklnn

ox.p local Ion,

I

oonooptlon of phyaloal aklllaV

Inoxtiloahlo

avihatanoo of wy

In tho thoory of

aav'oota of thoao oo«\oopt Unva wlijht

aitoipiato

tl»o

ttsaaonahly

taolt

knowloiUjo,

Inolvuto In a »woio

I'olanyl'a thoory, ailmlttlnn

tt\o

of onv aUv»atlvM\ aa knowlnvj holnija, novortholoaa

Inihthl

t

than

ahlo,

at

loaat

a uhmo ailoquato

Tho iMnooptlv^n

fimmlat Ion for all of on» ahllltloa ami apptoho»\alona.

of phyalovil akllla avninoat
atrniJtv»ro

throv>ijl>

oil

thojnln la aijaln that of

a

f»v'«\-to

In onlor to
iw wl\loh oot taln pa\tli'v\lara aro aaalmllatoil

aohlovo ami to attoml to

a

laiuor

IHitontlal atrviotnto of phyaloal

anpiHo ovon

tho unmt

a>\it

wiMO woanlnufvh oohoroivoo

.

Tho

akllla la nonotloally ulvon na. Imt wo

ami
haalo of akllla only thnmuh onr own offorta

167

desires.

Skills are thus an achievement.

Within this effort there can

be seen both a practical effort which integrates random motions into

effective ones and an interpretative effort which transposes meaningless
feelings into meaningful ones.
xinspecifiable

.

This structure is in many ways

We are unaware of many of the particulars which

contribute to the focal whole:

some particulars are by their nature

subliminal; some participate only as they have been already assimilated

within other acts of integration; and some particulars, even those that
can be specified in themselves, are transformed by their integration
and, therefore, have a new meaning within the focal whole.

integration of the particulars is also unspecifiable
ways, a personal act of discovery.

,

The

It is, in many

Such integration cannot be

explicitly taught but involves for each one of us a logical jump, a

commitment to a new kind of moving or being, a way of existence we have

both made and discovered.

The process of assimilation and integration

is on-going, and as our skills grow

— as

we seek further coherence, what

was once focal becomes in turn itself assimilated.

The theory of tacit

knowledge suggests a hierarchical conception of physical skills

,

a

series of higher and higher integrations in which the whole body
to
participates in many ways and at many levels to interact with and

apprehend reality.

Skills are, therefore, not isolated.

New

physical skills, but
assimilations are integrated not only with existent
personal, intellectual and
also within the whole context of previous

cultural assimilations.

and
The dependence between our physical skills

our "higher" abilities is mutual.
the context of the other.

Each gains from and is formed within
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Physical skills are themselves comprehensive entities

made and discovered by ourselves.

,

ones both

Through the same processes by which

these entities were formed, they have the potential for further growth

and refinement, and thus a significance, and a potential for further
coherence, which ranges beyond our present knowledge of them.

The

coherence which skills seek to achieve is both within our bodies and

within the world; but more importantly it is a coherence between our
bodies and the world.

Just as we choose to accredit our perceptions and

believe that they reveal to us some aspect of reality, so we may choose
to accredit our physical skills and believe that this coherence also

reveals a meaningful aspect of reality.

Physical skills may thus be

thought to apprehend certain truths about ourselves, about the world,
and about our relationship to that world.

We may believe that physical

skills guide us to the apprehension of something real, and in many cases
to the apprehension of a reality having

apprehension of it

— that

tlie

same structure as our

is to a comprehensive entity, a whole of parts

whose significance ranges in ways perhaps unguessed by us beyond the

specifiable particulars or even beyond the presently visible outlines of
the whole

.

These apprehensions

— and

indeed the very formation and

fmctioning of our skills and ourselves— must rest finally on our own
self-accreditation:

in the last analysis we must commit ourselves, a-

and
critically and beyond our knowing, to these modes of being

apprehension.

for such
The structure of tacit knowing suggests a basis

to interaction with
belief, and we may reasonably assume that our from-

particulars which we assimilate
the world is not arbitrary, that the

integration of them— having
have some bearing on reality, and that our

.
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as it does the same kind of structure as do all human
integrations, and

being itself the foundation for many of our other already-accreditated
apprehensions

has at least a similar chance for the achievement of true

apprehens ion
The theory of tacit knowledge also provides a further basis for

our belief in the truth of these apprehensions.

The conception of

physical skills suggested by Polanyi's theory is not only that of a
from- to interaction with the world; it is also, what
a creative sharing of ourselves-

I

have called above,

The acquisition of physical skills is

not only an interiorization of various particulars; it is also an
extension of ourselves out into the world.

Physical skills are one of

our ways of being open to the world, and they can ultimately succeed
only to the extent that we give ourselves to being.

The action through

which we assimilate particulars to ourselves becomes also the passion
through which we give ourselves to being.
a self-surrender,

find ourselves.

Our self-integration becomes

and our self-surrender the process through which we
It is always, in some sense, we who do the

apprehending; and indeed we do experience ourselves as distinct from our
surroundings.

However, what Polanyi's theory finally suggests is that

we feel ourselves to be thus distinct because we have created or

achieved ourselves
skills.

— at

least in part

— through

the processes of our

Every hiaman being possesses, by genetic endowment, the capacity

for becoming a person; but our existence is not given us

achieve it.

rather we

By dwelling in our skills, we create ourselves.

A more

learning and
adequate conception of physical skills suggests that the
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^sfin0insnt of such skills is both a dsspcning of our own intsmal

coherence, and an expansion of our coherence within the world.
In the introduction to this dissertation, within the metaphor of

the interface,

I

suggested that physical skills might be conceived as a

precarious yet precise balance.

I

believe that within the conception of

physical skills here presented, this concept of balance may be seen to
have a certain validity.

Physical skills are achieved not only through

our efforts to appropriate and manipulate, but also through our desire
for surrender.

ourselves

—we

In dwelling in a skill, we sometimes rise up out of

are possessed.

This in-dwelling is again not an

abdication nor a meaningless surrender, but is rather a commitment of
ourselves to what we believe will be a truer reality.

We seek to extend

ourselves, to refine our skills, to achieve an ever more precarious yet

precise balance, with the hope that we may become both more truly

ourselves and more truly a part of the world.

The passion, the beauty,

the sense of grace which often visit us at such times may be a clue that

our efforts and desires are not in vain.

.
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